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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of the European Union's key policies, 
encouraging the development of the European agricultural economy, the catching-up 
of rural areas and the achievement of certain environmental and climate protection 
objectives through its diversified support system and market regulation instruments. 
CAP resources accounted for about 36% of the EU's 2018 budget. The most 
significant of the CAP subsidies are the so-called direct payments, which are 
generally available to farmers based on the size of their land or livestock. Direct 
payments are income transfer measures aimed at strengthening agricultural 
production, stabilizing farmers' incomes, contributing to the production of safe food 
and compensating farmers for the production of certain public goods (such as nature 
protection and landscape conservation). 
In the 2018 grant year, a total of € 41.74 billion of CAP direct aid was disbursed to 
6.38 million beneficiaries across Europe. These figures well reflect the importance of 
direct payments in the life of the European agricultural economy. The subsidies have 
also had a significant impact on agricultural activity in Hungary since the 2004 
accession. 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the economic effects of CAP direct 
payments in the European Union. It is important to emphasize that the research does 
not include an examination of the environmental, sustainability, food security and 
classic rural development objectives of the agricultural policy, but focuses on 
economic consequences in the traditional sense (e.g. analysis of income, production, 
productivity issues). My research is motivated by personal, practical and scientific 
reasons. As for personal reasons, I have been working on the implementation of CAP 
subsidies in Hungary as a government official at the Hungarian paying agency since 
2003. Accordingly, my interest in the effects of direct payments is natural. The 
topicality of the research is given by the fact that the forthcoming reform of the CAP 
is already underway, one of the important topics of which is the future of direct 
payments. At the heart of the research's scientific interest is the understanding of how 
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different economic policy instruments affect the operation of a given sector, as well 
as how they influence the economic decisions of the actors involved. 
The research focuses on the regional economic effects of direct payments in the 
European Union and how these effects are balanced in different parts of Europe. I am 
also interested in how the effects differ between old and new Member States. The 
basic assumption of my research is that direct subsidies increase regional agricultural 
income, have a positive effect on productivity and efficiency, and that they alleviate 
regional poverty and income inequalities. 
These hypotheses were tested by quantitative, ex-post impact analysis methods, 
which were based on NUTS2 regional data from 2008-2018. I chose the regional 
level as the basic unit of the applied quantitative models because it allows for a much 
more detailed level of research than examining aggregated data by country. Studies 
published on the subject so far most often include analyzes at Member State level; 
regional research is relatively rare or, if available, usually deals with comparative 
analysis of a small number of regions. The scientific relevance of the present 
research is reinforced by examining the economic impact of CAP direct payments 
through a comprehensive analysis of the vast majority of EU regions. 
In the second chapter following the introduction of the dissertation, I present the 
history of direct payments. This is followed by a third chapter with a detailed review 
of the literature, in which I summarize previous scientific research on the subject, 
grouped according to the different economic effects of direct subsidies. The fourth 
chapter contains the research questions, the hypotheses derived from them, the 
description of the data on which the analysis is based, and the methods used. The 
fifth chapter contains the results of the research, after which a summary concludes 
the doctoral dissertation. 
I would like to point out that the doctoral dissertation is a scientific work created 
within the framework of my individual research activities; what is stated in it cannot 
be linked in any way to my paying agency activities or be considered an official state 
position. 
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2. HISTORY OF CAP DIRECT PAYMENTS 
 
2.1 The birth of direct payments with the MacSharry reform 
 
The initial purpose of the CAP was the encouragement of significantly reduced 
agricultural production after World War II. In addition to organizing the unity of the 
internal market and taking uniform action against external market effects, the CAP 
aimed to achieve this through a system of guaranteed minimum prices (so-called 
intervention prices) on the main agricultural markets. Under this market mechanism, 
agricultural products were bought in by the European Community at the guaranteed 
minimum intervention price, so that the market price could not fall below this price 
level. Thanks to the operation of the intervention, the price level in the Community 
was able to remain permanently above world market prices, which greatly increased 
the supply of agricultural products, and accordingly the CAP successfully achieved 
its initial goal of expanding production (Jámbor and Mizik, 2014). 
The first problems arose in the 1970s, when production exceeded self-sufficiency 
levels and huge stocks of products under intervention began to accumulate. Prices 
kept artificially above world market prices have become increasingly difficult for the 
Community to finance. The intensification of production raised environmental 
concerns, and the global market crisis of the 1970s also did not have a positive effect 
on the public perception of the CAP. In addition, in the 1980s, external pressures on 
the agricultural policy increased among global competitors who did not approve of 
the impact of CAP protectionism on their trade positions. As a result, the CAP 
plunged into a crisis in the 1980s, which it sought to address by reducing intervention 
prices, maximizing CAP spending and introducing measures to limit agricultural 
production (i.e. the introduction of quotas), but these measures were only partially 
successful (Buday-Sántha, 2011). 
Thus, a fundamental reform of the CAP became inevitable by the early 1990s. The 
1992 MacSharry reform, named after the then Commissioner for Agriculture, 
brought innovations in several areas (Buday-Sántha, 2011): 
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• The reform significantly reduced the level of guaranteed intervention prices. 
The decrease was most spectacular in case of cereals (-30%) but was also 
significant for other products. 
• To compensate for the reduction in intervention prices, direct payments 
were introduced. Unlike the previous system, in which the amount of CAP 
aid depended on the quantity of crop delivered to intervention, the amount of 
aid was determined on the basis of the size of the agricultural land used for 
production and the number of animals farmed. In this sense, the introduction 
of direct payments was the first, albeit only partial, step of breaking the close 
link between subsidies and agricultural activity (i.e., decoupling from 
production) (Daugbjerg, 2003). Direct payments are non-repayable income 
transfer measures; the amount of aid becomes part of the farmer's general 
income. 
• The reform introduced a number of new accompanying measures, such as the 
agri-environmental program, which was designed to address the 
environmental and nature conservation problems arising from the increase in 
agricultural production. In addition, an early retirement scheme was 
introduced, which encouraged the generational change needed in agricultural 
production. These measures went already beyond the traditional objectives of 
the CAP. In addition, a support scheme for afforestation of agricultural land 
has been set up to curb overproduction. 
• The introduction of compulsory set-aside was also aimed at limiting 
agricultural output, according to which certain direct payments were granted 
to farmers only if 10% of their production area was withdrawn from 
production for a given year. In addition, there was an increased amount of 
support for livestock keepers who were engaged in extensive livestock 
farming. 
The amounts available for direct payments were calculated by determining the size 
of the production area (or livestock herd) and the reference yield by country, 
averaged over the years 1986 to 1990, excluding the highest and lowest values. The 
yield thus calculated had to be multiplied by the support rate set by the Union in 
EUR / tonne. As the reference yields in the Member States varied significantly, there 
were large differences in the aid intensities between countries. These disparities, 
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recorded in the 1990s, have been more or less maintained to this day by the system of 
direct payments, which creates significant competitive tensions in the Member States 
of the Union. The following figure illustrates the difference between the average 
annual direct payments per hectare of each Member State for the period 2014-2020. 
 
Figure 1. – Annual direct payment per Member State (EUR / hectare), 
2014-2020 average 
 
 
Source: Matthews, 2013 
 
The MacSharry reform successfully reduced the prices of some agricultural crops, 
therefore the demand increased for these products. As a result, fewer intervention 
purchases were required, and the accumulated crop stocks were reduced. The reform 
of the subsidy system was successful in addressing external trade pressures, with 
direct subsidies meeting the requirements of the Uruguay Round of GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations (Cunha and Swinbank, 2011). 
However, the amount spent on agricultural policy did not decrease; on the contrary, it 
increased because of the reform. The reason for this was that direct payments were in 
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principle intended to compensate farmers for the loss of income due to declining 
intervention prices, but the amount of aid was set so high that it significantly 
exceeded the savings due to reduced intervention. As market prices decreased to a 
lesser extent than intervention prices (Buckwell et al, 1997), farmers' incomes have 
risen significantly, but overproduction dropped only slightly, and the CAP became 
more complex and bureaucratic due to the many new types of support introduced. 
State bodies implementing agricultural policy began to exercise too much 
administrative control over farmers (Tangermann, 1998). 
 
2.2 Adjusting the CAP: The Agenda 2000 reform process 
 
The above-mentioned contradictions of the 1992 reform, the renewed external 
pressure induced by world market competitors after the expiry of the GATT 
agreements, and the approaching enlargement of the Union to the east made a further 
adjustment of the CAP by the turn of the millennium inevitable. This happened in 
1999, when the Heads of State and Government agreed on the exact content of the 
Agenda 2000 reform package in Berlin. The main achievement of the reform is the 
transformation of the CAP into two pillars: the existing competitiveness and market 
organization measures (intervention system, direct payments, and some market 
regulation instruments) formed the first pillar, while the emphasis on the 
multifunctional nature of agriculture was included in the second pillar. This included 
various environmental and nature protection instruments, measures to restructure 
agriculture, and subsidies to diversify agricultural activity (Serger, 2001). 
There have also been important changes in the way the first pillar works. Following 
the trends set by the MacSharry reform, intervention prices continued to fall, while 
the level of direct payments increased. Agenda 2000 measures for the main product 
lines developed as follows (Ackrill, 2000a): 
• In the case of arable crops, the intervention price for cereals was reduced by 
15% and, in parallel, the direct payment for cereals was increased by a similar 
amount (from EUR 54 / tonne to EUR 63 / tonne). The aid for oilseeds and 
flax was also fixed at this level, while the aid for protein crops received a 
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higher aid of EUR 72.5 / tonne. Although the set-aside obligation was to be 
abolished, it was included in the final agreement unchanged (at the 10% 
level). 
• In the beef sector, intervention prices fell by 20%, while direct payments rose 
at a bigger rate. The beef cattle premium has been increased from EUR 135 
per animal to 210 and the suckler cow premium has been increased from 150 
to 200. Moreover, a new slaughter premium was introduced, amounting to 
EUR 80 per head (for most animals). 
• In the dairy sector, the intervention price fell by 15% and quotas were slightly 
increased by 2%. Direct aid for milk was introduced, allowing producers to 
expect aid of around € 100 per dairy cow. 
It can be concluded that Agenda 2000 carried on the lines set by the MacSharry 
reform. The measures taken were a step in the right direction, with further reductions 
in intervention prices bringing intra-Union and world market prices closer together 
and preventing the accumulation of additional intervention stocks. In addition, with 
the introduction of the second pillar, it has taken the first steps towards making the 
support system multifunctional. At the same time, the reform did not solve the 
problem of the growing CAP budget. Direct payments cost more than could be saved 
by reducing intervention buying-in. During the reform process, several instruments 
were envisaged to reduce costs: degressivity (which then meant a gradual, year-to-
year reduction in direct payments); national co-financing (according to which part of 
the grants should have been provided from the Member States' budgets); and 
modulation (which at the time meant more targeted support for small farms). By the 
end of the negotiations, however, only modulation was included in the final 
agreement, but only on a voluntary basis (Ackrill, 2000b). Moreover, the 
protectionist nature of the CAP also persisted. Overall, the Agenda 2000 process did 
not bring about as much change in the area of direct payments as the MacSharry 
reform, but rather carried on the processes launched there, and it did not address the 
tensions of the support system. 
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2.3 The 2003 Fischler reform and decoupling 
 
The reform process, named after Commissioner Franz Fischler, originally started out 
as a mere mid-term review of the new Agenda 2000 measures, but ultimately led to 
the most significant reform of the CAP. The major change was due to the traditional 
criticisms of the CAP that had already been made (overspending, deteriorating 
competitiveness, external pressure on the world market, sustainability issues). 
Increasing external pressure presented itself in the form of The Doha Round of 
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, which aimed to reduce trade barriers 
worldwide, and accordingly highlighted some protectionist measures in the CAP 
(Swinbank and Daugbjerg, 2006). This was accompanied by new problems around 
the turn of the millennium: the enlargement of the Union to the East, and the loss of 
consumer confidence in the quality of European food due to the spread of infectious 
animal diseases. As a result of the latter, the CAP – perhaps for the first time in its 
existence – came under criticism not only from professionals and academics, but also 
from the wider public. 
The basic idea of the 2003 CAP reform is to separate (decouple) direct payments 
from production activities, according to which agricultural production is not a 
condition for the payment of subsidies anymore. If farmers comply with certain basic 
farming standards, they will receive the aid regardless of the production activity. The 
theoretical background of decoupling is that as a result, farmers will be able to make 
their production decisions on a purely market basis, they do not have to be influenced 
or distorted by the logic of subsidies. As a result, farmers can get rid of unnecessary, 
inefficient production activities that were previously maintained for the sole purpose 
of receiving support (Beard and Swinbank, 2001). In addition, due to the reduction of 
their market distorting effect, decoupled subsidies have also been much more 
favoured in the WTO negotiations, which greatly helped their acceptance by external 
trading partners. 
The Fischler reform implemented the decoupling of direct payments by introducing 
the Single Farm Payment (SFP). The support measure was later renamed Single 
Payment Scheme (SPS). The SFP replaced almost all forms of coupled direct aid that 
existed until then (but coupled subsidies could still be granted for certain agricultural 
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products). In the year of introduction, payment entitlements were allocated to each 
farm as a property right. To determine the number and value of payment 
entitlements, each Member State had three options (Kilian and Salhofer, 2008): 
• In the historical model, the number of entitlements of the holding was based 
on the average amount of land used by the holding (in hectares) in the 
reference period of a few years before the introduction. The total value of the 
holding's entitlements corresponded to the average value of previous aid 
received during the reference period. Thus, entitlements with different unit 
values were allocated to different holdings, in order to maintain the past 
distribution of support payments. 
• In the regional model, the number of entitlements was equal to the size of the 
land used in the year of introduction, while its value was calculated by 
aggregating the support of all farms in the region during the reference period 
and dividing it by the total area used in the region. As a result, equal payment 
entitlements were created for all farmers in a given region, which 
significantly rearranged the distribution of support compared to previous 
periods. 
• The hybrid model was created by combining the above-mentioned two 
solutions. Payment entitlements were divided into two components, one 
based on a historical basis and the other on a regional basis. 
Very few Member States opted for a purely regional allocation method, presumably 
due to the high degree of support redistribution, which would have raised sensitive 
policy issues. Accordingly, most countries voted in favour of historical or hybrid 
models. 
The essence of the SFP is that the payment entitlements have to be activated by 
agricultural land every year. The farm must have as many hectares of land as it has 
entitlements. For example, if a farm has 10 entitlements and 10 hectares of land, it 
will receive the value of all entitlements as support payment. However, if the land is 
reduced to 8 hectares for some reason, the farm will not be able to use the value of 
two entitlements. If the same farmer buys land in addition to his ten existing 
hectares, but does not buy payment entitlements with them, they will not receive 
direct support for the additional area. Payment entitlements can be transferred with or 
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without land, although part of the value of the entitlement transferred without land 
can be withheld by the state. Many Member States have made use of this possibility 
in order to avoid the appearance of “bare” land that is not eligible for support, and 
therefore its value and marketability declines (Popp, 2004). It should also be noted 
that instead of introducing the SFP, new Member States had the option of using a 
simpler, decoupled support scheme until 2010, with a single level of support for all 
farmers for their utilized agricultural area (Single Area Payment Scheme, SAPS). 
Almost all new Member States made use of this possibility. 
In addition to the establishment of the SFP, an achievement of the 2003 CAP reform 
was the mandatory introduction of cross-compliance. It is a set of conditions 
combining environmental, food safety, animal health and animal welfare 
requirements that farmers must comply with in order to receive the full amount of 
direct payments. There are two kinds of conditions: the Good Agricultural and 
Environmental Conditions (which is primarily a means of keeping the land in an 
agriculturally and environmentally acceptable state) and the Statutory Management 
Requirements (which set out animal health, food safety and nature conservation 
conditions). Direct payments to farmers who do not comply with the criteria are 
reduced or cancelled altogether (in the event of intentional non-compliance). In 
addition to cross-compliance, the reform introduced the modulation of support, 
whereby a small part of higher direct payments was withdrawn and the resources 
released were reallocated to the rural development pillar. Rural development was 
strengthened financially and supplemented by new measures (e.g. measures to 
support innovation and investment). In addition, the common market regulation of 
certain products was substantially redesigned and simplified (Swinnen, 2008). 
Overall, the Fischler reform transformed the system of direct payments most 
radically of all CAP reforms. Subsidies were decoupled from production, which 
increased the efficiency of agricultural production. Greater emphasis was placed on 
environmental and food safety issues, in line with the wishes of European citizens. In 
addition, the introduction of the SFP support system has met the main demands of 
WTO negotiating partners (Swinnen, 2010). Rural development policy was also 
reformed, setting new directions. 
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2.4 Mid-term review: the Health Check 
 
During the 2003 CAP reform, Member States agreed to review the functioning of the 
revised CAP in 2008. This process was called the Health Check, which led to further 
refinement and adjustment of the results of the Fischler reform. On the one hand, the 
number of sectors in which decoupling could be maintained while the SPS was 
operating decreased. Apart from the beef, sheep and goatmeat sectors, other coupled 
payments have been abolished and the resources allocated to them have been merged 
into the value of SPS payment entitlements. The reform introduced the so-called 
‘specific support’, to which Member States could allocate 10% of their direct support 
envelope. These subsidies were intended to help certain disadvantaged sectors, to 
improve the quality of agricultural products and to contribute to the payment of 
agricultural insurance premiums. The degree of modulation also changed, with 5% 
previously deducted from direct payments above € 5,000, rising to 10%. In addition, 
an additional 4% deduction was applied to payments above € 300,000 (progressive 
modulation). The amounts withdrawn under modulation were transferred to the Rural 
Development (II. pillar), the financial importance of which further increased within 
the CAP budget. In addition, the compulsory set-aside obligation, which has been in 
place since 1992, was abolished and the possibility of applying SAPS support to the 
new Member States was extended until 2013 (Meyn, 2008). 
The Health Check also made some changes outside the area of direct payments. The 
importance of the intervention buying-in system further diminished, with buying-in 
conditions significantly restricted or abolished altogether. Because of this, the system 
of guaranteed prices lost its importance in the tools of European agricultural policy 
after 2008. In addition, the volume of milk quotas was increased by 1% per year, 
with the aim of being completely phased out in 2015. The reform also simplified 
cross-compliance controls. Overall, the Health Check cannot be considered a 
fundamental reform of the CAP, but rather an interim review aimed at adapting EU 
agricultural policy to the changing economic and social environment (Henning, 
2008). This is reflected in the strengthening of the rural development pillar and the 
further reduction of some market-distorting measures. 
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2.5 The 2013 CAP reform 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of direct payments crystallized by the beginning of the 
2010s, when they had been in operation for 20 years. Direct payments raised farmers' 
incomes, effectively offsetting losses from the abolition of the intervention system. 
In addition, due to the gradual strengthening of decoupling, they had less and less 
market-distorting effects. Because of these aspects, they played an important role in 
supporting European agriculture. At the same time, critics of the policy have pointed 
out that direct payments were not sufficiently targeted and effective in the long run: 
they could not significantly affect the level of agricultural employment, there were 
serious disparities in the distribution of aid (large farms receive the majority of 
payments) and the transfer efficiency was low because a significant part of the 
payments do not go to farmers but to landowners and suppliers of other production 
factors. As the level of subsidies was determined by the size of the agricultural land 
used, land prices rose sharply. In addition, income stabilization could be more 
effectively supported by targeted measures (Swinnen, 2009). Accordingly, support 
policy was ripe for another reform, which took place in 2013, in line with the timing 
of EU budgetary cycles. 
The reform brought about changes of direct payments in the following areas (Anania 
and D’Andrea, 2015): 
• External convergence: it was agreed to reduce the differences in unit support 
intensities between Member States by reducing the direct aid budgets of 
countries with above-average support amounts year by year and reallocating 
the relevant amounts to countries below the EU average. 
• Internal convergence: in order to reduce the differences between the values of 
SPS payment entitlements (due to calculations based on a historical reference 
period), the values of entitlements have been approximated in year-by-year 
steps. Thus, the renewed SPS support (renamed the Basic Payment Scheme / 
BPS after the reform) eased tensions arising from the disproportionate 
payment of support. 
• Degressivity: Member States were required to reduce the part of the BPS 
payment above EUR 150,000 by at least 5% to alleviate the disproportions in 
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the distribution of aid. The amounts thus withdrawn were used to finance 
support for the rural development pillar. The rate of withdrawal has been 
determined differently in each country: from a minimum reduction of 5% to 
100% capping. 
• Greening: the reform introduced greening support into the system of direct 
payment, for which Member States have had to use 30% of their total direct 
payment envelope. Greening is a direct area payment: all farmers who receive 
a single basic area payment must also comply with the conditions for 
greening, in return for which they receive an additional amount of aid per 
hectare. Greening sets requirements for farmers in three main areas (Bureau 
et al, 2012). First, farmers must comply with certain crop diversification 
requirements. Farms with more than 10 hectares of arable land have to grow 
at least two different types of crops, while farms with more than 30 hectares 
of arable land must grow at least three. Secondly, farmers have to maintain 
permanent grassland; its proportion must not decrease compared to a national 
reference rate set when greening was introduced. Thirdly, producers with 
arable land larger than 15 hectares have to maintain Ecological Focus Areas 
(EFAs). These EFA elements are part of the ecological network or other areas 
beneficial for the climate or for the environment. They include fallow land, 
landscape features, water protection zones, agroforestry systems, forest edge 
areas, short rotation coppice, afforested agricultural areas, and areas sown 
with certain secondary or nitrogen fixing crops. Farmers must maintain EFA 
corresponding to 5% of their total arable land (as any combination of 
different elements of choice). If this ratio is violated, the amount of greening 
support is reduced proportionately (Szerletics, 2018a). 
• In addition to greening, support for young farmers has also become a 
mandatory element of direct payments, according to which producers under 
the age of 40 can expect an increased amount of area-based support. In 
addition, Member States could introduce the support scheme for small 
farmers, whereby beneficiaries can receive a maximum amount of aid of € 
1,250 per year, under simplified application and control conditions. The aim 
of the measure was clearly to simplify the implementation of the CAP. It was 
also an option for Member States to decide on the introduction of 
redistribution aid, which shifts payment amounts from larger farms to smaller 
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farms. Moreover, Member States have had the opportunity to grant support to 
areas with natural constraints. In addition, if the Member State so decided, 
15% of the direct support envelope could be paid to farmers in the form of 
coupled payments in certain agricultural sectors. 
• An active farmer condition was introduced to increase the transfer efficiency 
of direct payments. According to this, applicants who technically are entitled 
to receive direct payments through their land, but whose activities are mainly 
of a non-agricultural nature (e.g. airports, sports grounds, real estate 
development companies), are excluded from support. 
In addition to direct payments, the 2013 reform also brought changes to common 
market organizations. Measures related to the abolition of milk and sugar quotas 
were strengthened, support for producer groups was expanded, and a crisis fund was 
set up to mitigate the effects of market shocks. Rural development measures were 
organized into a Common Strategic Framework, the essence of which is that all EU 
financial funds (including those outside the field of agriculture and rural 
development) are managed according to a common set of rules and procedures. A 
number of simplification measures were also introduced, and the level of co-
financing was standardized in Pillar II. 
The following two figures present the financial weight and budget of direct 
payments. The financial weight of the CAP within the European Union (EU) budget 
is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – Proportion of CAP expenditure within the EU budget, 2018 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2020 
 
Direct payments account for the largest share of the CAP budget, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 – Components of the 2018 CAP budget 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2020 
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Based on this, we can conclude that about 26% of the total EU budget was spent on 
direct payments after the 2013 reform. There are a number of merits to the 2013 CAP 
reform: direct payments, perhaps for the first time since their inception, have moved 
towards achieving environmental goals. In addition, agricultural policy has placed 
greater emphasis on reducing the unequal distribution of aid. At the same time, 
critics of the reform say that these steps were taken in the good direction; however, 
their extent was not sufficient. The level of redistribution has not been ambitious 
enough, and the environmental conditions for greening have been too diluted by the 
political compromises made in the reform process. Consequently, farmers do not 
have to restructure their farming practices to any great extent in order to meet 
support expectations. According to some analyzes, the reform sought to reconcile the 
interests of the farmers' lobby (to maintain the level of direct support), the growing 
environmental expectations and the views of economic experts (on the greater 
targeting of the support system). While the reform was successful in the first aspect, 
the implementation of the other two aspects was far from successful (Swinnen, 
2015). 
The history of direct payments, in the light of each CAP reform, is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 – Evolution of direct payments in light of CAP reforms 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
2.6 The future of the CAP: the forthcoming reform 
 
The forthcoming CAP reform is already underway (Szerletics, 2018b). In early 2017, 
the Commission conducted a wide-ranging public consultation with various actors in 
the sector, the results of which were presented at a conference in July 2017. This was 
followed in November by a communication on the new CAP, in which the 
Commission outlined its strategic vision for the future of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. The draft Commission regulation was made public in early June 2018 and 
already contains detailed information on how the future CAP will work. An 
agreement on the future rules of the CAP was reached in the Council in October 
2020, which is going to be followed by consultations with the European Parliament 
as part of the co-decision process. Final agreement on the agricultural policy is 
planned to be reached in the first half of 2021. 
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An important innovation of the post-2021 CAP is that the details of the program are 
determined by the Member States, who draw up their own country-specific CAP 
strategic plans. Programming was already used in the field of rural development 
before 2020, but it is a new phenomenon in terms of direct payments. The strategic 
plans leave more freedom to the Member States in developing the CAP toolbox, as 
well as the possibility to adapt the CAP to local conditions to a greater extent. The 
draft Commission legislation describes in detail exactly what elements the strategic 
plans should cover as a minimum (European Commission, 2018): 
• SWOT analysis should be performed separately for each of the specific 
objectives of the CAP; 
• an intervention strategy must be developed, i.e. monitoring indicators have to 
be established and target values have to be set, specific support measures 
have to be designed; 
• a description of the common regulatory elements for different support 
measures; 
• a description of various support instruments, detailing the territorial and 
individual scope of each aid scheme, the eligibility criteria for the support, 
the planned aid intensity; 
• a plan should be drawn up to achieve the target value of the monitoring 
indicators, which contains the various target values in tabular form, and sets 
milestones in annual breakdown in order to gradually achieve the targets; 
• the national institutional context for the implementation of the CAP has to be 
outlined, with particular reference to the division of the various functions 
required by Community law; 
• a separate chapter should be devoted to explaining how the implementation of 
the CAP Strategic Plan will contribute to the modernization of agriculture, 
highlighting the importance of knowledge transfer and innovation and the 
digitalisation of agriculture. 
Under the draft regulations on the future of the CAP, direct payments will continue 
beyond 2020 in the form of decoupled and coupled payments. The scope of the 
planned decoupled measures is as follows (European Commission, 2018): 
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• Basic Income Sustainability Support: a fixed amount per hectare for 
agricultural land, conditional not on production but on maintaining the area in 
good condition (successor to the BPS / SAPS support). 
• Complementary redistributive income support: used to reallocate support 
from large farms to small and medium-sized farms by providing additional 
support amounts for a limited amount of eligible land on the farms. This way, 
smaller farms can achieve higher aid intensities. 
• Complementary income support for young farmers: additional support to 
young farmers starting their agricultural activity in excess of the basic 
payment. 
• Support scheme for environment and climate protection: farmers who 
undertake additional obligations in the field of environment and climate 
protection can receive additional aid in the form of an area-based support 
premium. 
Community agricultural policy continues to be fundamentally based on direct 
payments, despite the fact that there has already been a great deal of criticism in the 
scientific literature for conserving existing structures and distributing aid unequally 
between beneficiaries (Severini and Tantari, 2013a). The draft regulations outline a 
direct support system with a structure very similar to the 2013 reform, whereby the 
main income distribution principles remain unchanged. However, due to increased 
subsidiarity, it will be the responsibility of Member States to ensure that a more 
targeted direct support system is set up in the next programming period.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CAP DIRECT 
PAYMENTS 
 
3.1 Identification of relevant research items 
 
It is worth starting the study of the effects of direct payments with a systematic 
literature review to find out who has already dealt with the topic, what methods have 
been used and what results have been achieved. In the Web of Science and Scopus 
databases, I used the words “direct” “support” and “impact” as a joint search. These 
words had to appear in the title, abstract, or between keywords. I was only looking 
for articles published in English, but I didn't apply further restrictive conditions 
during the search. 
This search returned 1119 items in total. After having filtered out duplicates, 725 
items were left. After reading the abstracts of these articles, I started processing them 
systematically. By the end of the process, after a reading of the title and abstracts, 
and the reading of the remaining research material in full, I found that 150 articles 
were specifically about the economic effects of the CAP direct payments. 
I found it very important to be strict and consistent in my selection. A great many 
articles have been written on a topic which deals only tangentially with direct 
payments, but not with their effects. There were also many general agricultural 
policy reflections on the impacts and challenges expected, but these were not in the 
focus of my search either. There have also been many articles on describing the 
reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, which I also did not consider to be 
relevant for this part of my research. In addition, there were articles in the search 
results that did not specifically address economic, but rather environmental or 
sustainability impacts; these were also not part of my research topics. The entire 
selection process is presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 – Number of literature items on the effects of direct payments 
 
 
  
Source: own composition 
 
3.2 Main features of the reviewed scientific literature 
 
The distribution of the reviewed research items by year of publication is shown in 
Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 – Year of publication of reviewed research articles 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
The figure above shows that the studies in the literature review are relatively recent, 
with their rounded average and median also falling to 2012. Moreover, the highest 
number of studies was published this year (14). Interest in the topic was lower in the 
early 2000s (one article was written on the topic in 2000, 2001, and 2005). Overall, 
the figure is a good reflection of the ongoing scientific interest in the topic, especially 
in the period from 2006 to the present. This also confirms the scientific relevance of 
my dissertation. 
The distribution of the literature items by analyzed countries is shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 – Member States analyzed by the reviewed research articles 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
The variance in the number of countries examined is not particularly large, due to the 
fact that a significant part of the articles contains findings for all Member States or 
for a larger group of Member States. An average of 35 articles deal with a given 
country (of course, it should be borne in mind that an article may deal with several 
Member States). Interest in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France was 
particularly high in the articles examined, but the number of Hungarian analyzes was 
also above average. Based on all this, it can be said that the studies included in the 
literature review provide a balanced, complete picture of all the Member States of the 
European Union. 
I coded the relevant literature research according to the economic effects they 
analyzed. For each article reviewed, I noted the economic implications of direct 
support covered by that article. During the coding of the various economic effects, I 
did not have predefined categories, i.e. the classification was completely open. When 
I processed half of the literature items, I reviewed the categories, consolidated them, 
filtered out duplications, and continued the process accordingly. After reviewing all 
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literature items, I repeated this step (Mayring, 2000). The finalized categories of the 
reviewed literature are shown in Figure 8. 
  
Figure 8 – Categorization of reviewed studies based on economic impacts 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
The distribution of reviewed articles among the above topics is shown in Figure 9: 
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Figure 9 – Number of reviewed articles by the analyzed economic effects 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
The rest of this chapter presents the main findings of the studies reviewed according 
to the categories above. 
 
3.3 Impact of direct payments on agricultural incomes 
 
3.3.1 Subsidy effects on agricultural income 
 
CAP direct payments are income-type subsidies by nature. This is especially true in 
case of decoupled payments, where the support is only loosely linked to actual 
production activities (although they are still linked to one of the production factors, 
i.e. agricultural land). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that direct payments are 
generally considered to raise gross farm incomes. This is reflected in the study of 
Boysen et al (2016), who analysed the impact of the 2003 CAP reform on, inter alia, 
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Irish farmers’ income by applying a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model 
on Irish farm data. CGE models in a general allow for analyzes that seek to predict, 
based on specific economic data, how the economy would respond to changes in 
technology, economic policy, or other external factors. The authors found that 
besides small GDP gains, more efficient and targeted direct payments would increase 
farmers’ real income by 7% in the medium and 10% in the long run. 
Ciaian et al. (2015) also investigated the income effects of coupled direct payments, 
the single payment scheme and rural development programme. By using a large set 
of cross-country farm level data between 1999 and 2007, the authors found that 
farmers gained 66–72%, 77–82% and 93–109% income from these programmes, 
respectively. This means that there is a sizeable positive income effect of direct 
payments. On the other hand, rural development support seems to be more efficient 
in income transmission in this sense. This result is in line with the Commission’s 
intention to shift the CAP from a production based to a rural development and public 
goods based policy. 
Income effects of direct payments were also studied in new Member States. Nková et 
al (2009) studied the utilization of direct payments in the Slovak Republic after the 
2003 CAP reform. Using industry reports, information from the Paying Agency and 
other sources, the authors made a comparative study of direct payments before and 
after the country’s EU accession. It was found that there was a significant increase in 
the level of subsidies after joining the EU, whereby Slovakia opted for the use of the 
Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS), which is a decoupled basic income payment. 
To compensate for the phasing-in mechanism, Slovakia decided to apply 
complementary national payments for certain sectors of the agriculture. As a result, 
Slovakian farmers could access funds that were 53.1% of the average funding in old 
Member States in 2004. The incrementally growing subsidies in the phasing-in 
period had a positive effect on agricultural income. 
Kozar et al (2006) examined different CAP policy options after the accession of 
Slovenia, and their effects on agricultural income. A survey was carried out with 120 
farmers for the year 2001, and on this basis a static deterministic total income model 
was utilized on different scenarios: a baseline pre-accession scenario from 2001; a 
post-accession scenario with coupled payments from before the 2003 reform; a 
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scenario with flat-rate decoupled payments (SAPS); with regionalized decoupled 
payments differentiated for arable land and permanent grassland (SPS); a scenario 
with SPS complemented by certain coupled payments. It was found that the overall 
farm income situation would improve under all post-accession scenarios. 
In another study in this topic, Fragoso et al. (2011) analyzed the economic effects of 
the CAP on the Alentejo region of Portugal by applying a positive mathematical 
supply model and concluded that agricultural income increased with Single Farm 
Payments (though foreseen price increases did not compensate the loss of the 
Agenda 2000 area payments with regards to competitiveness). 
Galluzzo (2016, 2018a) also found positive effects of the CAP on farms income in 
Slovenia and Romania, respectively, especially in less favoured rural areas, by 
applying SEM models on FADN data over 2007 and 2015. Galluzzo (2018b) reached 
similar conclusions when analysing the role of CAP in Irish farm income by applying 
multiple regression model and DEA analysis on Irish FADN data.  
The relevant articles on the effects of direct payments on income are summarized in 
table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Income effects of direct payments 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Boysen et al 
(2016) 
Impact of CAP on 
Irish farmers’ 
income 
Ireland CGE model applied 
on Irish farm data 
Direct payments have a 
positive effect on farm 
income, but they could be 
better targeted. 
Ciaian et al. 
(2015) 
Income effect of 
various CAP 
subsidies 
Several 
Member 
States 
Analysis of cross-
country farm level 
data from 1999-
2007 
Positive income effect of 
direct payments, the 
efficiency of income 
transfer could be improved. 
Nková et al 
(2009) 
Effect of 
introducing the 
CAP in Slovakia 
Slovakia Comparative study 
(pre/post-accession) 
Direct payments raised 
agricultural incomes 
following the EU-
accession. 
Kozar et al 
(2006) 
Comparative 
study of post-
accession 
scenarios 
Slovenia Static deterministic 
total income model 
Overall farm income 
situation improved after the 
EU accession. 
Frogoso et al. 
(2011) 
CAP economic 
effects in Portugal 
Portugal Positive 
mathematical supply 
model 
Directs payments increased 
income, though not 
necessarily 
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competitiveness. 
Galluzzo 
(2016) 
CAP income 
effects on less 
favoured areas 
Slovenia Structural equation 
model 
Positive effect of CAP on 
farm income. 
Galluzzo 
(2018a) 
CAP income 
effects on less 
favoured areas 
Romania Structural equation 
model 
Positive effect of CAP on 
farm income. 
Galluzzo 
(2018b) 
Farm income 
analysis 
Ireland Multiple regression 
model 
Positive effect of CAP on 
farm income. 
Source: own composition 
 
It can be stated that all relevant articles found a positive relationship between direct 
payments and farm income levels. Income subsidies by nature, direct payments raise 
the income of agricultural producers, although there are some doubts as to the 
efficiency of this income transfer. A few studies suggest that direct payments should 
be better targeted in order to have more impact on raising agricultural income. 
Furthermore, direct payments were able to improve the income situation of farms in 
new Member States after their EU accession. 
 
3.3.2 The effect of direct payments on income distribution 
 
The uneven distribution of direct payments among beneficiaries has been a much 
debated subject by policy-makers, farmers and the general public alike. This is also 
reflected in the scientific literature, which analyzes the income distributional effect 
of direct payments extensively. The question here is not whether the subsidies have a 
positive effect on income, but rather if they are distributed in a justifiable way (so 
that the result is economically reasonable, and socially acceptable). 
3.3.2.1 External convergence 
 
One of the main criticisms concerning CAP direct payments that they do not allocate 
financial resources equally between Member States. This is due to many historic 
reasons. As a result, a few countries (particularly the Baltic States) receive 
substantially lower unit amount of payments than the EU-average. To alleviate this 
situation, a so-called external convergence procedure needs to be put in place, 
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whereby support intensity differences are eliminated or reduced. Volkov et al. 
(2019a) state that the unit value of direct payments (i.e. euro per hectare or euro per 
animal) is significantly lower in the new Member States than in the old Member 
States. From time to time, the European Commission attempts to reduce these 
inequalities in its legislative proposals on the CAP, but the study argues that these 
measures are not sufficient to achieve true convergence between Member States. The 
authors propose an alternative way of allocating direct payment amounts, based on 
production cost ratios. Based on Eurostat data from 2014-2016, the cost of producing 
agricultural commodities with a value of 1 euro was calculated for all Member 
States. Where the costs are higher, a higher amount of direct payments should be 
allocated, according to the study (although this raises questions of competitiveness). 
The method would result in a major restructuring of direct payments, with the Baltic 
States, Slovakia and Finland receiving significantly higher amounts of direct support, 
while Malta, Greece, Cyprus, and the Netherlands receiving significantly lower 
amounts. 
Rumanovska (2016) examined the same question on the example of Slovakia, by 
looking at the effects of the 2014-2020 CAP reform on the Slovakian agricultural 
sector. Despite the policy efforts on converging the level of support per hectare, 
Slovakian farmers were still less intensively subsidized than their counterparts in 
several Member States. Because of this, the author argues that CAP direct payments 
should be much more in favour of less productive regions – this is the only way for 
the CAP to reach its economic and social goals throughout the EU. 
Furthermore, Ackrill (2003) showed that direct payments should be reduced if all 
Member States wanted to receive the same level of payments. By using a CAPCEE 
(CAP Central-Eastern Europe) model based on 1995-1999 data, the author called for 
a change in the system of direct payments to be financially fair and socially equal. 
(The entry of new Member States after the publishing of the article probably further 
nuanced the picture of external convergence.) 
Erjavec et al. (2011) took a different approach to the same problem, by investigating 
the possibility to introduce an EU-wide flat area payment system and their impacts. 
Using the AGMEMOD 2020 (Agricultural Member State Modelling) combined 
model, the authors concluded that some minor negative impacts on production would 
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occur, though impacts varied by sector, an especially beef turned out to be an 
exception. AGMEMOD is a dynamic, partial equilibrium model that makes medium-
term forecasts for agricultural production, productivity, prices, market supply, and 
other economic factors. In any case, the introduction of a single level of support 
would greatly redistribute CAP resources between Member States (and, of course, 
between individual beneficiaries), thus making a significant contribution to 
alleviating inequalities in support levels between countries. 
The focus of the study of Gocht et al (2013) was similar. They investigated farm-type 
effects of an EU-wide decoupled payment harmonisation by using different scenarios 
in the CAPRI model. The CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regionalized 
Impact) model is a partial static equilibrium model for ex-ante impact assessments. 
In the scenario where equalised per-hectare rates are given inside each Member State 
together with a partial harmonisation of the SPS, new Member States were found to 
gain and old Member States to lose, implying a serious redistribution of existing 
payments. 
The study of the accession procedure of Member States in 2004 yielded further result 
in the topic of external convergence. For a period after their accession, new Member 
States did not immediately have access to the level of direct payments of old 
Member States; instead, support amounts started out from a reduced level (25%) and 
were increased year-by-year until it reached 100% (phasing-in). To compensate for 
this, new Member States could introduce complementary direct payments financed 
by the national budget. Rednak et al (2003) analyzed the potential effects of phasing-
in on farm income by utilizing the extended economic account for agriculture (EAA) 
model and a partial equilibrium sector model. It was found by both models that the 
reduced amount of direct payments (even when complemented by national funds) is 
simply not sufficient to compensate for the expected drop in agricultural prices after 
accession; therefore a significant decrease in farm income would be likely to take 
place. The authors argued that new Member States should have been able to access 
100% of direct payments directly after accession, in order to prevent deterioration in 
important agricultural sectors. From this finding we can also conclude that external 
convergence procedures were hindered by the phasing-in mechanism put in place. 
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Rancheva et al (2012) studied the impact of the CAP on Bulgarian farm development 
through a survey completed by 65 experts on agriculture. The participants had to 
rank the perceived effect of different aspects of the CAP on main economic 
indicators like income, competitiveness, market orientation and employment. The 
results were then analyzed by statistical methods to identify rank correlations, 
concordance coefficients and to check their significance. It was found that the most 
significant effect of the CAP was the improvement of competitiveness of farms. The 
experts pointed out that the CAP can only be effective if simplification of procedures 
and the increase of the amount of direct payments were to take place in the future. 
This also hints at the need for further effort in converging payment levels among 
different regions in Europe. 
3.3.2.2 Internal convergence 
 
An old criticism concerning CAP payments is that 20% of the beneficiaries get 80% 
of the total funds spent on agriculture. Direct payments are highly concentrated; the 
majority of the payment amount is collected by a few large-scale producers. The 
situation was not alleviated by the accession of new Member States, either. During 
the recent history of the CAP, a number of attempts have been made at the internal 
convergence of payments, but these instruments seem to have had only partial results 
so far. The highly skewed distribution of payments hinders desirable structural 
change processes, limits the efficiency of income transfer and constitutes a sensitive 
social issue which is not only a subject of scientific enquiry, but also of often 
emerging public criticism. 
Trnková et al (2012) analyzed the distribution of the economic results of 140 Czech 
arable farms in the period 2005-2010, and the effect of CAP subsidies on the 
inequalities of economic results. The quantification of inequalities was performed 
with the utilization of the Gini coefficient, the effect of subsidies was measured 
through calculating its elasticity.  
The Gini coefficient is intended to show the degree of variance of a variable, usually 
used in economics for income inequality calculations. The results show a high level 
of inequality of economic results across the farms in question. CAP support did not 
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appear to have a significant redistributive effect on economic result, therefore failing 
to reach its objective in this respect. 
Other studies have also shown the limits of the CAP concerning the achievement of a 
fairer distribution of funds. Severini et al. (2015b) examined the distribution of direct 
payments among farmers in different Member States. Data was drawn from the 
Commission publication on all payments of direct support from 2005 to 2010, as 
well as Eurostat structural farm data. Concentration ratios were then regressed 
against policy, structural and economic variables (like labour intensity, gross output 
per hectare of land, intensity of decoupling, model of SPS utilized in given Member 
State etc). It was found that the concentration of direct payments is very 
heterogeneous among Member States, and it can reach very high levels in some of 
them. Payment concentration is mainly driven by land concentration, and it does not 
seem to be in correlation with direct payment policy choices. Therefore, the available 
policy tools (for example, level of decoupling and other measures) could not affect 
the distribution of funds in a significant way. 
Allanson (2006) arrived at a similar conclusion concerning the redistributive effects 
of the Common Agricultural Policy on Scottish farm incomes, by measuring 
differences of the Gini-coefficients of pre-support and post-support incomes on farm 
survey data. Results suggest that the distribution of support in 1999/2000 in Scotland 
was regressive with respect to pre-support farm incomes. Consequently, direct 
payments were ineffective and inefficient as redistributive instruments because of the 
re-ranking of farms. The decoupling of payments can be a much better instrument in 
this regard, according to the author. 
Some studies focused on the introduction of direct payments into the toolkit of the 
CAP.  Keeney (2000) analyzed the distributional effects of the MacSharry reform on 
income of Irish farmers. The Gini Coefficient was decomposed by different 
components of income, based on national farm survey data from 1992 to 1996. It was 
found that direct payments introduced by the MacSharry reform had a small but 
beneficial effect on the distribution of farm income in Ireland, in a sense that they 
channelled more funds towards less well-off farms (compared to previous CAP 
market interventions). The share of market income reduced, but it was still the largest 
single income component in the study period. Although the distribution of farm 
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income became a little bit less asymmetric with the introduction of direct payments, 
the situation was far from settled (the top three deciles of farms received more than 
98% of market incomes). To tackle issue of disproportional incomes, a more targeted 
payment system would be called for. 
Deppermann et al. (2016) took a different approach. The authors used an ex-ante 
policy model to analyse the redistributive effects of CAP liberalisation and found 
that the abolishment of the main components of the CAP, including direct payments, 
resulted in a more unequal distribution of income in relative terms but a more equal 
distribution of income in absolute terms. These results call for more targeted policy 
instruments, according to the authors. 
Spatial analysis of direct payment distribution also yielded interesting results. 
Bonfiglio et al (2016) analysed the distributional effects of CAP payments by 
applying a multiregional input-output model on the European space and found that 
CAP expenditure redistributes its effects towards richer and urban regions, though 
the magnitude largely depends on intersectoral and interregional linkages. This is 
contrary to the basic goal of the CAP to support and develop rural regions and 
economies. 
Decoupling and further reforms 
From the above-mentioned studies, the conclusion can be drawn that direct payments 
have no or low income redistributive effect. But does the situation change with the 
decoupling of direct payments and further reforms of the CAP? Relevant studies 
present that the income effect in this case is ambiguous, or its magnitude is small, 
therefore it could not solve the distributional problems associated with CAP direct 
support. 
For example, Viaggi et al. (2010) investigated the effect of the decoupling of CAP 
direct payments on farm income and investment. It was found that decoupling can 
have a negative or a positive effect on income, depending on the variable reactions of 
different farms to decoupling. Furthermore, Ahmadi et al. (2015) analysed the 
impacts of greening and found that changes in the CAP had no major impact on the 
net margins of Scottish beef and sheep farmers. By using an optimising farm-level 
43 
 
model, they also showed that all farm types analysed were better off by adopting new 
greening measures than not qualifying for the green payments. 
The income effects were also found to be ambiguous in case of the study conducted 
by Gelan and Schwarz (2008), who analysed the effects of the decoupled Single 
Farm Payment on Scottish farms by using a CGE modelling framework. A special 
emphasis was put on farms characterised by low productivity because of 
unfavourable natural conditions. Results suggest that decoupling affected farms from 
least favoured areas (LFA) negatively and non-LFA farms positively. This is 
contrary to the cohesion and environmental goals of the CAP, which aim at the 
heavier subsidization of marginal areas. 
Rednak et al (2006a and 2006b) studied the redistributive effect of the 2003 CAP 
reform on farm income in Slovenia. They utilized a static deterministic model on a 
large sample of farms, comparing the income distribution of the pre-2003 period to 
different options set out by the 2003 CAP reform. The results showed that the 
introduction of a fully lump-sum decoupled payment would cause a significant drop 
in payments for 23% of the farms. Since these farms had been paid nearly half of all 
direct payments before the reform, this would clearly be a sensitive issue. Moreover, 
the negative effects would be concentrated in the beef and milk sectors. To alleviate 
the negative redistributive effects, the Member State should make use of the partial 
coupling options of the reform, introduce the new decoupled schemes gradually over 
time, or opt for a mixed-model of decoupling whereby a part of the amount of 
payments is determined by the farm subsidy level of a past reference period. 
The study conducted by Solazzo et al (2014) on the 2013 reform of the CAP yielded 
somewhat similar results concerning the Italian tomato sector. The impact of 
dividing direct payments into a basic support and a greening component was 
analyzed, with a focus on convergence of payments and the possible effects of 
greening on production decisions of farms. They analyzed data from Italian tomato 
farms, using Positive Mathematical Programming methodology to run different 
scenarios. They found that greening – as proposed originally by the Commission – 
could have a major impact on production by significantly reducing cereal production 
and agricultural income. The version proposed by the Council (which prevailed later 
on) would only have minor impact. Later criticism of the greening instrument often 
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pointed this out as a shortcoming of the policy in the field of environmental 
protection and climate change. The study furthermore found that tomato farms would 
not change their land use conditions, but the convergence of basic payments would 
cause reducing levels of income in the sector. 
Ciliberti and Frascarelli (2018) analysed the redistributive effects of decoupled 
payments and their impacts on farm income in Italy by using a model based on 
Italian FADN data from 2014 to 2020. The FADN is a network through which 
sample economic data on agricultural production units are collected in all Member 
States. Results suggest that CAP reform somewhat decreases the concentration of 
direct payments. However, the reform is also expected to generally limit the 
reduction in farm income inequality. 
Regionalization and convergence of basic payments 
Another policy tool to tackle income distributional problems is the (somewhat 
misleadingly) so-called regionalization of the Single/Basic Payment Scheme. In the 
course of the 2003 decoupling, Member States could opt for different models of the 
Single Payment Scheme (the basic direct income support to farmers). Under the 
historic model, payment entitlements for individual farmers were fixed based on the 
amount of support received in a previous reference period. The utilization of this 
payment model led to disproportionate differences in the levels of payment of 
different farmers. Under subsequent policy reforms, the Commission therefore 
sought to review the allocation of payment entitlements in order to converge 
payment amounts towards a uniform intensity. A move towards the equally 
distributed regional model of SPS (whereby payment entitlements are equal for the 
whole region or country) is basically beneficial in this regard, as documented by 
Severini and Tantari (2013a and 2013b), who examined the effects of the 2013 CAP 
reform on income distribution. Their most important finding was that the regional 
implementation of the Single Payment Scheme seems to lower the level of 
concentration of direct payments and household income, as opposed to the so-called 
historic model (whereby previous years’ reference data served as a basis for the 
calculation of support amounts). On the other hand, converging payments involves 
reallocation of funds between regions and sectors, which lead to tensions and may 
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contradict other policy goals. Therefore, the convergence of payment entitlements 
has been a rather slow-going process in a number of Member States. 
Convergence of payments can move the focus of the CAP to less intensive sectors. 
Matthews et al (2013) set up a spatial analysis framework from both biophysical and 
socio-economic data to model the effects of CAP policy changes on Scottish farms. 
The focus of the study was on the possibility of Member States to depart from the 
former, historic entitlement-based direct payments towards a flat-rate area payment 
in the course of the 2013 reform. The analysis showed that such a move would result 
in smaller income gains for a large number of farms, while a few farms would be 
negatively affected to a high extent. Crops with a high significance in the agri-food 
industry (cereals, dairy, and livestock) would experience reduced amounts of 
support. Generally, funds would be redistributed from intensively managed farms to 
extensive holdings, a fact worthy of the attention of policy-makers. This change 
would also occur at the regional level, shifting the focus from the Southern areas 
with more serious agricultural production to the Northern areas. 
Vosough Ahmadi et al (2015) arrived at similar conclusions. They examined the 
possible impacts of the 2013 reform of direct payments, particularly the 
regionalization of the basic payment scheme. The study used data on 247 Scottish 
cattle on sheep farms, which were analysed by an optimizing linear programming 
farm level model. It was found that moving from a payment scheme based on historic 
payment entitlements to a regional flat-rate payment decreased the net margins of 
most farm types, except for extensive sheep farms (those were unfavourably affected 
by the previous historic model). The regionalization of payment had a much more 
important impact on farm margins than the introduction of greening, which did not 
affect farms fundamentally. 
Convergence of payments can put certain agricultural subsectors in an unfavourable 
position. Instead of fixing payment entitlements for farms based on a previous 
reference period (whereby the payment intensity differs for individual farms), the 
Health Check proposed to converge the level of individual payments to a uniform per 
hectare amount. Roselli et al (2009) studied the possible effects of such an 
approximation process on the olive growers of Apulia province in Italy. The authors 
set up a simulation of farm economic balance, which was based on representative 
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olive-growing farms. The data was gathered from official statistics and a structured 
survey conducted in the region. Based on this, olive growers were classified into 
representative categories. Three policy scenarios were analysed: no changes in 
payments, 50% approximation of payments, and 100% convergence of payments. 
The results showed that maintaining the status quo would be the best scenario for 
olive farmers, while a total convergence of payments would cause significant income 
losses, especially for middle-sized farms and farms located in the most productive 
areas. 
Kozar et al (2006) also identified undesired side-effects in connection with 
regionalization. In their study, they found that the SPS regionalization scenarios were 
characterised by strong redistribution effect towards less intensive farms, and 
therefore deemed to be an economically risky instrument. 
Chatellier (2004) analysed the impacts of the 2003 CAP reform on French farms by 
using own simulations on FADN data and found that regionalisation without a 
transitional period would decrease farmers’ income specialised in field crops and 
those located in diversified areas (beef, sheep or extensive dairy production). 
Modulation 
During the Health Check process, it was agreed that direct payments over EUR 5000 
would be reduced by 10%, and payments above EUR 300 000 would be reduced by 
further 4 percentage points. The corresponding amounts would be transferred to the 
second pillar to fund rural development measures. The so-called modulation seems to 
have had a beneficial effect in terms of uniform distribution of payments, but the 
magnitude of the effect could only be called slight at best. Moreover, starting from 
the 2014-2020 budget cycle, Member States have been given the option of 
redistributing 15% of CAP resources from Pillar I to Pillar II. and vice versa. With 
this option, the redistributive effect of modulation between pillars has been 
substantially eliminated by several Member States. 
Medonos et al (2009) made an ex-ante impact assessment of the compulsory 
modulation of direct payments in the Czech Republic. Based on data on support 
amounts from the Czech paying agency, the authors modelled the possible effects of 
modulation, taking certain regional aspects also into consideration. The results 
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showed that modulation would have a significant effect on direct payment levels, 
mainly because of the large average size of Czech farms. Mountainous regions with 
grasslands, environmentally sensitive areas and a high share of family farms were 
least affected by modulation, while agricultural landscapes with large corporate 
farms were more heavily influenced. On the whole, modulation could be a good tool 
to channel funds from direct payments to more targeted rural development measures, 
but its effects could in practice be limited by the artificial splitting-up of farms to 
avoid reduction of support. 
A further study on modulation by Sinabell et al. (2013) examined the distribution of 
direct payments in 27 Member States of the EU from 2000 to 2010. On a basis of 
statistical data on subsidy amounts in different EU-countries, they calculated 
different indicators of distribution (mean/median ratio, concentration ratio, Lorenz 
curve, Gini index). Based on the results, the concentration of direct payments is high 
in Malta, Slovakia, Portugal and the Czech Republic and it is low in Luxembourg, 
Finland, Ireland and Slovenia. It was expected that the concentration would decrease 
in the studied period, because of the decoupling of direct payments and the 
introduction of modulation. Contrary to this, the study failed to find a definite pattern 
for the change in the distribution of payments (in some countries it increased, while 
in others it decreased). It seems that the dynamics of distribution issues is highly 
country-specific, and is not sufficiently influenced by modulation measures. 
Further articles reinforce this finding. Severini et al. (2015a) examined inequalities in 
the distribution of support by analyzing a large sample (9722 units) of Italian family 
farms from the FADN in 2011 with Gini index decomposition by income source. It 
was found that direct payments can somewhat mitigate the unequal distribution of 
funds, and particularly modulation can be a beneficial instrument in this regard, 
although its effects are limited by relative low financial weight it represents. 
Transferring funds between direct payments and rural development, however, does 
not influence the concentration of support (contrary to the beliefs voiced in this 
regard). The article also points out that a uniform approach to the subject may not be 
correct, because significant differences were found between plains, hill and mountain 
farms’ subsamples. 
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Capping 
From 2013, the Commission attempted to alleviate the inequalities by introducing a 
compulsory reduction of certain high-amount direct payments. Furthermore, Member 
States have the option to put in place an absolute threshold (cap), beyond which no 
payment can be made to the beneficiary concerned. Szerletics (2018) examined 
whether the results of capping are in line with the original goals of the CAP, based 
on data on Hungarian beneficiaries. It was found that capping often leads to artificial 
splitting of large farms, which prevents the desired redistributive effects to take 
place. On the other hand, capping may have an adverse effect on competitiveness and 
productivity. Therefore, the future utilization of capping instruments has to be 
carefully evaluated in this regard. 
In a study on the same subject, Sahrbacher et al (2012) examined the possible effect 
of capping by using a spatial-dynamic agent-based model of structural change and 
policy response on a study region in East Germany dominated by large farms. In the 
model, individual farm decisions are simulated as a response to policy change. Two 
scenarios were implemented and then compared (a reference scenario and a scenario 
with capping). The results showed that capping causes far a smaller redistribution 
effect than expected by policy-makers. Furthermore, in the long run it causes losses 
in profits that are far greater than the redistributed amount ‘gained’. Capping can be a 
burden on the growth of the most efficient farms, may cause intra-sectoral distortions 
and promote inefficient but labour-intensive production. The latter effect is partly 
due to the fact that the agricultural wages can be deducted by the beneficiaries from 
the amount of aid on which the reduction is based (in those Member States where 
this option is used). 
Redistributive payment 
The 2013 reform of the CAP gave Member States the option to introduce a 
redistributive payment, whereby direct payment funds are reallocated from large 
farms towards smaller ones. Severini et al. (2014) analyzed Italian FADN data from 
2011 on all individual farms. They defined different measures of concentration, and 
looked at their decomposition by income types. It was found that redistributive 
payments may help in reducing inequalities (because they allocate higher amounts of 
support to relatively smaller farms). On the other hand, defining a ‘strong’ active 
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farmer condition (whereby many previous beneficiaries would be excluded from 
payment) usually increases concentration and contributes to further inequalities. 
Potori et al (2013) were more critical on the subject of redistributive payments. They 
examined the implications of the 2013 CAP reform, particularly the economic effects 
of the redistributive payment and the capping of payments. These can be considered 
as somewhat overlapping policy tools, because both aim at redistributing funds from 
larger enterprises towards smaller ones. The authors presented six policy scenarios, 
in which redistribution and capping is used to a different extent. These scenarios 
were then modelled in an agent-based simulation, using subsidy data from the 
Hungarian paying agency and the FADN. The evidence coming from the model 
suggested that the application of capping can be preferable compared to 
redistributive payment, because the latter draws funds away not only from bigger 
farms, but also middle-sized family enterprises. Furthermore, the simulation did not 
show any considerable restructuring effect of the redistributive payment on farms’ 
arable production or livestock farming. 
Hansen and Offermann (2016) examined the effect of the 2013 CAP reform on the 
distribution of direct payments among beneficiaries. By analyzing the components of 
the Gini-index and other concentration indices based on FADN data on German 
farms, they found that the introduction of the so-called redistributive payment 
(whereby funds are directed towards beneficiaries with fewer hectares at the cost of 
large-area farms) did decrease the inequalities in the distribution of direct payments, 
but it could only marginally influence income inequalities. This is mainly due to the 
limited budget allocated to redistributive payment in Germany. The simulations also 
showed, however, that if the full budget was utilized for this instrument, the 
distribution of income would only slightly improve. The reason for this is probably 
the limited correlation between size of agricultural area and income level of a farm. 
Therefore the redistributive payment is not a very efficient tool for redistributing 
income. 
The reviewed articles analyzing the income distributional effects of direct payments 
are summarized in table 2. 
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Table 2 – Effect of direct payments on income distribution 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Volkov et al. 
(2019a) 
Differing CAP 
amounts in 
Member States 
All 
Member 
States 
Analysis of support 
amounts and 
production cost 
ratios 
Subsidy amount differ 
significantly among 
Member States. Less 
productive/efficient 
regions should receive 
more CAP funds. 
Rumanovska 
(2016) 
CAP payment 
levels 
Slovakia Analysis of support 
amounts in light of 
the 2013 CAP 
reform 
CAP direct support is still 
significantly lower in 
Slovakia, despite the 
conversion efforts. Less 
advance economies 
should receive more aid. 
Ackrill (2003) Equalization of 
CAP payments 
among Member 
States 
New 
Member 
States 
CAPCEE model 
based on 1995-
1999 data 
If all countries were to 
receive the same unit 
amount of direct support, 
overall payment levels 
would have to be reduced. 
Erjavec et al. 
(2011) 
Introduction of 
EU-wide flat-rate 
payment 
All 
Member 
States 
AGMEMOD 2020 
combined model 
The introduction of an 
EU-wide flat-rate 
payment would 
significantly reduce 
differences in support 
levels, but result in a 
significant change in 
budget allocation between 
Member States. 
Gocht et al 
(2013) 
EU-wide 
decoupled 
payment 
harmonisation 
All 
Member 
States 
Comparison of 
different policy 
scenarios in the 
CAPRI model 
Conversion of payment 
levels causes a serious 
redistribution in budget 
allocation between old 
and new Member States. 
Rednak et al 
(2003) 
Analysis of 
payment levels 
after the EU-
accession 
Slovenia Extended economic 
account for 
agriculture (EAA) 
model and a partial 
equilibrium sector 
model 
The gradual increase of 
direct payments in new 
Member States (phasing-
in) hindered external 
convergence processes for 
a period after the 
accession. 
Rancheva et al 
(2012) 
Economic effects 
of CAP in 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria Agricultural survey Increase of direct 
payments of Bulgarian 
farms is called for, in 
order for the CAP to be 
able to reach its economic 
goals. 
Trnková et al 
(2012) 
Distribution of 
economic results 
of Czech arable 
farms 
Czech 
Republic 
Analysis of Gini-
coefficient 
elasticity 
CAP support did not 
appear to have a 
significant redistributive 
effect. 
Severini et al. 
(2015b) 
Distribution of 
direct payments 
among 
beneficiaries  
Several 
Member 
States 
Analysis of 
payment 
concentration ratios 
Concentration of direct 
payments is high; it is not 
influenced by the policy 
in a beneficial way. 
Allanson 
(2006) 
Distribution of 
CAP support 
Scotland Comparison of 
pre/post-support 
Direct payments were 
inefficient as income 
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Gini-indices redistributive instruments. 
Keeney 
(2000) 
Income 
distributional 
effects of the 
MacSharry 
reform 
Ireland Decomposition of 
Gini-coefficient 
The distribution of farm 
income became a little bit 
less asymmetric with the 
introduction of direct 
payments, but it still 
remained heavily 
concentrated. 
Deppermann 
et al. (2016) 
Redistributive 
effects of CAP 
liberalisation 
Germany Ex-ante policy 
model 
The abolishment of direct 
payments resulted in a 
more unequal distribution 
of income in relative 
terms but a more equal 
distribution of income in 
absolute terms.  
Bonfiglio et al 
(2016) 
Spatial analysis 
of distributional 
effects of CAP 
All 
Member 
States 
Multiregional 
input-output model 
CAP expenditure 
redistributes its effects 
towards richer and urban 
regions, though the 
magnitude largely 
depends on inter-sectoral 
and interregional linkages. 
Viaggi et al. 
(2010) 
Effect of the 
decoupling of 
CAP direct 
payments on 
farm income 
Several 
Member 
States 
Dynamic multi-
objective 
household model 
Decoupling can have a 
negative or a positive 
effect on income, 
depending on the variable 
reactions of different 
farms to decoupling. 
Ahmadi et al. 
(2015) 
Impacts of the 
introduction of 
greening 
Scotland Optimising farm-
level model 
Changes in the CAP had 
no major impact on the 
net margins of Scottish 
beef and sheep farmers. 
Gelan and 
Schwarz 
(2008) 
Effect of the 
Single Farm 
Payment on 
Scottish farms 
Scotland CGE modelling 
framework 
Results suggest that 
decoupling affected farms 
from least favoured areas 
(LFA) negatively and 
non-LFA farms 
positively. 
Rednak et al 
(2006a and 
2006b) 
Redistributive 
effect of the 2003 
CAP reform on 
farm income 
Slovenia Static deterministic 
model on pre- and 
post-reform policy 
scenarios 
Introduction of a fully 
lump-sum decoupled 
payment would cause a 
significant drop in 
payments. 
Solazzo et al 
(2014) 
Effect of the 
2013 CAP reform 
Italy Positive 
Mathematical 
Programming 
The convergence of basic 
payments causes reducing 
levels of income in the 
sector. 
Ciliberti and 
Frascarelli 
(2018) 
Redistributive 
effects of 
decoupled 
payments on 
farm income 
Italy Own model based 
on panel (FADN) 
data 
The 2013 CAP reform 
somewhat decreases the 
concentration of direct 
payments but it also limits 
the reduction in farm 
income inequality. 
Severini and 
Tantari (2013a 
and 2013b) 
The effects of the 
2013 CAP reform 
on income 
distribution 
Italy Gini-coefficient 
decomposition 
The regionalization of the 
Single Payment Scheme 
seems to lower the level 
of concentration of direct 
payments and household 
income. 
Matthews et al The effect of Scotland Biophysical and Converging basic 
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(2013) regionalization of 
basic payments 
during the 2013 
reform 
socio-economic 
spatial analysis 
framework 
payment amounts does 
have an equalizing effect 
on farm income 
distribution. Income is 
redirected from 
intensively managed 
farms to extensive 
holdings. 
Vosough 
Ahmadi et al 
(2015) 
Possible impacts 
of the 2013 
reform of direct 
payments 
Scotland Optimizing linear 
programming farm-
level model 
Regionalization helped in 
achieving a fairer 
distribution of income, 
but decreased the net 
margins of most farm 
types, except for 
extensive sheep farms. 
Roselli et al 
(2009) 
The effect of 
regionalization 
during the Health 
Check 
Italy Farm economic 
balance simulation 
A total convergence of 
payments would cause 
significant income losses 
for certain subsectors. 
Kozar et al 
(2006) 
SPS 
regionalization 
scenarios 
Slovenia Static deterministic 
total income model 
SPS regionalization has a 
strong redistribution 
effect towards less 
intensive farms. 
Chatellier 
(2004) 
Impact of 2003 
reform on French 
farms 
France Own simulations 
applied on FADN 
data 
Regionalisation without a 
transitional period would 
decrease farmers’ income 
specialised in field crops 
and those located in 
diversified areas. 
Medonos et al 
(2009) 
Modelling the 
effects of 
compulsory 
modulation 
Czech 
Republic 
Ex-ante impact 
assessment 
Modulation could be a 
good tool to redistribute 
CAP payments, but its 
effects could be limited 
by the artificial splitting-
up of farms to avoid 
reduction of support. 
Sinabell et al. 
(2013) 
Analysis of the 
distribution of 
direct payments 
All 
Member 
States 
Indicators of 
distribution 
(mean/median 
ratio, concentration 
ratio, Lorenz curve, 
Gini index) 
Concentration of direct 
payments is high in 
several Member States. It 
was not influenced by the 
introduction of 
modulation in any definite 
manner. 
Severini et al. 
(2015a) 
Inequalities in the 
distribution of 
direct support 
Italy Gini index 
decomposition by 
income source 
Modulation mitigates 
inequalities of income 
distribution, but its effects 
are limited. 
Szerletics 
(2018) 
Analysis of the 
maximum 
threshold of 
direct payments 
(capping) 
Hungary Analysis of support 
application data 
Capping often leads to 
artificial splitting of large 
farms, which prevents the 
desired redistributive 
effects to take place. 
Sahrbacher et 
al (2012) 
Possible effect of 
capping 
Germany Spatial-dynamic 
agent-based model 
of structural 
change 
Capping results in smaller 
redistribution effect than 
expected, and in the long 
run it causes losses in 
profits. 
Severini et al. 
(2014) 
Analysis of 
redistributive 
payment 
Italy Decomposition of 
different 
concentration 
Redistributive payments 
may help in reducing 
inequalities, because they 
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indices allocate higher amounts to 
smaller farms. 
Potori et al 
(2013) 
Economic effects 
of capping and 
redistributive 
payment 
Hungary Agent-based 
simulation on 
FADN data 
Redistributive payment 
draws funds away not 
only from bigger farms, 
but also middle-sized 
family enterprises. The 
simulation did not show 
any considerable 
restructuring effect of the 
redistributive payment. 
Hansen and 
Offermann 
(2016) 
Effect of the 
2013 reform on 
income 
distribution 
Germany Analysis of the 
components of 
concentration 
indices 
Redistributive payment 
decreased the inequalities 
in the distribution of 
direct payments, but it can 
only marginally influence 
income inequalities. 
Source: own composition 
 
The extensive scientific literature on the distributional issues concerning direct 
payments has identified several study aspects of the problem. One such aspect is the 
uneven allocation of CAP funds among Member States and regions, and the efforts 
to reduce or eliminate the differences (external convergence). Studies established that 
there are significant differences in the unit amount of direct payments among 
Member States (certain new Member States receive below-than-average payment 
amounts). The total elimination of such differences would result in serious budget 
reallocation between countries, which is a politically sensitive issue, therefore the 
convergence procedure moves forward slowly. The elimination of differences in 
support level was hindered by the phasing-in mechanism in certain new Member 
States. 
Another aspect of income distribution is the disproportionate allocation of direct 
payments between farmers of a given country. Almost all relevant articles 
established that the concentration of direct payments can reach very high levels in 
several Member States. Consequently, CAP support has none or very low income 
redistributive effect. 
The third studied aspect is the so-called internal convergence procedure, whereby the 
policymakers tried to alleviate the unfavourable income distributional situation by 
introducing a wide range of new policy tools: 
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• Decoupling in itself has had no major income effect, or its effect varies from 
sector to sector, therefore in itself it could not solve the problems associated 
with disproportionate support amounts; 
• Regionalization of the basic direct payment (SPS/BPS), on the other hand, is 
an effective tool in reallocating subsidy funds in the desired direction. 
However, it comes with certain unwanted side-effects: it may cause serious 
budget tensions, and may shift funds towards less intensive sectors, raising 
questions of competiveness. In addition, it is able to correct inequalities in 
income transfer within a region, but it does not have a positive effect between 
regions; 
• Modulation was also beneficial in remedying income distribution problems, 
but its effects were limited in practice by the relatively low financial weight it 
represented, and the artificial splitting-up of farms in order to avoid 
modulation; 
• The same could be stated about redistributive payment; 
• Capping has had a far smaller redistributive effect than expected; the reason 
for this was also the artificial splitting-up of farms. 
To sum it up, the internal convergence procedure was partially successful in reaching 
a more equal income distribution among farmers, but the problem is far from settled. 
 
3.3.3 The effect of direct payments on income stabilization 
 
As a relatively stable source of financial support, direct payments are generally 
expected to reduce fluctuations in agricultural incomes. In practice, research has 
failed to confirm this supposed theoretical effect of direct support on a number of 
occasions. Severini et al (2017) made a study into the income stabilizing effect of 
direct payments. Being a relatively stable source of revenue, direct payments aim at 
reducing the variability of agricultural incomes. The article analyzed balanced panel 
data on Italian farms from the period 2003-2012, with non-linear regression 
techniques in order to measure the effects of direct payments, farm size, 
specialization, labour intensity and other factors on income variability. The results 
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show that on each subsample direct payments increased (and not reduced) income 
variability. This may be the case because direct payments reduce the risk farmers 
perceive and prompts them to engage in riskier activities. All in all, direct payments 
are not that effective in stabilizing agricultural income. Moreover, they partially 
collide with the risk management instruments of the CAP, reducing their basis and 
efficiency. 
In a similar study the authors (Severini et al, 2016) analyzed the data of all Italian 
farms in FADN from 2003 to 2012, with mean of variance decomposition by income 
components. The results show that income variability is high in the agricultural 
sector, particularly in case of smaller farms. The main source of variability comes 
from the revenue component. In contrast to this, subsidies are stable parts of 
agricultural income. However, direct payments do little to reduce the volatility of 
other income components, and their effect is highly dependent on farm size. Because 
of this, the targeting of direct payments is not efficient in terms of income 
stabilization.  
Linking the level of direct payments to the market situation could be a solution to the 
problem, but it raises a number of political and practical problems. 
Bojnec and Ferto (2019) arrived at a similar conclusion. They analysed the role of 
direct payments in stabilising Hungarian and Slovenian farmers’ income and by 
applying a panel regression model on national FADN data, the found that although 
direct payments represented a stable source of income, they had limited 
countercyclical role. These subsidies were not found to be well-targeted and thus 
inefficient in stabilising farm income. 
Further study on the subject was performed by Judez et al (2001), who analyzed the 
possible effects of the „Agenda 2000” reform of CAP on arable and beef producers 
with Positive Mathematical Programming methods in the study region of Navarra, 
Spain. The model considered three different size categories of farms both in the 
arable and the beef sector. The results showed that the increase of unit values (euro 
per hectare, euro per animal) of direct payments proposed by the reform is not 
sufficient to compensate the drop in prices assumed by the model. Therefore, the 
revenues of farmers were likely to drop after the reform took place. The authors 
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speculate that the fluctuations of income may somewhat be reduced because of the 
subsidies, but revenues following market conditions are not sufficiently affected. 
As researchers realized the limited effects of direct payments on income 
stabilization, they also came up with alternative policy tools. Möllmann et al (2019) 
explored the possibility of substituting the income stabilization effect of direct 
payments with subsidized agricultural insurance. A survey was conducted among 
German farmers to measure their willingness to pay for agricultural insurance in a 
scenario where direct payments would be significantly reduced. The focus of the 
study was on whole-farm income insurance, and single-crop revenue insurance, 
which were considered to be more cost-effective than simple yield insurance. A 
generalized multinomial logit model was applied on the gathered data, whose results 
showed a positive willingness to pay for subsidized agricultural influence, even if 
direct payments were abolished (in order to finance insurance premiums). Farmers 
would pay more for whole-farm insurance than for single-crop insurance; publicly 
administered insurance policies would be more popular compared to those of the 
private sector; insurance with broader coverage would also be more sought after. The 
results suggest that insurance subsidies could be used to offer an alternative to direct 
payments in agriculture, although whether the farmers’ expected payments could 
cover the costs of such insurances still remains to be seen. In addition, market-
based insurers do not currently typically provide general insurance covering all 
agricultural risks, so some level of public involvement would continue to be needed. 
The reviewed articles analyzing the income stabilization effects of direct payments 
are summarized in table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Effects of direct payments on income stabilization 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Severini et al 
(2017) 
Income 
stabilizing effect 
of direct 
payments 
Italy Non-linear 
regression 
techniques 
Direct payments increased 
(and not reduced) income 
variability. 
Severini et al Farm income 
components 
Italy Variance 
decomposition by 
Direct payments are stable 
parts of agricultural 
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(2016) analysis income components income, but they do little 
to reduce the volatility of 
other income components. 
The targeting of direct 
payments is not efficient in 
terms of income 
stabilization. 
Bojnec and 
Ferto (2019) 
Income 
stabilizing effect 
of direct 
payments 
Hungary 
and 
Slovenia 
Panel regression 
methods 
Direct payments 
represented a stable source 
of income, they had limited 
countercyclical role. 
Judez et al 
(2001) 
Effects of 
Agenda 2000 
Spain Positive 
Mathematical 
Programming 
The fluctuations of income 
may somewhat be reduced 
because of the subsidies, 
but revenues following 
market conditions are not 
sufficiently affected. 
Möllmann et 
al (2019) 
Substituting 
direct payments 
with subsidized 
agricultural 
insurance 
Germany Generalized 
multinomial logit 
model 
Insurance subsidies could 
be used to offer an 
alternative to direct 
payments in agriculture. 
Source: own composition 
 
Based on the review of the relevant articles, we can state that while direct payments 
constitute a stable part of agricultural income, they have little influence over other 
income components; therefore they have little income stabilization effect. More 
targeted support is called for in this matter, which specifically aims at mitigating 
risks (insurance premiums, mutual funds, income stabilization tools). 
 
3.4 The effect of direct payments on production 
 
3.4.1 Subsidy effects on production 
 
The reviewed articles usually measure the effect of direct payments in an indirect 
way: how production would be affected if payments were abolished, or significantly 
reduced. Based on these calculations, most studies established that direct payments 
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have a positive effect on agricultural production, but there is no consensus as to the 
magnitude of this effect. 
Some articles detect a major production effect of direct payments. Bednarikova and 
Doucha (2009) analysed the impacts of different policy scenarios related to 
decreasing the amount of direct payments in two Czech districts by using a CGE 
model. Generally the authors found that even a slight decline in direct payments had 
negative impacts to the local economy – GDP losses, adverse social impacts and 
employment loss. 
In another example from Romania, Jitea et al (2011) explored various policy 
scenarios prior to the 2013 reform of the CAP. Data was collected from 21 mixed 
livestock farms from Cluj county, Romania in 2010-2011, which was then used in a 
programming model under different policy scenarios (status quo; reformed direct 
payments with greening element; abolishment of support). The results showed that 
the greater the change in policy, the bigger losses the sector has to bear in terms of 
average gross margin. The smallest farms would be hardest hit by the reduction of 
payments. 
Furthermore, Barnes et al. (2016) analysed Scottish livestock farmers’ intentions 
towards future food production regarding past CAP reforms and found that most 
farmers desired to continue business as usual even if payments were about to 
increase. Under the declining payments scenario, however, 9% of the farmers would 
exit the industry and around half of them would decrease herd size and intensity. Past 
reforms were found to be significant determinants of future farm decisions. 
Other articles found that while direct payments probably encourage agricultural 
production, this effect is slight (because the abolishment of payments would not lead 
to significant losses in production). Kozar et al (2012) explored policy effects related 
to restructuring and development. The authors performed a scenario analysis by the 
CAPRI model to explore likely effects of possible CAP reforms. A baseline scenario 
(the continuation of CAP direct payments as introduced by the Health Check) was 
compared with a reform scenario, in which all coupled support was abolished, the 
amount of direct payments was cut by half, and the Single Farm Payment was 
allocated on flat-rate basis in all Member States, corrected for purchasing power 
disparities between regions. It was found that there would be an overall 9% drop in 
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agricultural gross value added in case of the reform scenario. The reduction in 
agricultural income varies by Member State and region, by the share of directs 
payments in agricultural income, intensity of production and the sector concerned. 
Beef and suckler cow breeding would be affected more, because of the abolishment 
of coupled payments that these sectors are highly dependent upon. The conclusion of 
the article was that even a radical cut and modification of direct payments would not 
cause a drastic drop in overall agricultural production. 
Chantreuil et al. (2013) investigated the effects of different direct payment policy 
scenarios on agricultural markets in the New Member States (NMS) by applying 
AGMEMOD’s dynamic partial equilibrium models and found that the reduction or 
abolishment of direct payments would not result in any dramatic medium-term 
changes to agricultural markets of the NMS by 2020, calling for future CAP reform. 
Erjavec and Salputra (2011) conducted a similar study, where they used the 
AGMEMOD 2020 model to analyse the impacts of different direct payment policy 
scenarios on agricultural markets in the New Member States (NMS). Results suggest 
that the preservation of pre-2013 policy would have increased production quantities 
in NMS except for dairy and beef. More interestingly, the decrease or abolishment of 
direct payments was not found to have any dramatic medium-term changes in NMS 
agricultural markets. 
Espinosa et al. (2014) reached similar conclusions when analysing a 30% reduction 
in direct payments together with an introduction of an EU-wide flat rate payment. By 
applying a recursive dynamic regional CGE model, results here suggest that overall 
GDP effects are not significant, though agricultural sector impacts are important and 
differ according to the nature of the policy shock. 
The scientific literature seems to establish that production effect of direct payments 
varies from sector to sector. While certain products, regions or group of farmers 
would not be heavily affected by the elimination of direct payments, some other 
vulnerable sectors would be harder hit. These sectors have particularly grown 
dependent on direct support, without which they could not respond to market 
challenges anymore. The reasons for this are manifold: they are partly due to former 
subsidy structures or policy choices, dire market conditions in certain sectors, or the 
absence of restructuring that would have been necessary. For example, Uthes et al 
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(2011) analyzed the possible outcome of the elimination of direct payments with the 
aid of both quantitative and qualitative methods in four different European regions 
from Denmark, Germany, Italy and Poland. The main message of the study is that the 
effects differ widely across regions. Areas less suited to agricultural production, with 
unfavourable marketing structures and a higher dependency on direct support are 
affected most negatively by the abolishment of CAP payments (German region). 
Regions that have a competitive agricultural sector, where the share of CAP support 
is not so high (Denmark), or where the agriculture is highly diversified (Italy) are not 
affected so badly. Direct support can stabilize the economies in transition (Polish 
region), which is a desirable effect, but in the long run they can conserve existing 
structures and thus hinder further restructuring and development. 
These finding were partly confirmed by Vosough Ahmadi et al (2015), who also 
found in their study on Scottish cattle and sheep farms that more diversified farms 
(keeping both cattle and sheep) would respond better to a theoretical abolishment of 
payments than specialized farms (that were too dependent on the financial support). 
With a view to the possibility of decreasing CAP funding after 2020, Lehtonen and 
Niemi (2018) analysed the potential effects of a drastic reduction in subsidies. The 
non-linear optimisation-based Dynamic Regional Sector Model of Finnish 
Agriculture (DREMFIA) was used to evaluate different policy scenarios, taking into 
account aggregate and regional effects as well. The south of Finland is mainly 
oriented towards cereal production; a reduction of CAP decoupled aid here would 
result in a significant (20-25%) drop of agricultural income. Central and northern 
Finland, on the other hand, would not be so sensitive to cutting decoupled aid, but 
the loss of coupled support in the cattle and milk sectors would lead to serious 
economic problems. These sectors have been dependent on coupled aid since the 
early 2000s, which were effective in maintaining the status quo and keeping the 
market situation stable but could not initiate any restructuring which would be sorely 
needed for the long-term competitiveness of dairy and cattle farms. 
Another example of a sector where direct payments hinder restructuring is provided 
by Jitea et al (2015), who assessed the possible impacts of the 2013 reform of the 
CAP in the North-Western NUTS2 (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) of 
Romania. The Positive Mathematical Programming model was utilized on data 
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collected from 207 mixed-sheep farms on the basis of a structured survey delivered 
through face-to-face interviews by individual farmers. A baseline scenario was 
compared to different reform scenarios, with different levels of total Pillar I financial 
allocation and share of coupled support. The results showed a decrease in utilized 
permanent grasslands and number of livestock, especially by small, extensive farms 
with high nature value pastures. Their vulnerability is grounded in the fact that these 
farms are typically the most dependent on direct payments (the share of Pillar I 
support in their total income is highest in their case). These negative effects can be 
counteracted by increasing targeted agri-environment payments, by diversification of 
activities, or by seeking off-farm employment. 
Coupled support granted to specific sectors can also lead to high dependency on 
financial aid. Hanrahan et al (2012) utilized the AGMEMOD model to make 
projections on possible CAP reform scenarios. AGMEMOD is a dynamic, partial 
equilibrium, multi-product modelling system. A ten-year simulation is produced with 
the model in a baseline scenario (policy status quo as per the Health Check in 2008), 
which is then compared to a policy reform scenario, where all coupled support is 
abolished and the differing direct payment systems across Member States are 
substituted by a flat-rate, 100 Euro/hectare decoupled payment. The results showed 
that in this case wheat production would fall by 2,1% in the EU; the drop would be 
more significant in Member States where arable production is not very widespread, 
and where the change would constitute a larger drop in subsidy levels (mainly old 
Member States). The impact on beef production would be more articulate, whereby a 
5% decrease in production was foreseen. The negative change is greater in countries 
that have previously granted coupled support to the beef sector in the baseline 
scenario (which would then be foregone in the reform scenario). This suggests that 
higher dependency on subsidies leads to vulnerabilities in a given sector. 
The dependency on direct support can reach high levels in certain examples (where 
the market situation became extremely unfavourable or economic structures became 
obsolete), where entire sectors are sustained solely by CAP direct payments. In these 
cases, subsidy is vital for the continued production in those sectors, but also has the 
unwanted side-effect of slowing much-needed transformation processes down in 
farms whose activities sometimes are barely viable in economic terms. In such cases, 
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the question arises as to whether production should be artificially maintained or how 
producers could be encouraged to engage in economically sustainable activities. 
To demonstrate this, Rezbova et al (2012) studied the effects of Complementary 
National Direct Payments on the cattle breeding sector in the Czech Republic. To 
compensate for the phasing-in process (whereby the amount of direct payments in 
new Member States only gradually reached the level of support in old Member 
States), new Member States were allowed to make complementary payments for 
certain sectors. By analysing data for the period 2007-2012 of the Czech Paying 
Agency, Statistical Office and various breeding organizations, the authors studied the 
link between support and various index numbers characterizing the cattle breeding 
sector. The results showed that the costs were higher than the revenues in the dairy 
sector, a deficit which should be compensated through financial support. Taking into 
account the level of Complementary National Direct Payments, as well as the 
indirect effect of area-based direct payments, it can be said that dairy production was 
just about self-sufficient in the study period. The situation is not so grave in the 
suckler cow sector, where the number of animals was gradually rising. Further 
growth can be obtained by restructuring the production and a more targeted support 
system. 
A much-debated subject concerning the CAP is the subsidization of the European 
tobacco-growing sector. Manos et al (2010) analysed different decoupling scenarios 
of direct payments made to the tobacco sector in for important Spanish and Greek 
production regions. For the purposes of the study, a multicriteria mathematical 
programming model was developed, and an extensive survey was performed in the 
study regions for the period 2000-2005. The results showed that each study region 
would react slightly differently to the decoupling of tobacco aid, due to variations in 
the percentage of tobacco cultivated in each region, the alternative crop suggested 
and other factors. It was found, however, that in all study regions tobacco production 
would be discontinued if the support was fully decoupled. Decoupling would have a 
slight negative effect on farmers’ income, a more profound negative impact on rural 
employment. From an environmental point of view, decoupling of sectoral support 
would be beneficial, as agricultural pollution would decrease in all study regions. To 
remedy the short- and medium-term negative social impact of decreasing tobacco 
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production, the study of alternative crops should be given more attention (the stevia 
plant looks most promising in this aspect). 
The reviewed articles analyzing the production effects of direct payments are 
summarized in table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Effects of direct payments on agricultural production 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Bednarikova 
and Doucha 
(2009) 
Analysis of 
decreasing direct 
payment scenarios 
Czech 
Republic 
CGE model Even a slight decline in 
direct payments had 
negative impact on 
economic activities. 
Jitea et al 
(2011) 
Analysis of 2013 
CAP reform 
scenarios 
Romania Programming model The greater the change in 
policy, the bigger losses 
the sector has to bear in 
terms of average gross 
margin. 
Barnes et al. 
(2016) 
Farmers’ 
intentions related 
to CAP reforms 
Scotland Multinomial logistic 
regression 
Under the declining 
payments scenario, 
however, 9% of the 
farmers would exit the 
industry and around half 
of them would decrease 
herd size and intensity 
Kozar et al 
(2012) 
Policy scenario 
analysis 
All 
Member 
States 
CAPRI model Even a radical cut and 
modification of direct 
payments would not cause 
a drastic drop in overall 
agricultural production. 
Chantreuil et 
al. (2013) 
Effect of different 
policy options 
New 
Member 
States 
AGMEMOD 
dynamic partial 
equilibrium model 
The reduction or 
abolishment of direct 
payments would not result 
in any dramatic medium-
term changes to 
agricultural markets of 
new Member States. 
Erjavec and 
Salputra 
(2011) 
Policy impact 
assessment in new 
Member States 
New 
Member 
States 
AGMEMOD 
dynamic partial 
equilibrium model 
Reduction in direct 
payment levels would not 
cause drastic changes in 
agricultural markets. 
Espinosa et al. 
(2014) 
Analysis of a 30% 
reduction in direct 
payments together 
with an 
introduction of an 
EU-wide flat rate 
payment 
All 
Member 
States 
Recursive, dynamic 
regional CGE 
model. 
Overall GDP effects are 
not significant, though 
agricultural sector impacts 
are important and differ 
according to the nature of 
the policy shock. 
Uthes et al 
(2011) 
Possible outcome 
of the elimination 
of direct payments 
Several 
Member 
States 
Mixed-method 
approach 
Areas less suited to 
agricultural production, 
with unfavourable 
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marketing structures and a 
higher dependency on 
direct support are affected 
most negatively by the 
abolishment of CAP 
payments. 
Vosough 
Ahmadi et al 
(2015) 
Study on Scottish 
animal keepers’ 
reactions to policy 
change 
Scotland Optimising linear 
programming farm-
level model 
(ScotFarm) 
More diversified farms 
would respond better to a 
theoretical abolishment of 
payments than specialized 
farms. 
Lehtonen and 
Niemi (2018) 
Potential effects of 
a drastic reduction 
in subsidies 
Finland Non-linear 
optimisation-based 
DREMFIA 
economic 
agricultural sector 
model 
The loss of coupled 
support in the cattle and 
milk sectors would lead to 
serious economic 
problems; these sectors 
have been dependent on 
subsidy since the early 
2000s. 
Jitea et al 
(2015) 
Possible impacts 
of the 2013 reform 
Romania SIMULCAP model 
(based on Positive 
Mathematical 
Programming) 
Reduction of aid would 
affect the production of 
small, extensive farms 
with high nature value 
pastures most negatively - 
these farms are typically 
the most dependent on 
direct payments. 
Hanrahan et al 
(2012) 
Analyzing the 
effect of 
abolishing coupled 
support 
All 
Member 
States 
AGMEMOD model The impact on beef 
production would be most 
severe. The negative 
change is greater in 
countries that have 
previously granted 
coupled support to the 
beef sector. Higher 
dependency on subsidies 
leads to vulnerabilities in 
a given sector. 
Rezbova et al 
(2012) 
Effect of 
Complementary 
National Payments 
Czech 
Republic 
Correlation analysis 
of subsidy figures 
and economic 
indices 
Dairy production was just 
about self-sufficient in the 
study period, owing to 
agricultural subsidies. 
Manos et al 
(2010) 
Effect of 
decoupling in the 
tobacco sector 
Greece, 
Spain 
Multi-criteria 
mathematical 
programming model 
Tobacco production only 
continues because of the 
coupled nature of 
subsidies. If they were 
decoupled, all production 
would be discontinued. 
Source: own composition 
 
All in all, CAP direct payments do seem to influence agricultural production in a 
positive way. There is no consensus on the extent of this effect, however. While 
some studies claim direct support is a strong incentive towards production, others 
detect only a slight effect. Higher dependency on subsidies leads to vulnerabilities in 
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a given sector, meaning if direct payments were abolished or reduced, these sectors 
(mainly beef and milk) would be more negatively affected than others. Coupled 
support can particularly make a given sector more dependent on subsidies, so much 
so that in certain examples all production would be finished in the absence of 
coupled payments. 
 
3.4.2 The effect of decoupling on agricultural production 
 
Another field of study concerning direct support’s effect on agricultural production is 
whether the decoupling of subsidy influences production in any significant manner. 
In theory, decoupled payments are less market distortive, leave more freedom to 
farmer when determining their production choices and therefore can be expected to 
have an impact on agricultural production. Before decoupling took place, there were 
fears of massive land abandonment and decline in agricultural production. In 
practice, this did not prove to be the case. The overall effect of decoupling on 
production was small, although the effect varied from sector to sector. 
This was shown in a comprehensive study, in which Phelps (2007) described how the 
CAP’s objectives had been gradually moving from purely economic goals towards 
sustainability and the protection of the environment. Traditionally, CAP aimed at the 
increase of agricultural supply, but increased consumer demand for food safety, 
decreasing rural population, international trade concerns, and raising public 
awareness on the environment resulted in a series of reforms which shifted the CAP 
towards a more diverse set of goals. The study examined the effects of the 2003 
decoupling on nature protection issues. In theory, decoupling was expected to bring 
major benefits for the environment, since subsidies were no longer tied to 
agricultural production. The study argues that decoupling in itself would not bring 
significant changes in production decisions, so there would be little impact on the 
environment.  
Rude (2008) also examined the production effects of the 2003 decoupling of direct 
payments. Lump-sum subsidies can alter the way farmers perceive wealth and 
economic risks, change their investment possibilities, influence productivity and - 
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through all these factors – affect the level of production. The study set up a 
theoretical static production function and reviewed general and partial equilibrium 
models to study the production effect of decoupling. It was found that decoupling 
reduced incentives towards production, but this effect is modest at best. The effect’s 
magnitude depends on the different levels of decoupling introduced in the 
country/region concerned. 
Katranidis and Kotakou (2012) simulated different policy scenarios and their effects 
on cotton production. Based on FADN data of 438 cotton producers for 1994-2002, 
they estimated the level of cotton supply in case of coupled payments, full 
decoupling, and in case all support is abolished. The results showed that higher levels 
of decoupling led to gradual decrease of agricultural production. However, 
decoupled payments were not entirely production-neutral: the level of cotton supply 
was higher in the decoupled support scenario than in the no-CAP scenario. The 
wealth effect of decoupled payments seems to influence production decisions; they 
are not entirely based on market conditions. The strength of this effect is also related 
to the risk preferences of farmers (the less risk averse they are, the higher the 
decrease in production). 
Other studies focused on sectors or groups of farmers that were more negatively 
affected by decoupling. Areal et al. (2007) investigated the effects of the 2003 CAP 
reform on arable crops in England by building a farmer profit maximisation model. 
They found that with decoupled payments, small scale farmers will increase their 
output by allocating more land to cereals, while large farms will decrease their arable 
lands and cereals production, resulting in an overall downturn in cereal areas in the 
UK. Barley and oilseeds will be the most affected sectors, according to the 
projections of the authors. 
Balkhausen et al. (2008) were also in search for the production-related effects of 
decoupling by comparing eight selected simulation model results. According to their 
results, all models predicted that decoupling would result in a decrease in cereal, beef 
and sheep production areas in the EU-15, while fodder area would increase. 
However, there is a large diversity among the models due to different specifications. 
The focus of the study performed by Dixon and Matthews (2007) was similar, which 
evaluated the 2003 mid-term review of the CAP in Ireland by using a CGE model. 
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Their results suggested reductions in output of previously subsidised goods as cattle, 
sheep and cereals, while livestock, fruit and vegetables and forestry production 
would increase. Gross value added was about to slightly increase, according to the 
model. 
Esposti (2017) also analysed the impact of the 2003 CAP reform by applying a 
multi-valued treatment approach on Italian FADN farm data for 2003-2007 and 
found that decoupled direct payments had an impact in reorienting farm production 
choices but this response was found heterogeneous and concentrated in the lower 
levels of support. 
Giannoccaro et al. (2015) analysed the impacts of the 2013 CAP reform on the 
European livestock sector based on a survey of 1301 specialised livestock farms 
across nine EU members carried out in 2009. Results suggest that NMS were more 
sensitive to policy changes along with organic and LFA farms. Generally, decoupled 
payments were found to decrease livestock numbers throughout Europe, while 
specialist dairy units were expected to increase. 
Gohin (2006) assessed previous CAP modelling results on farm production with a 
sensitivity analysis and found that decoupled payment effects were negative both on 
arable crop and beef production, especially if land market imperfections and 
eligibility rules are taken into account. 
 
A very particular production effect of the CAP concerns the uptake of organic 
farming. In this regard the decoupling appears to have had uniquely positive 
production results. This is reflected by the study of Offermann et al (2003), which is 
focused on the influence of CAP on the competitiveness of organic farms. They 
based their study on the analysis of the structure of relevant CAP payments, as well 
as a survey carried out on 110 organic farms in Germany in 1995. Organic farms 
usually received less-than-average amounts of direct payments, because the crops 
they grow are only partially eligible for support, and the extensive animal breeding 
that is a specificity of organic farms are also less heavily subsidized. Minimum price 
support mechanisms also favoured conventional farms, as prices of organic products 
are usually higher. Organic farms could compensate these negative effects with 
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participating in agri-environment programs and the voluntary set-aside scheme, 
which were more popular with them than with conventional farms. On the whole, the 
1992 reform of the CAP had a positive effect on the competitiveness of organic 
farming, but some policy instruments remained biased towards conventional farming. 
In another article on the same subject, Offermann et al (2009a) studied organic farms 
with a special emphasis on the effects of the 2003 CAP reform and the Eastern 
enlargement of the EU. Data came from an extensive survey carried out on 50 
organic farms in ten Member States in 2004, farm accountancy data and information 
gathered with the aid of local agricultural experts. The results showed that the 2003 
reform had beneficial effects on organic farming in old Member States, mainly 
because of the increase of direct payments, which were decoupled from production 
and thus easier to access to a greater extent for organic farms. Redistribution of first 
pillar payments also favoured organic farms where the regional model of the basic 
payment was adopted. In new Member States, the introduction of the CAP was 
expected to a significant increase in organic production. Income levels of organic 
farms would be greatly increased, which could generate economic growth in the 
sector. On the other hand, the prices of production factors would also increase, as 
well as the dependency of farms on direct payments. 
In a similar study, Offermann et al (2009b) compared a 2003 reform scenario to a 
non-reform scenario in a model where projection of exogenous variables was based 
on other model results. The aim was again to identify reform effects on organic 
farms. In line with former findings (Offermann et al 2009a), it was shown that the 
level of increase in farm income depends on the level of redistribution regarding 
direct payments in the given Member State. Where a historical model was opted for, 
which based payments on a former reference period, the income gain of organic 
farms was not so substantial. This is due to the fact that the reference period’s 
coupled payments were more in favour of conventional farms. On the other hand, in 
Member States selecting the regional model (whereby direct payments are more 
levelled) the increase of income regarding organic farms is much higher. 
Jaime et al (2016) studied the effect of different CAP subsidies on the uptake of 
organic farming by beneficiaries, especially in light of the 2003 CAP reform. Panel 
data was drawn from the Swedish FADN for the period 2000-2008 on a large sample 
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of organic farms. A dynamic non-linear unobserved effects probit model was used to 
analyze the relationship between subsidies and the likelihood of organic farming. In 
line with theoretical expectations, it was found that before the reform coupled direct 
payments had a negative effect on the uptake of organic farming, while after 
decoupling the effect changed to positive (although its magnitude was small). 
Decoupled subsidies influence production decisions to a lesser extent, and therefore 
reduce the opportunity costs of organic farming. Consequently, decoupling can 
mitigate the negative effects of coupled market support, but it cannot significantly 
contribute to increasing the share of organic farming. Second pillar support (agri-
environmental programs in particular), however, were more effective in incentivizing 
organic production, and were also able to compel farmers to choose certified organic 
farming over non-certified organic production. 
 
The reviewed articles analyzing the production effects of decoupling are summarized 
in table 5. 
 
Table 5 – Effects of decoupling on agricultural production 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Phelps (2007) Effects of the 
2003 decoupling 
on production 
choices 
All 
Member 
States 
Analysis of detailed 
policy data 
decoupling in itself would 
not bring significant 
changes in production 
decisions 
Rude (2008) Production effects 
of the 2003 
decoupling 
All 
Member 
States 
General and partial 
equilibrium models 
Decoupling reduced 
incentives towards 
production, but this effect 
is modest at best. 
Katranidis and 
Kotakou 
(2012) 
Different policy 
scenarios on 
cotton production 
Greece Estimation of the 
supply function 
under different 
policy scenarios 
Decoupled payments are 
not entirely production-
neutral, the influence it 
through the wealth effect. 
Production loss is not so 
significant. 
Areal et al. 
(2007) 
Effects of the 
2003 CAP reform 
England Farmer profit 
maximisation 
model 
With decoupled payments, 
small scale farmers will 
increase their output, 
while large farms will 
decrease their cereals 
production. 
Balkhausen et 
al. (2008) 
Production-related 
effects of 
Old 
Member 
Simulation models Decoupling would result 
in a decrease in cereal, 
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decoupling States 
(EU-15) 
beef and sheep production 
areas, while fodder area 
would increase. 
Dixon and 
Matthews 
(2007) 
Evaluation of the 
2003 review of the 
CAP 
Ireland CGE model Reductions in output of 
previously subsidised 
goods as cattle, sheep and 
cereals, while livestock, 
fruit and vegetables and 
forestry production would 
increase. 
Esposti (2017) Impact of the 2003 
CAP reform 
Italy Multi-valued 
treatment approach 
Decoupled payments had 
an impact in reorienting 
farm production choices 
but this response was 
heterogeneous and 
concentrated in the lower 
levels of support. 
Giannoccaro et 
al. (2015) 
Impact of the 2013 
CAP reform on 
the livestock 
sector 
Several 
Member 
States 
Survey of 
specialised 
livestock farms 
Decoupled payments were 
found to decrease 
livestock numbers 
throughout Europe, while 
specialist dairy units were 
expected to increase. 
Gohin (2006) Effects of 
decoupling 
All 
Member 
States 
Sensitivity analysis 
of CAP modelling 
results 
Decoupled payment 
effects were negative both 
on arable crop and beef 
production. 
Offermann et 
al (2003) 
The influence of 
CAP on the 
competitiveness of 
organic farms 
Germany Analysis of the 
structure of relevant 
CAP payments 
The introduction of direct 
payments had a positive 
effect on the 
competitiveness of organic 
farming. 
Offermann et 
al (2009a) 
The effect of the 
2003 CAP reform 
on organic farms 
Several 
Member 
States 
Analysis of the 
results of an 
extensive survey 
The 2003 reform had 
beneficial effects on 
organic farming, mainly 
because payments were 
decoupled from 
production and thus easier 
to access to a greater 
extent for organic farms. 
Offermann et 
al (2009b) 
The effect of the 
2003 CAP reform 
on organic farms 
Several 
Member 
States 
Estimation where 
projection of 
exogenous 
variables was based 
on other model 
results 
The level of increase in 
organic farm income 
depends on the level of 
redistribution regarding 
direct payments. 
Jaime et al 
(2016) 
The effect of 
different CAP 
subsidies on the 
uptake of organic 
farming 
Sweden 
 
 
 
Dynamic non-linear 
unobserved effects 
probit model 
Before the reform coupled 
direct payments had a 
negative effect on the 
uptake of organic farming, 
while after decoupling the 
effect changed to positive. 
Source: own composition 
 
To sum it up, the overall result of decoupling can be a slight reduction of production 
in certain sectors (although the effect varies sector by sector). The effect is not so 
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profound as previously expected, this may be due to the fact that a majority of 
decoupled payments are not linked to production but still linked to an important 
production factor (i.e. agricultural land). Also, decoupled payments were found to be 
incentivizing production through the wealth effect. The reduction of production is 
greater in sectors that have become too dependent on support (beef, sheep, and 
cereals), with farmers who are less risk-averse, and larger farms. Decoupling can also 
lead to increase in production under certain circumstances (the former logic of 
coupled subsidies do not influence production decisions any more, therefore farmers 
can allocate grow the most productive crops and allocate better quality land). This 
holds especially true for organic farming, where former coupled subsidies had a 
negative effect on the uptake of organic production (they did not reflect the higher 
costs associated with organic products, therefore encouraged conventional 
production instead). 
 
3.4.3 The effect of direct payments on promoting structural change in 
agriculture 
 
Direct payments have been criticised for not being able to promote structural change 
in Member State economies. On the contrary, they sometimes seem to slow 
beneficial transformation processes down, or preserve old structures and production 
systems. This might have a stabilizing effect in the short run, but in the longer run it 
hinders restructuring and puts a halt on further development in the agricultural sector. 
This is confirmed by the study of Lobley and Butler (2010), who considered farmers’ 
plans for the future in light of the changes brought about by the 2003 CAP reform. 
The study was based on a survey conducted in Southwest England with 1852 farms. 
To identify patterns in responses, a factor analysis was performed, whose results then 
served as basis for a hierarchical cluster analysis, with the factor scores as clusters. It 
was found that the CAP did not promote the rapid restructuring of agriculture, but it 
reinforced some already existing trends (increasing diversification, growing gap 
between small and big farmers). Decoupling affected different groups of farmers in a 
different way: large dairy and arable farms were likely to further expand, while many 
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of the small livestock farmers would have to withdraw from agriculture. A sizeable 
group of farmers, however, did not alter their economic behaviour in light of the 
2003 CAP reform. Decoupling led to increased influence of market conditions on 
economic decisions, which is certainly a goal decoupling had aspired to achieve. On 
the whole, it seems that this ‘freedom to farm’ could only be fully exploited by a 
limited number of farmers, whose economic weight was likely to increase after the 
reform. 
A further study on farm structures was conducted by Happe et al (2009), who 
examined the evolution of single-holder farms in Slovakia, with a special focus on 
the impact of the introduction of direct payments. In several new Member States the 
farming sector is dualistic, with a few large corporate holdings and a high number of 
small, single-holder farms. An agent-based simulation model of structural change in 
agriculture (Agricultural Policy Simulator, AgriPoliS) was applied with data on 
farms in the Nitra region of Slovakia. Starting from base year 2002, the model 
scenarios were run for a 25-year period, which included a few years with pre-
accession agricultural policies and then the gradual phasing-in of direct payments. 
The results showed that the gradually increasing direct payments made a strong 
impact on farm structures in the short run: single-holders considering exiting the 
sector usually changed their minds because of the increasing level of subsidies. Yet 
in the phasing in period, cost of labour and land steadily increased (in the latter case, 
mainly because direct payments were capitalized into rental prices), so the amount of 
direct payments also had to increase in order to compensate for rising costs. When 
direct payments reached their final level, the structure collapsed: the small single-
holder farmers who remained only because of rising payments levels left once the 
phasing-in period was over. In this fashion, the CAP can aid transitional agricultural 
sectors preserve their old structure in the short-run, but it cannot contribute to 
defining long-term structural trends that would be necessary for these economies. 
Experience was gathered on farm restructuring through the example of new Member 
States. Sahrbacher et al (2009) studied the effects of introducing CAP on transition 
economies, by looking at the example of the Czech Republic. On the one hand, an 
ex-post analysis on the structural change and farm incomes was performed, based on 
statistical data from 2001 to 2007 on the whole country. On the other hand, an ex-
ante analysis is also done on the Vysoĉina region by utilizing a spatial-dynamic 
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agent-based model (AgriPoliS). The focus of this simulation was to identify the 
structural changes of farms as a response to accession (from pre-accession support 
policy to coupled support after the accession). Furthermore, the effects of a possible 
decoupling of CAP support were also studied. It was found - both by the ex-ante and 
ex-post methods - that structural change (which was mainly driven by the transition 
process) was slowed down by the introduction of direct payments. 
As a major production factor, agricultural land and its supply has a major impact on 
agricultural transformation processes. Milczarek-Andrzejewska et al (2018) found 
that mainly agricultural regions the effect of the CAP on land prices made farmers 
unwilling to sell land, therefore the land market turnover slowed down. This led to 
the conservation of unfavourable farm structures, difficulties in acquiring land for 
agricultural production, and even the slowing down of potential urbanization 
processes.  
Another aspect of economic change is spatial restructuring. Martinho (2015) assessed 
the impact of the Single Payment Scheme (basic direct payment) on the output, 
employment and productivity of the Portuguese agricultural sector, by setting up a 
Cobb-Douglas production function with the aid of municipality-level data on support 
measures and other statistics for 2010. The analysis showed that the support should 
be better suited to Portuguese conditions, because it did not explicitly raise 
agricultural output, and it could not incentivize farming outside the traditional 
agricultural regions. Direct payments might have helped the sector in some aspects, 
but it did not seem to be able to promote spatial restructuring. 
Hecht et al (2016) modelled restructuring by simulating a scenario where direct 
payments were shifted towards permanent grassland. They utilized FARMIS, which 
is a comparative, static programming model for farm groups, which was used on 
FADN data on German, Welsh and Swiss farms. The baseline scenario was 
compared to a situation in which direct payments for extensive use of permanent 
grassland areas are significantly increased, at the cost of diminishing arable 
payments. In such a scenario, a strong increase (80%) of utilized permanent 
grasslands can be foreseen. Income is redistributed from arable to extensive livestock 
farms. All in all, the scenario would efficiently increase the preservation of 
permanent grasslands, but the impact on milk and beef production and the number of 
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total livestock is minimal, and there would also be unintended side effects like the 
increase of the price of fodder and land rent prices of permanent grasslands. 
Therefore, strong restructuring would not be achieved in this case, either. 
Further studies also underline that direct payments cannot promote structural change. 
Sarov and Kostanerov (2019) set up an optimization model in order to study the 
impact of CAP subsidies on production structure. A typical Bulgarian mountain farm 
served as basis for the calculations, taking into consideration its special 
circumstances and restraints. The analysis also included factors like agricultural 
prices, availability of rented land and its costs, labour resources. It was found that 
while direct payments may increase gross margins, they have no effect on the 
production structure of farms. Furthermore, Rumanovska (2016) found that despite 
the policy efforts of the CAP in Slovakia, the agricultural sector is still characterized 
by low labour productivity, low levels of diversification of farm activities, and 
structural problems concerning the ownership of land (Slovakian farms only own 
about 10% of their utilized area). The structural anomalies from before the accession 
to the EU continue to hinder development in the sector. 
Biró et al. (2017) also found no significant effects of the latest CAP reform, and 
especially green direct payments, on the agricultural production in Hungary by using 
the national CAPRI model simulations. Hungarian agricultural producers do not 
seem to change their basic production decisions after 2014, according to the authors. 
The reviewed articles analyzing the effects of direct payments on promoting 
structural change are summarized in table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Effects of direct payments on promoting structural change 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Lobley and 
Butler (2010) 
Farm production 
decisions in light 
of the 2003 CAP 
reform 
England Factor analysis and 
hierarchical cluster 
analysis 
CAP did not promote the 
rapid restructuring of 
agriculture, but it 
reinforced some already 
existing trends. 
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Happe et al 
(2009) 
Evolution of 
single-holder 
farms in Slovakia 
Slovakia Agent-based 
simulation model of 
structural change in 
agriculture 
(AgriPoliS) 
The CAP can aid 
transitional agricultural 
sectors preserve their old 
structure in the short-run, 
but it cannot contribute to 
defining long-term 
structural trends. 
Sahrbacher et 
al (2009) 
The effects of 
introducing CAP 
on transition 
economies 
Czech 
Republic 
AgriPoliS model Structural change (which 
was mainly driven by the 
transition process) was 
slowed down by the 
introduction of direct 
payments. 
Milczarek-
Andrzejewska 
et al (2018) 
Effect of CAP on 
land prices 
Poland Regional 
Computable 
General Equilibrium 
Model (POLTERM) 
The effect of the CAP on 
land prices led to the 
conservation of 
unfavourable farm 
structures, difficulties in 
acquiring land for 
agricultural production. 
Martinho 
(2015) 
Spatial 
restructuring of 
agricultural 
production 
Portugal Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
Direct payments might 
have helped the sector in 
some aspects, but it did 
not seem to be able to 
promote spatial 
restructuring. 
Hecht et al 
(2016) 
Shifting direct 
payments towards 
permanent 
grasslands 
Several 
Member 
States 
Comparative, static 
FARMIS 
programming model  
Some restructuring would 
be achieved concerning 
grassland preservation, but 
the effect in the milk and 
livestock sectors would be 
minimal. 
Sarov and 
Kostanerov 
(2019) 
The impact of 
CAP subsidies on 
production 
structure 
Bulgaria Production 
optimization model 
While direct payments 
may increase gross 
margins, they have no 
effect on the production 
structure of farms. 
Rumanovska 
(2016) 
The policy effects 
of the CAP 
Slovakia Policy paper 
comparison and 
analysis 
Despite the policy efforts 
of the CAP in Slovakia, 
the agricultural sector is 
still characterized by low 
labour productivity, low 
levels of diversification of 
farm activities, and 
structural problems 
concerning the ownership 
of land. 
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Biró et al. 
(2017) 
The effects of the 
2013 reform on 
production 
decisions 
Hungary CAPRI model 
simulations 
Hungarian agricultural 
producers do not seem to 
change their basic 
production decisions after 
the reform. 
Source: own composition 
 
In summary, it can be stated that the reviewed articles found no strong production 
restructuring effect of CAP direct payments. On the contrary, they preserve old 
production and land allocation structures, which may stabilize the economic situation 
in the short run, but hinder development in the long run. In new Member States, the 
introduction of direct payments helped the agricultural sector in increasing its income 
and production but did not offer a solution to eliminating old structural problems. 
 
3.4.4 The effect of direct payments on productivity, technical efficiency 
 
The effect of CAP on the productivity and efficiency of farms is an extensively 
studied subject. Zhu et al (2012) made a study of the effects of CAP direct payments 
on the technical efficiency of German, Dutch and Swedish dairy farms between 1995 
and 2004. The article theorizes that subsidies influence technical efficiency mainly 
through the income effect (change in the level of income), the insurance effect 
(stability of income makes farmers less risk averse), and - in case of support coupled 
to inputs or outputs - the coupling effect. To reflect these effects, three subsidy-
related variables were set up that were then entered into an Inefficiency Effects 
Model. The results show that higher percentage of directs subsidies within the total 
agricultural income of farms leads to lower technical efficiency in all countries 
concerned. Furthermore coupled support had an additional negative effect on 
technical efficiency in Germany and the Netherlands (but no significant effect in 
Sweden), as compared to decoupled support. This suggests that the farmers’ 
motivation to innovate and work ever more efficiently is reduced when they become 
increasingly dependent on subsidies as a source of income. 
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In another article on the same subject (Zhu et al, 2010), the authors find that the level 
of efficiency is highest in the Netherlands, followed by Sweden and Germany. 
Positive contributors to technical efficiency are farm size and level of farm 
specialization. The share of agricultural subsidies in total income is a negative 
contributor in all three countries. 
Further studies also suggest a negative effect on farm efficiency. Using 
microeconomic data from the Polish FADN on 1212 dairy farms over the period 
2004-2011, Marzec and Pisulewski (2017) estimated the translog production function 
in order to measure the effect of CAP subsidies on technical efficiency of farms. The 
stochastic frontier analysis revealed that although there was some technical 
development in the study period among Polish dairy farms, CAP subsidies on the 
whole had a negative influence on efficiency. 
Mary (2013) also arrived at a similar conclusion. FADN data of 1529 French crop 
farms from the period 1996-2003 was used to assess the impact of CAP on total 
factor productivity, by estimating a production function based on the generalized 
method of moments approach. The calculations showed that CAP measures that are 
more or less automatically granted to farmers on a per hectare or per animal basis (all 
direct payments and certain rural development measures, like support to less-
favoured areas) had a significant negative effect on the productivity of farms. On the 
other hand, selective measures like investment or environmental support had no 
sizeable effect. Moreover, the decoupling of direct payments seems to have had 
positive influence on farm efficiency. 
In a study on the same subject, Latruffe et al (2017) examined the association 
between CAP subsidies and the technical efficiency of European dairy farms. FADN 
data from nine EU countries was used from the period 1990-2007, and on this basis a 
stochastic production frontier was estimated with the Method of Moments, to 
account for possible endogeneity issues. The analysis produced mixed results: direct 
payments influenced technical efficiency positively in two study countries, 
negatively in two other countries, while no effect was detectable in others. 
Furthermore, it was shown that decoupling did not change the direction in which 
CAP support influences technical efficiency, but it generally reduces its magnitude 
(compared to coupled payments). 
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Based on the above-mentioned articles, we could arrive at the general conclusion that 
CAP direct payments tend to lower the efficiency of farms. However, it seems that 
the decoupling of payments can somewhat alleviate this unwelcome policy effect. 
For example, Rizov et al (2013) estimated the impact of CAP on total farm 
productivity using a structural semi-parametric procedure. Data from the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) on a large sample of farms from the EU-15 
countries for the period 1991-2008 served as basis for the calculations. Total 
productivity was aggregated by country and farm type. The results showed that in the 
years before the 2003 decoupling of direct payments, the subsidies had a negative 
effect on the productivity of farms. After the decoupling, the situation became 
somewhat mixed, in some countries the effect on productivity even became positive. 
These empirical findings are in line with the theoretical background: subsidies in 
general distort market conditions, and therefore lower the efficiency of farms. On the 
other hand, decoupled direct support is less distortive and therefore has a more 
positive (or less negative) effect on farm productivity.  
Decoupling was also the focus of a study performed by Kazukauskas et al (2010), 
which explored the effect of decoupling on the productivity of Irish dairy farms. 
Based on national farm survey data for the period 2001-2007, a productivity 
estimation model was set up based on the proposal of Olley and Pakes, as well as on 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis. The models controlled for the significant capital 
investment grants in the study period, and for the increased price volatility caused by 
the uncertainties associated with decoupling. With the exclusion of these effects, the 
models found a significant and positive relationship between decoupling and total 
productivity in the dairy sector. 
In a similar study on the same subject (Kazukauskas et al, 2014), the authors used 
Irish, Danish, and Dutch farm-level data from national agricultural surveys in the 
period 2001-2007. Once again, they found a positive relationship between 
decoupling and farm productivity, which was especially significant in the case of 
Ireland. Moreover, decoupling seemed to alter farmers’ choices on specialization, in 
a sense that they moved their production towards more productive farming activities. 
Note has to be taken that while the majority of studies detect a negative relationship 
between direct payments and efficiency, there are some exceptions. Martinez Cillero 
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et al (2018) performed a stochastic frontier analysis to measure the effect of direct 
payment on the technical efficiency of Irish beef farms. The calculations were based 
on panel farm-level data from the FADN for the period 2000-2013. The analysis 
showed a low overall technical efficiency in the Irish beef sector. The situation was 
improving from 2000 to 2007, but from 2008 to 2012 a slight decline was detectable. 
In contrast to the general findings of other studies, it was shown that the effect of 
direct payments on technical efficiency was positive. In case of coupled payments 
(which were present during the beginning of the study period), this could be due to 
the fact that headage based animal premiums incentivized farmers towards 
intensification, in order to gain higher amounts of support. Decoupled payments, on 
the other hand, decreased production risks and therefore aided farm investments, 
which raised technical efficiency levels. The authors note, however, that decoupling 
might have had different effects in Member States where a more radical decoupling 
took place (Ireland opted for the historic model of decoupling, which did not 
redistribute payments to a great extent). In similar articles, Cillero et al. (2018, 2019) 
analysed technological heterogeneity in the Irish beef sector and by applying a latent 
class stochastic frontier model, they again found that decoupled direct payments had 
significant positive effects on technologically advanced farms. 
 
The reviewed articles analyzing the effects of direct payments on technical efficiency 
are summarized in table 7. 
 
Table 7 – Effects of direct payments on technical efficiency of farms 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Zhu et al 
(2012) 
Effects of CAP 
direct payments 
on technical 
efficiency of 
farms 
Germany 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
Inefficiency 
Effects Model 
Higher percentage of 
directs subsidies within 
total agricultural income 
of farms leads to lower 
technical efficiency in all 
countries concerned. 
Coupled support had an 
additional negative effect 
(as compared to 
decoupled support). 
Zhu et al Effects of CAP Germany Inefficiency Positive contributors to 
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(2010) direct payments 
on technical 
efficiency of 
farms 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
Effects Model technical efficiency are 
farm size and level of 
farm specialization. The 
share of agricultural 
subsidies in total income 
is a negative contributor 
in all three countries. 
Marzec and 
Pisulewski 
(2017) 
Study of 
technical 
efficiency of 
Polish farms 
Poland Stochastic frontier 
analysis 
Although there was some 
technical development in 
the study period among 
Polish dairy farms, CAP 
subsidies on the whole 
had a negative influence 
on efficiency. 
Mary (2013) Impact of CAP 
on total factor 
productivity 
France Generalized 
method of 
moments 
CAP measures that are 
automatically granted to 
farmers on a per hectare 
basis had a negative 
effect on productivity. 
Decoupling can offset this 
effect to a certain extent. 
Latruffe et al 
(2017) 
Association 
between CAP 
subsidies and 
farm technical 
efficiency 
Several 
Member 
States 
Stochastic frontier 
analysis 
Direct payments 
influenced technical 
efficiency positively in 
two study countries, 
negatively in two other 
countries, while no effect 
was detectable in others. 
Rizov et al 
(2013) 
Effect of 
decoupling on 
productivity 
Old Member 
States (EU-
15) 
Structural semi-
parametric 
estimation 
procedure 
Decoupled direct support 
is less distortive and 
therefore has a more 
positive (or less negative) 
effect on farm 
productivity than coupled 
support. 
Kazukauskas 
et al (2010) 
Effect of 
decoupling on 
productivity 
Ireland Stochastic frontier 
analysis 
There is a significant and 
positive relationship 
between decoupling and 
total productivity in the 
dairy sector. 
Kazukauskas 
et al (2014) 
Effect of 
decoupling on 
productivity 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Stochastic frontier 
analysis 
Decoupling seems to alter 
farmers’ production 
choices: a shift towards 
more productive farming 
activities was detected. 
Cillero et al 
(2018, 2019) 
CAP policy 
effects on 
efficiency 
Ireland Stochastic frontier 
analysis 
Decoupled payments 
decrease production risks 
and therefore aid farm 
investments, which can 
raise technical efficiency 
levels. 
Source: own composition 
 
All in all, most studies made in the subject of technical efficiency established a 
negative relationship between direct payments and productivity. Being a relatively 
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stable source of income, direct support does not incentivize farmers towards 
innovation, newer technologies, reorganization of economic activities or investment. 
Coupled support seems to be especially disadvantageous in this manner, because it 
influences and distorts production decisions to a higher extent. Decoupling, on the 
other hand, appears to be at its best when it comes to tackling issues related to 
productivity. In the previous chapters, we have seen that decoupling has mixed 
results in the areas of income and absolute production levels; however, the reviewed 
articles unanimously underline that decoupling has a beneficial effect on the 
technical efficiency of farms. This can alleviate, but not eliminate negative policy 
effects. 
 
3.5 The effect of direct payments on agricultural land 
 
3.5.1 The effect of direct payments on the price of agricultural land 
 
One of the main criticisms concerning direct payments is that support amounts are 
likely to get capitalized into the sale and lease prices of agricultural land. 
Consequently, land owners are able to capture a significant proportion of direct 
support, which raises serious questions about the overall efficiency of direct 
payments. In an article on this subject, Patton et al (2008) studied the effects of direct 
payments on land rental prices. In theory, coupled area-based payments increase 
rents because they increase the returns of production, which raises the demand for 
inputs such as land. Furthermore, farmers need to own or lease agricultural land to 
access decoupled payments, a fact that also leads to a raise in rent prices. To test 
these theories, the authors conducted GMM estimation with instrumental variable 
techniques based on panel data from a farm business survey of 400 farms in Northern 
Ireland in the period 1994-2002. The calculations revealed that the effect on rental 
prices depended on the type of direct payment. Concerning coupled support, the 
payment to the sheep sector (where production is largely dependent on land but few 
other inputs are used) was fully capitalized into land rent; while payment to the beef 
sector was not (where production is much less dependent on land but other inputs are 
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widely used). The higher the input demand for land in the sector, the greater the 
effect on land rent prices of coupled payments. In case of decoupled payments, 
support was fully capitalized into rental values. These findings raise serious payment 
distribution issues between landowners and farmers, and they question the overall 
efficiency of direct payments. 
O’Neill (2016) also found evidence on support being capitalized into land rent prices 
in Ireland. The model is based on the assumption that the rent is a function of 
expected market returns and expected amount of support. On this foundation, a two-
step GMM estimation was set up, using data on 1200 farms from a national farm 
survey. The results showed that coupled direct payments had been heavily 
capitalized into land rent prices (67-90 cent per each euro of support), seriously 
hindering the transfer efficiency of such payments. The long-run effect is strongest 
among crop farms, which use land as a major input for production. After the 2003 
decoupling of payments, the capitalization effect remained present, but its extent was 
reduced by half. This observation is contrary to the findings of Patton et al (2008), 
and may be attributed to the option of Irish farmers to consolidate their payments 
from rented land where the rent had expired to their remaining agricultural area, a 
fact that prevented landowners to increase rental prices. Pillar II area-based payments 
were not capitalized into lease rates. 
The study of the market of agricultural land can also yield interesting results in the 
topic. Milczarek-Andrzejewska et al (2018) studied the land use conflicts generated 
by the CAP. A bottom-up, multi-regional Computable General Equilibrium model 
called POLTERM was used to identify distortions on the market of agricultural land. 
The simulation revealed that there was a 27% yearly average increase in land prices 
due to the CAP in Poland in the period 2004-2013. Direct payments contributed to 
77% of this rise. The policy effect depends on the socio-economic conditions, farm 
structure and level of urbanization of the region concerned. In less developed and 
urbanized regions with small farms, the influence of CAP on land prices is too 
strong: because of the future expectations on area-based subsidies and the steeply 
rising prices, farmers are not incentivized to sell land, therefore the land market 
turnover slows down. This leads to difficulties in buying land for agricultural 
production. In highly urbanized regions, however, economic processes drive the 
price of land much higher than the effect attributable to CAP, which remains 
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relatively minor in this regard. In this case, farmers are willing to supply land, which 
is often converted to non-agricultural purposes. 
A game theory research on the likely behaviour of landowners in New Member 
States after the EU accession also shed some light on the dynamics of land rent 
prices. Latruffe and Davidova (2007) studied the distributional effects of CAP 
subsidies for corporate farms within new Member States. The paper focused on the 
question whether private landowners were likely to withdraw rented land from 
professional farms once CAP direct subsidies were introduced, so as to keep the 
subsidies for themselves. Using game theory, and the data form a survey conducted 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, they found that while renegotiating the rental 
price would be a widespread phenomenon, only in a few cases would landowners 
withdraw their rental contracts from farms. The willingness to change depends on the 
current rental price, as well as the relationship between landowners and farmers 
(landowners with a close relationship to farms would be less likely to change the 
current rental conditions). After the accession to the EU, rental prices were bound to 
increase as a result. 
A Bavarian example further confirms the heavy capitalization of CAP support into 
land prices. Klaiber et al (2017) made a study into the effects of CAP direct 
payments on land rental prices. For the purposes of the analysis, FADN data of a 
large sample of Bavarian farmers for the period 2005-2011 was used. A fixed-
effects, reduced form equation was estimated, whose result showed a strong 
capitalization effect of the Single Payment Scheme (basic direct payment) into land 
rental prices (37 cent of each additional euro of SPS). The study also looked at the 
effect of the 2013 CAP reform, which required the harmonization of the amounts of 
basic direct payments (to move the individually varying unit amounts of payments 
between farmers, regions and Member States towards a uniform, flat-rate level). It 
was found that this process further increased capitalization into land rent prices (53 
cents per each support euro). After the harmonization of payments, an even higher 
proportion of CAP payments could be captured by landowners. 
The decoupling of direct payments could also not remedy the distributional questions 
between landowners and farmers. Kilian et al (2012) investigated the effect of the 
2003 reform of the CAP on land rental prices. For this purpose, a graphical analytical 
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model was developed, which represented the situation both before and after the 
reform. The theoretical findings of the model were then compared to empirical 
evidence from a regression using data of Bavarian farms and land prices for 2005. 
The results showed that decoupling increased the capitalization of direct payments 
into land rental prices (compared to the previous coupled direct support schemes). 
One additional euro of direct payments increased land rental prices by 28-78 cents in 
Bavaria. The results suggested that the closer the relationship between a support 
instrument and agricultural land, the higher the level of capitalization. The Fischler 
reform might have severed the link between direct support and agricultural 
production, but the relationship to agricultural land remained intact (decoupled 
payment entitlements still have to be activated by hectares of land at the farmer’s 
disposal). To solve the problem of capitalization, a subsidy system less connected to 
production factors could be introduced (like the bond scheme proposed by Swinbank 
and Tangermann, 2004). 
Furthermore, Brady et al (2009) also analysed the impacts of the 2003 reform of the 
CAP by an agent-based modelling scheme and added that increased land rental prices 
will reduce the ability of the CAP to provide income security for farmers. Britz et al 
(2012) applied the CAPRI model to investigate the income effect of the 2003 reform 
and Health Check and expected land values to increase considerably, especially in 
the case of grasslands. The authors applied the CAPRI model to investigate the 
income effect of the 2003 reform and Health Check and found significant income 
shifts only for specific product groups. Income was found to be redistributed away 
from traditional cultures to fodder production which was caused by the capitalisation 
of decoupled payments on previously unsubsidised land. Bartolini and Viaggi (2013) 
analysed the determinants of changes in farm size in the EU with a sample of 2363 
farm households from nine European countries. They found, in relation with direct 
payments, that the different implementation models affected the willingness to pay 
for land. More specifically, they found that countries where hybrid or SAPS models 
were implemented had more farmers with a higher probability of paying more for 
land. Therefore it seems that the more direct link between support amounts and 
agricultural land (as in case of SAPS and hybrid models) increases the extent of 
capitalization into land prices. 
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Further studies also provide confirmation on capitalization and increase of land 
prices. Latruffe et al (2010) analysed the effect of CAP introduction on Lithuanian 
agriculture. It was found that direct payments could be considered a relatively stable 
income source, which might raise farmers’ willingness to expand and gain credit. 
Because of this, more farmland would be utilized; consequently land prices were 
likely to increase. In a study on the effects of introducing CAP in the Czech 
Republic, Sahrbacher et al (2009) came to the conclusion that a significant 
proportion of income subsidies were capitalized into land rentals and the prices of 
other production factors. 
Hecht et al (2016) modelled a policy scenario in which permanent grassland would 
gain more subsidy funds compared to the current situation. Under these conditions, a 
strong increase (80%) of utilized permanent grasslands was detected. As an 
undesirable side effect, however, the increase of the price of fodder and land rent 
prices of permanent grasslands was also detected. 
In certain extreme examples, studies also showed an increase in land rent prices 
beyond the magnitude of direct subsidy amounts. Ciaian and Swinnen (2009) 
analysed the impact of subsidies on income by using an FADN based simulation 
model based on French 2003-2004 data and showed that land rents increased by 
more than the subsidy, causing that on aggregate farms lost from the subsidy, 
supposing that farms are homogenous. 
Ciaian et al. (2018) analysed the impact of the decoupled payments on the 
capitalisation of land values and found that each euro of decoupled payment 
increased capitalisation by an additional 18 cents. However, while capitalisation in 
the New Member States decreased somewhat (from 83% to 79%) after 2015, it 
actually doubled (from 21% to 43%) in Old Member States. Their results are in line 
with a previous research of the authors (Ciaian et al., 2014) where they concluded 
that implementation details of the new SPS model, especially the reference period for 
entitlement allocation, regionalization, payment differentiation, and budgetary 
changes would largely determine the impact on land markets.   
On the contrary, in a recent research conducted by Guastella et al. (2018), using 
Italian FADN data, results suggest that when selectivity, endogeneity and 
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unobserved individual heterogeneity are accounted for, no capitalisation of coupled 
payments and limited capitalisation of decoupled payments are observed in Italy. 
 
The reviewed articles analyzing the effects of direct payments on the price of 
agricultural land are summarized in table 8. 
 
Table 8 – Effects of direct payments on the price of agricultural land 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Patton et al 
(2008) 
Effects of direct 
payments on 
land rental prices 
Northern 
Ireland 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments 
estimation with 
instrumental 
variables 
The higher the input 
demand for land in a 
given sector, the greater 
the capitalization effect 
on land rent prices of 
direct payments. 
O’Neill (2016) Effects of direct 
payments on 
land rental prices 
Ireland Two-step 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments 
Coupled direct payments 
were heavily capitalized 
into land rent prices (67-
90 cent per each euro of 
support). 
Milczarek-
Andrzejewska 
et al (2018) 
Study of the 
market of 
agricultural land 
Poland Computable 
General 
Equilibrium model 
(POLTERM) 
Strong increase of land 
prices after EU-
accession, direct 
payments contributed to 
77% of this rise. 
Latruffe and 
Davidova 
(2007) 
Distributional 
effects of direct 
subsidies 
New 
Member 
States 
Game theory Land rent increased after 
EU-accession. Private 
landowners were likely 
to renegotiate the price 
of rented land with 
professional farms. 
Klaiber et al 
(2017) 
Effects of direct 
payments on 
land rental prices 
Germany Fixed-effects, 
reduced form 
regression 
estimation 
Capitalization of direct 
support into land rent 
prices reached 53 cents 
per each support euro 
after 2013. 
Kilian et al 
(2012) 
The effect of the 
2003 CAP 
reform on land 
Germany Graphical 
analytical model, 
regression 
Decoupling increased the 
capitalization of direct 
payments into land rental 
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rental prices estimation prices. One additional 
euro of direct payments 
increased land rental 
prices by 28-78 cents. 
Brady et al 
(2009) 
Impact of the 
2003 CAP 
reform 
Several 
Member 
States 
Agent-based 
modelling scheme 
Increased land rental 
prices will reduce the 
ability of the CAP to 
provide income security 
for farmers. 
Britz et al 
(2012) 
Impact of the 
2003 CAP 
reform on 
income 
distribution 
All Member 
States 
CAPRI model Income was redistributed 
away from traditional 
cultures to fodder 
production which was 
caused by the 
capitalisation of 
decoupled payments on 
previously unsubsidised 
land. 
Bartolini and 
Viaggi (2013) 
Determinants of 
changes in farm 
size in the EU 
Several 
Member 
States 
Comparison of 
survey data on 
farmer intentions 
between policy 
scenarios 
The more direct link 
between support 
amounts and agricultural 
land, the higher the 
capitalization of support 
into land prices. 
Latruffe et al 
(2010) 
Introduction of 
CAP in 
Lithuania 
Lithuania Analysis of FADN 
data and survey on 
farmer intentions 
Direct payments are a 
stable income source, 
which raises farmers’ 
willingness to expand. 
Because of this, more 
farmland would be 
utilized; land prices were 
likely to increase. 
Sahrbacher et 
al (2009) 
Introducing CAP 
in the Czech 
Republic 
Czech 
Republic 
Agent-based model 
(AgriPoliS) 
A significant proportion 
of income subsidies were 
capitalized into land 
rentals and the prices of 
other production factors 
Hecht et al 
(2016) 
Permanent 
grassland policy 
scenario analysis 
Germany 
Wales 
Switzerland 
Case study If policy shifted toward 
grassland, the area of 
utilized pastures would 
increase, as well as the 
price of fodder and land 
rent prices. 
Ciaian and 
Swinnen 
(2009) 
Impact of direct 
subsidies on 
income 
France Simulation model 
based on FADN 
data 
Land rents increased in 
2003-2004 by more than 
the subsidy, causing that 
on aggregate farms lost 
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income because of the 
policy intervention. 
Ciaian et al. 
(2014, 2018) 
Impact of 
decoupled 
payments on 
capitalisation 
All Member 
States 
Study of the 
implementation 
details of payment 
schemes 
The level of 
capitalization depends on 
the implementation 
details of the payment 
system. Subsidies with 
more direct link to land 
get heavily capitalized 
into land prices. 
Guastella et al. 
(2018) 
Impact of direct 
support on land 
prices 
Italy Estimation 
accounting for 
selectivity, 
endogeneity and 
unobserved 
individual 
heterogeneity 
Weak link between 
direct payments and land 
rent prices. 
Source: own composition 
 
Based on the reviewed articles, it can be stated that direct payments significantly 
increase land lease and sale prices. The support increases the expected returns of 
agricultural activities, therefore the demand for agricultural land raises. The closer 
the link between the given support measure and agricultural land, the higher the 
capitalization of subsidy amount into land prices. Also, the more a given sector uses 
land as a production input factor, the higher land prices climb as a result. Because of 
this, even animal husbandry support gets capitalized into land prices (in cases where 
pastureland is an important production factor). The level of capitalization detected by 
the studies varied from a minimum of 20-30% to extremely high levels (90-100%). 
Decoupling does not seem to alleviate the situation (decoupling broke the link 
between support and production but having agricultural land at the farmer’s disposal 
is still a precondition for accessing decoupled payments). The capitalization effect is 
also reflected in the fact that land prices have been rising significantly in new 
Member States since their EU-accession. The effect of direct payments on land 
prices raises serious doubts concerning the efficiency of the support system. Better 
targeted policy is called for, where landowners cannot channel a significant part of 
the funds towards themselves. 
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3.5.2 The effect of direct payments on land use conditions 
 
The majority of direct payments are linked to the use of agricultural land, because 
farmers are required to have land at their disposal in order to access support amounts. 
This is also true for decoupled payments, where agricultural production is not a 
requirement, but the minimum maintenance of agricultural land is. Consequently, 
direct payments influence land use conditions, although these effects do not always 
point in the appropriate direction or have the necessary magnitude. One example of 
this was explored by Nikodemus et al (2010), who examined the effects of certain 
CAP payments on land use conditions in Latvia. After the collapse of the Soviet 
centralised planned economy, the abandonment of agricultural land gained 
unprecedented momentum, a situation that was expected to be alleviated by CAP 
payments. Focusing on five, geographically diverse sample municipalities, the 
authors analyzed land use changes by comparing historic maps with modern land use 
data coming from CAP area-based claims, complemented by geographical 
information on land quality. It was found that support amounts coming from the 
single area payment scheme (SAPS) and the payment for less favoured areas (LFA) 
could somewhat limit land abandonment, but not to the expected extent. The 
majority of direct payments went to farmers with large parcels in good agricultural 
condition, and not to farms situated in most valuable or most vulnerable landscapes. 
To achieve complex land use goals, more targeted support would be called for. 
3.5.2.1 The effect of decoupling on land use conditions 
 
The scientific literature particularly concerns itself with the effects of decoupling on 
land use. Tranter et al (2007) studied the effects of the decoupling of support 
introduced by the 2003 Fischler reform of the CAP. Under the Single Farm Payment, 
the amount of support would no longer depend on the level of agricultural 
production, a fact that led to fears of land abandonment, decrease in production and 
massive amounts of labour leaving the agricultural sector. To see if these fears were 
well-founded, the authors conducted a postal survey of 4200 farmers from the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Portugal. The results show that there would be relatively 
little change in the status quo: the decrease of production would be smaller than 
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predicted by previous quantitative studies, especially in the cereal sector. Land 
abandonment is also of little concern, except for certain regions in Portugal. 
Bougherara and Latruffe (2010) analysed the potential impacts of the 2003 CAP 
reform on land idling decisions of French landowners through a survey and found 
that landowners showed little interest regarding good agricultural and environmental 
conditions (GAEC), suggesting that no dramatic changes would occur in terms of 
land idling in France after the 2003 reform.  
While generally it is true that decoupling did not lead to massive land abandonment, 
it might have triggered unfavourable changes in certain regions and sectors or caused 
unwanted changes to the structure of land use. Trubins et al (2013) studied the effects 
of decoupling on the changes of land use in Southern Sweden between 2002 and 
2010. Based on the GIS data from the applications for area-based support, and data 
from the LPIS they examined the changes of land use between main utilization 
categories. It was found that decoupling causes agricultural production to concentrate 
on better quality land, while lower quality land is increasingly left fallow or 
converted from arable land to temporary grassland. 
Ostenburg et al (2006) also reported problems concerning land use after the 
decoupling of payments. They studied the effects of the 2003 decoupling of the CAP 
in Brandenburg, an agriculturally less favoured region of Germany. A linear 
programming farm model was set up, which took into account different factors such 
as land quality, interactions with agri-environment and energy crop schemes, level of 
decoupling. It was found that decoupling would have small effect on production on 
high-quality land, but a significant abandonment of marginal land could occur. 
Sectors highly dependent on coupled aid (dairy and certain animal breeding sectors) 
could be negatively affected as well. 
Reger et al (2009) also examined the effects of decoupling on land use, by focusing 
on habitat diversity in an agriculturally less favourable region (Dill catchment area in 
Hesse, Germany). Three scenarios were set up (coupled area payments, decoupled 
area payments, no direct payments), and the land use conditions were simulated in 
each case with the agro-economic land use model ProLand. Habitat diversity was 
then monitored by utilizing different indices for each scenario, and compared to a 
past baseline of 1995. The results showed that neither scenario was able to uphold 
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the baseline level of habitat diversity – to reach this aim, direct payments are simply 
not sufficient and probably more targeted Pillar II aid would be needed. The situation 
was worsening as the level of decoupling in the scenarios increased, leading to 
significant land abandoned or afforestation. On the other hand, coupled payments 
were most efficient in keeping some land under arable production in the 
agriculturally unfavourable study region, so this scenario contributed most to habitat 
diversity. 
Roche et al (2004) analyzed the potential effects of the 2003 decoupling of direct 
payments on land allocation decisions of farmers. A mean-variance portfolio 
optimisation framework was utilized to check how decoupled payments (which are 
essentially free from the risks of production) alter the production decisions of 
(typically risk-averse) farmers, changing the amounts of land they allocate to 
different crops. The authors argue that theoretically - after the decoupling - farmers 
may leave some of their land idle, but the land that remains in production will be 
allocated to riskier products. This theory was then checked against data from 1990-
2001 on British and Irish grain-producing farms. The result was in line with the 
theory, showing that the grain farms indeed moved towards riskier products during 
their land allocation decisions. An intensification of production could be foreseen on 
good quality land, while other areas could get marginalized. 
3.5.2.2 The effect of CAP and greening on land use conditions 
 
One of the main criticisms concerning the greening payment of the 2013 reform is 
that it failed to reach sufficient restructuring in agricultural production and land use. 
Louhichi et al (2018) explored this topic by using static positive programming 
methods on individual farm-level data to investigate the possible economic effects of 
greening all over the EU. The model utilized data of all individual farms from the 
FADN in every Member State, as well as data from the CAPRI database and Eurostat 
information. The IFM-CAP models the economic behaviour of each individual farms 
based on a set of presumptions (for example production issues, risk aversion, income 
stabilization goals). The main message of the study was that even though 86% of the 
agricultural area in the EU was subject to greening, its effects would not be 
substantial on production (0,9% decrease) or on income (1% decrease). Furthermore, 
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changes in land use would also be small (4,5% of the total area), which suggested 
that the environmental effects of greening would also not meet the expectations. 
Greening might have been a proper first step towards making the CAP more 
sustainable, but in the future it clearly needs certain adjustments. 
In an article on the same subject, Louhichi et al (2017) examined the influence of the 
greening’s crop diversification measure on farmers’ production decisions. The IFM-
CAP model was used to simulate individual farm decisions, based on data of all 
farms present in the EU-FADN. The results showed that the overall effects of 
diversification (which is a part of the requirements of the greening measure) were 
rather small. A 0.5% decrease was experienced in farm income and crop production. 
The reallocation of land due to diversification was less than 1% of the total utilized 
agricultural area in the EU-27. The strongest restraint of the requirement seemed to 
be the 75% limit on the area of the main crop of the farm, which primarily affected 
medium-sized farms (small farms were partially exempted, large farms had had 
diversified production even before greening was introduced). To be an effective 
policy in terms of environment protection and climate change mitigation, greening 
measures have to become more ambitious in their requirements on the one hand, and 
more targeted in their scope on the other hand. 
Furthermore, Solazzo et al (2014) studied the 2013 reform of the CAP regarding the 
Italian tomato sector, with a focus on convergence of payments and the possible 
effects of greening on production decisions of farms. The study found that tomato 
farms would not change their land use conditions significantly as a result of the 
reform. 
Cortignani and Dono (2019) analysed the impact of greening on Italian farms and 
environment by applying a Positive Mathematical Programming model on Italian 
FADN data. Results suggest that greening had a limited impact on the environment, 
reinforcing those already determined by the previous CAP reform. However, results 
found to differ across regions and were sometimes controversial. In an earlier article, 
Cortignani et al. (2017) even found that coupled payments were more effective in 
achieving environmental goals.   
Gocht et al. (2017) analysed the economic and environmental impacts of CAP 
greening by using the CAPRI model and found relatively minor effects in terms of 
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land use, production, prices and income. Environmental impacts were also found to 
be quite small, although differences existed by region. 
Bertaglia et al. (2016) investigated the possible impacts of greening on European 
agriculture and found that the simple fact that crop diversification and ecological 
focus areas were not applied for small holdings had significant consequences. More 
concretely, the authors found that the vast majority of agricultural land is exempt 
from greening in those regions where there was a major prevalence of specialist 
cereal farming systems.  
Bertoni et al. (2018) analysed farmland use transitions due to greening in Italy by 
applying a Markov chains approach on 2011-2016 farm data. Results suggest that 
monoculture land uses have significantly decreased, especially for maize. The paper 
argues that despite various criticisms on the ambiguous effects of greening, ex-post 
estimations verified the effectiveness of this new policy instrument in Italy. 
Capitanio et al. (2016) analysed the impact of CAP on crop diversity decisions of 
Italian farms by using panel regression models and found a positive relationship 
between decoupled payments and diversity.  
Diversification of crops is defined as a goal that the greening payment aims to 
achieve. In their paper, Peltonen-Sainio et al (2016) focused on crops that were 
cultivated only on a limited amount of agricultural area but had a potential for 
expanded production. Long term data on yields and production areas from crop 
experiments all over Finland were analyzed in the period 1970-2013. By comparing 
the situation before and during the application of CAP, the authors found that the 
policy strengthened the role of cereal monocultures (spring barley, oat, wheat), and 
reduced the role of minor crops (rapeseed, potato, pea, sugar beet) – both regarding 
production areas and realized yields. This suggests that the CAP in its present form 
does not contribute to diversification goals very efficiently. 
Further studies also were focused on diversity of agricultural production. Volkov et 
al (2019b) looked into the socio-economic sustainability of small farms between 
2004 and 2016 in Lithuania, in the context of CAP direct payments. To measure 
sustainability, a list of indicators was set up, which was then aggregated into a single 
composite index using the multi-criteria decision-making method. It was found that 
direct payments were not sufficient to contribute to the sustainability of small farms 
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until 2013 - they had a negative effect on the diversity of local production. From 
2013, however, the system of direct payments was reformed, which resulted in an 
increasing trend in the values of the composite indicator on sustainability. 
Resl et al (2006) analyzed the effects of the CAP on Czech cash crop growing, by 
modelling hypothetical farms in three production regions. The analysis included data 
from the FADN, statistical data on crop prices and yields, and data on the support 
payments made to farmers. The focus of the analysis was on comparing the 
profitability of certain cash crops before the 2004 accession to the EU, and directly 
after that period. It was found that the profits for 2004-2006 increased in case of 
winter wheat, summer barley and rapeseed (mainly because of the CAP direct 
payments). An even greater rise was detected in case of sugar beet (mainly because 
of a significant increase in prices). By raising the price of intensive cereal and other 
cash crops, CAP does not contribute to the diversification of production. 
Bartolini et al. (2014) aimed at explaining the determinants of on-farm 
diversification in Tuscany and by applying a two-step simulation model, the authors 
suggested that high per hectare direct payments had a negative influence on 
diversification intensity. 
The reviewed articles analyzing the effects of direct payments on land use are 
summarized in table 9. 
 
Table 9 – Effects of direct payments on land use conditions 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Nikodemus et 
al (2010) 
Effects of certain 
CAP payments on 
land use 
conditions 
Latvia Comparison of 
historic spatial data 
with land use data 
coming from CAP 
area-based claims 
The majority of direct 
payments went to 
farmers with large 
parcels in good 
agricultural condition, 
and not to farms situated 
in most valuable or 
vulnerable landscapes. 
Tranter et al 
(2007) 
Effects of 
decoupling on 
United 
Kingdom 
Comprehensive 
survey 
Decoupling does not 
result in massive land 
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land use Germany 
Portugal 
abandonment. Certain 
regions in Portugal are 
affected to a greater 
extent. 
Bougherara 
and Latruffe 
(2010) 
Farmer decisions 
on setting aside 
land 
France Comprehensive 
survey 
No dramatic changes 
were expected to occur in 
terms of land idling in 
France after the 2003 
reform. 
Trubins et al 
(2013) 
Effects of 
decoupling on  
changes of land 
use 
Sweden Analysis of GIS and 
LPIS data on land 
utilization 
categories 
Decoupling causes 
agricultural production to 
concentrate on better 
quality land, while lower 
quality land is 
increasingly left fallow 
or converted. 
Ostenburg et 
al (2006) 
Effects of 
decoupling on 
land use 
Germany Linear 
programming farm 
model 
Decoupling has small 
effect on production on 
high-quality land, but a 
significant abandonment 
of marginal land could 
occur. 
Reger et al 
(2009) 
Effects of 
decoupling on 
land use 
Germany Agro-economic 
land use model 
(ProLand) 
Land use situation was 
worsening as the level of 
decoupling in the policy 
scenarios increased, 
leading to significant 
land abandoned or 
afforestation. 
Roche et al 
(2004) 
Effects of 
decoupling on 
land allocation 
decisions 
United 
Kingdom 
Ireland 
Mean-variance 
portfolio 
optimisation 
framework 
Farms moved towards 
riskier products during 
their land allocation 
decisions. An 
intensification of 
production could be 
foreseen on good quality 
land, while other areas 
could get marginalized. 
Louhichi et al 
(2018) 
Effect of greening 
on land use 
All Member 
States 
Static positive 
programming 
methods on 
individual farm-
level data (IFM-
CAP) 
Changes in land use are 
expected to be small 
(4.5% of the total area). 
Louhichi et al 
(2017) 
Effect of greening 
on crop 
All Member 
States 
IFM-CAP The reallocation of land 
due to diversification was 
less than 1% of the total 
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diversification utilized agricultural area 
in the EU-27. 
Solazzo et al 
(2014) 
Effects of the 
2013 reform on 
tomato farms 
Italy Positive 
Mathematical 
Programming 
model 
Tomato farms would not 
change their land use 
conditions significantly 
as a result of the reform. 
Cortignani 
and Dono 
(2019) 
Impact of 
greening on 
Italian farms 
Italy Positive 
Mathematical 
Programming 
model 
Greening has limited 
effect on farm activities. 
Gocht et al. 
(2017) 
Impact of 
greening 
All Member 
States 
CAPRI model Relatively minor effects 
in terms of land use, 
production, prices and 
income. 
Bertaglia et al. 
(2016) 
Exemptions from 
greening 
obligations 
All Member 
States 
Policy analysis A vast majority of 
agricultural land is 
exempt from greening by 
regulation. This limits the 
effects of the policy 
considerably in certain 
regions and sectors. 
Bertoni et al. 
(2018) 
Farmland use 
transitions due to 
greening 
Italy Markov chains 
approach 
Despite criticisms on the 
ambiguous effects of 
greening, ex-post 
estimations verified the 
effectiveness of the 
policy. 
Capitanio et 
al. (2016) 
Impact of direct 
payments on land 
diversity 
decisions 
Italy Panel regression 
methods 
There is a positive 
relationship between 
decoupled payments and 
diversity. 
Peltonen-
Sainio et al 
(2016) 
Diversification of 
land use for 
producing 
different crops 
Finland Analysis of land use 
and production 
yield data 
Direct payments 
strengthened the role of 
cereal monocultures 
(spring barley, oat, 
wheat), and reduced the 
role of minor crops 
(rapeseed, potato, pea, 
sugar beet). 
Volkov et al 
(2019b) 
Socio-economic 
sustainability of 
small farms 
Lithuania Multi-criteria 
decision-making 
method 
Direct payments had a 
negative effect on the 
diversity of local 
production until 2013 
From 2013 however, the 
situation has changed. 
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Resl et al 
(2006) 
Comparison of 
the profitability 
of certain cash 
crops before and 
after EU-
accession 
Czech 
Republic 
Modelling 
hypothetical farms 
based on FADN, 
spatial and crop 
yield data 
Profits after the EU-
accession increased in 
case of winter wheat, 
summer barley and 
rapeseed. By raising the 
price of intensive cereal 
and other cash crops, 
direct support does not 
contribute to the 
diversification of land 
use. 
Bartolini et al. 
(2014) 
Explaining the 
determinants of 
on-farm 
diversification 
Italy Two-step 
simulation model 
High per hectare direct 
payments had a negative 
influence on 
diversification intensity. 
Source: own composition 
 
Based on the review of the scientific literature on land use effects of direct payments, 
it can be stated that the policy does not always influence land use conditions in the 
desired direction. Some studies suggest that the majority of payments are targeted at 
large, intensively cultivated parcels and not at the most valuable or vulnerable areas. 
Decoupling did not seem to have achieved major changes in the structure of land use. 
The fears of massive land abandonment associated with decoupling were not 
confirmed in practice, although decoupling did shift production to better quality land, 
while marginal land was abandoned or set-aside. This effect can even be called 
significant in certain regions and sectors. Decoupled direct support overall tends to 
strengthen the production of intensive cash crops, with little incentive to diversify 
land use and production. Surprisingly, the introduction of the greening payment did 
little to alleviate the situation in this regard. The majority of the reviewed articles 
(with the exception of Bertoni et al, 2018 and Capitanio et al, 2016) found evidence 
that greening can achieve only minor changes in land use decisions, therefore its 
impact on crop diversification is rather small. 
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3.6 4. Further economic effects of direct payments 
 
3.6.1 The effect of direct payments on investment 
 
Direct payments are by definition income subsidies; therefore they are not directly 
aimed at bolstering agricultural investments. However, it is interesting to see if – 
through indirect effects – they can influence the level of farm investments in any 
way. 
Sckokai and Moro (2009) sought the answer to this question when they studied the 
effects of arable CAP payments on farm investment and output. They analyzed data 
from the Italian FADN on professional arable farms in the period 1994-2002. By 
utilizing a dynamic dual model of farm decision-making, they studied different 
policy scenarios concerning changes in the amount of intervention aid, coupled area 
payments and decoupled area payments. The results showed that an increase of the 
intervention price has a significant, positive effect on farm investment, mainly 
because it reduces price volatility. On the other hand, increasing the level of support 
that does not influence price volatility (for example, area payments) has no 
significant effect on investment decisions. Being risk-averse, farmers see price 
volatility as a hindrance of future investments. All in all, direct payments did not 
seem to be very efficient in promoting investment. 
In an interesting study on production and investment decisions, Piot-Lepetit (2011) 
examined the effect of CAP support on the beef sector. A dynamic microeconomic 
model was used, which included factors like past and anticipated future prices of 
beef, size of the herd, investment rates, and level of slaughtering. It was found that 
coupled beef premiums generally had a positive effect on the size of the herd and the 
level of market supply on beef products; however this effect varied between types of 
cattle. In case of decoupled aid after 2013, production decisions merely depended on 
past and present prices in case of male cattle; regarding reproductive stock (cows and 
heifers), the expected future prices were also an important factor. All in all, direct 
support might have added to production levels, but they did not have a significant 
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influence on investment decisions, whereby farmers’ expectations play the major 
role, due to the long-term nature of cattle production. 
Certain articles analyzed the effect of direct payments on farm investment with a 
focus on the decoupling of support. Viaggi et al. (2010) investigated the effect of the 
decoupling of CAP direct payments on income and investment choices of a sample 
of farmers from 8 different Member States, in the period of 2006-2013 and 2014-
2021. They ran two scenarios of farm household dynamic models using multi-
objective integer programming: one before the decoupling took place in 2003, the 
other assuming full decoupling of direct payments. The results show that investments 
are not affected at all in the majority of cases. This diversity of farming systems has 
to be taken into account when evaluating policy programs. 
In another article the authors (Viaggi et al, 2011a) looked into the same problem with 
different methods. They analyzed a sample of 248 farms from 8 countries, using non-
parametric classification tree methods. The focus of their research was to identify the 
underlying factors of on-farm investment decisions as a reaction to decoupling. It 
was found that specialization, existence of a successor, the farmer’s age, labour 
management, the amount of support per hectare are important determinants of 
investment decisions, along with the country the farm is located in (which even tends 
to substitute the some of the above-mentioned factors). Decoupling in itself generally 
cannot change farmers’ investment choices, although it can contribute to the amount 
of investment if a farmer already has a positive attitude towards it. This was also 
established in a further study by the authors (Viaggi et al, 2011b), where a mixed-
method approach was utilized (an analysis was performed using quantitative 
modelling methods as well as farm surveys and interviews). 
In theory, if financial support no longer requires actual agricultural production, then 
loss-making activities could be expected to be discontinued, thereby resulting in 
disinvestment, loss of production and possible farm exit. Kazukauskas et al (2013) 
used FADN data from the EU-15 countries for the period 2001-2007 in order to 
model possible decreases in production and disinvestment as an outcome of 
decoupling. The authors used a difference-in-differences approach (exploiting the 
fact that total decoupling was introduced at a different time in Member States) to 
estimate these possible effects. It was found that the probability of disinvestment did 
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not increase (contrary to theoretical expectations) after policy decoupling. The 
certainty of decoupled direct payments and the increase of cash flow could be the 
cause of this effect. Land reduction was also not detectable as a consequence of 
decoupling, because the payment of decoupled support was only granted on 
condition of the presence of agricultural land at the farmer’s disposal. 
From the above-mentioned articles we can draw the conclusion that direct payments 
(either coupled or decoupled), are quite neutral in terms of farm investment. 
However, in certain countries or sectors, there can be exceptions to this general rule. 
One example would be the case of economies in transition. Latruffe et al (2010) 
analysed the potential credit constrains Lithuanian farmers were facing, and the 
effect of CAP direct payments on those constrains. First, they analysed the pre-
accession situation using data on individual farmers in the FADN for the period 
2000-2002, to identify whether their economic activities were limited due to a 
shortage of finance. A two-stage, accelerator investment model was used for this 
purpose. Secondly, a survey was conducted with the same group of farmers in 2005 
to inquire about their plans for the future regarding farm investments, which was 
then supported by the presence of direct payments. Farms facing severe constrains 
for credit were often smaller in size, with lower levels of subsidies and little 
knowledge and experience about acquiring loans. The analysis uncovered that the 
introduction of CAP support brought about an overall increasing willingness towards 
farm investments, but farmers who were previously more constrained for credit 
proved especially eager to expand their businesses. This underlines the income effect 
of direct payments, which provide farmers with a relatively stable income element 
that can be directly invested or used to gain access to credit. This was also confirmed 
by Ciaian et al. (2012), who analysed the impact of direct payments on farm bank 
loans and by using a panel regression on FADN data for the period 1995-2007. They 
found that direct payments influenced farm loans, though long-term loans of large 
farms increased more than those of small farms, due to decoupled payments. 
Moreover, short-term loans for small farms were found to be only affected by 
decoupled subsidies. 
In a study with similar focus, Tóth et al. (2017) studied the effects of the CAP on 
access to credit of Slovakian farms in the period following the country’s EU 
accession. They found that direct payments significantly improve farms’ access to 
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credit, because they seem to decrease the overall risk of farm activities. Because 
most direct payments are linked to size of agricultural area, larger crop farms tend to 
have a better position because they receive a high amount of direct payments. The 
main factor for banks when considering credit decisions is profitability, which is 
enhanced by direct payments. 
Kallas et al (2012) also arrived at a different result than the majority of studies in the 
field of policy effects on investment. FADN data of the Spanish cereal, oilseed and 
protein (COP) sector for 2000-2004 was used in order to estimate a reduced form 
dual model of investment under uncertainty. It was found that area-based direct 
payments increased demand for variable inputs and through this, they generated 
agricultural production in the short term. Farm investment was also increased by 
direct support, and it was also influenced by input and output prices, level of risk and 
the utilization of insurance schemes, the age of the farmer and land use structures. 
Production decisions (in terms of which crop to grow), however, were only 
influenced by market prices for inputs and outputs. 
 
The reviewed articles analyzing the effects of direct payments on investment are 
summarized in table 10. 
 
Table 10 – Effects of direct payments on investment 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Sckokai and 
Moro (2009) 
Effects of arable 
CAP payments 
on farm 
investment and 
output 
Italy Dynamic dual 
model of farm 
decision-making 
Increasing the level of 
support that does not 
influence price volatility 
(direct payments) has no 
significant effect on 
investment decisions. 
Piot-Lepetit 
(2011) 
Effect of CAP 
support on the 
beef sector 
All Member 
States 
Dynamic 
microeconomic 
model 
Direct support might 
have added to production 
levels, but they did not 
have a significant 
influence on investment 
decisions, whereby 
farmers’ price 
expectations play the 
major role. 
Viaggi et al. Effect of Several Farm household Investments are not 
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(2010) decoupling on 
farm investment 
Member 
States 
dynamic models 
using multi-
objective integer 
programming 
affected at all in the 
majority of decoupling 
policy scenarios. 
Viaggi et al 
(2011a, 2011b) 
Effect of 
decoupling on 
farm investment 
Several 
Member 
States 
Classification tree 
Mixed-method 
approach 
Decoupling in itself 
generally cannot change 
farmers’ investment 
choices, although it can 
contribute to the amount 
of investment if a farmer 
already has a positive 
attitude towards it. 
Kazukauskas 
et al (2013) 
Effect of 
decoupling on 
production, 
investment, farm 
exit 
Old 
Member 
States (EU-
15) 
Difference of 
differences 
approach 
The probability of 
disinvestment did not 
increase after policy 
decoupling. The certainty 
of decoupled direct 
payments and the 
increase of cash flow 
could be the cause of this 
effect. 
Latruffe et al 
(2010) 
Analysis of farm 
credit constrains 
Lithuania Two-stage, 
accelerator 
investment model 
The introduction of CAP 
support eased credit 
constrains farmers were 
facing; consequently it 
brought about an overall 
increasing willingness 
towards farm 
investments. 
Ciaian et al. 
(2012) 
Impact of direct 
payments on 
farm bank loans 
All Member 
States 
Panel regression on 
FADN data 
Direct payments 
influenced farm loans 
positively (mainly the 
long-term loans of large 
farms). 
Tóth et al. 
(2017) 
Effects of CAP 
on credit 
Slovakia Analysis of farm-
level subsidy and 
financial data 
Direct payments 
significantly improve 
farms’ access to credit, 
because they decrease the 
risk of farm activities. 
Kallas et al 
(2012) 
Policy effects on 
investment 
Spain Reduced form dual 
model of investment 
Farm investment was 
increased by direct 
support, and it was also 
influenced by input and 
output prices, level of 
risk and the utilization of 
insurance schemes, the 
age of the farmer and 
land use structures. 
Source: own composition 
 
In summary, most reviewed articles found that direct support does not have a 
significant farm investment effect. Price expectations, risk preferences, production 
and land use structures play a more important role in this regard. The decoupling of 
direct payments in itself was not able to change farm investment choices altogether, 
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although it may have increased the extent of farm investment that the farmer already 
decided to perform, regardless of decoupling. 
There is one notable exception, however: in case of New Member States, certain 
groups of farms faced very severe credit constrains before the EU-accession. In these 
countries, direct payments (which represent a relatively stable income source) helped 
farmers gain access to credit and consequently bolstered investment. Also, the 
investment effect varies quite significantly between Member States and sectors; this 
also has to be taken into consideration during the policy effects on investment. 
 
3.6.2 The effect of direct payments on farm employment conditions 
 
3.6.2.1 Farm employment issues 
 
The creation of jobs in rural areas is one of the major policy expectations towards the 
CAP. Petrick et al (2012) analyzed the effects of the CAP with a dynamic, fixed-
effects labour demand equation. The data on support and other economic indices and 
indicators came from 69 East-German counties in the period 1994-2006. It was found 
that agricultural employment was decreasing steadily in the study period. The level 
of employment was responding very slowly to any economic changes (compared to 
other sectors of the economy), especially in the case of family farms. Direct 
payments and area-based rural development measures had no effect on employment 
in the model. The decoupling of direct payments further increased job cuts, because 
the extra labour was no longer needed to maintain the production requirements of 
former coupled payments. However, investment measures (typically financing 
buildings and machinery) could under certain conditions be used to create jobs.  On 
the whole, CAP was not found to be particularly effective for increasing farm 
employment. 
Another study by the authors on the same subject came to slightly different results. 
Petrick et al (2011) conducted an impact evaluation of the CAP on agricultural 
employment in German states Brandenburg, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. Instead of 
using a basic treatment-effect model, they applied a difference-in differences 
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approach on panel data aggregated at county level from 1995-2006. The utilization of 
panel data allows for the elimination of time-fixed latent effects from the analysis, as 
well as studying the delayed effects of policy treatment on employment. The results 
showed that investment measures and income transfers to least favoured areas have 
no effect on employment levels. The increase of direct payments led to a reduction of 
jobs, especially after decoupling support from production. Agri-environment 
measures, on the other hand, promoted labour-intensive agricultural operations and 
technologies, and could therefore contribute to maintaining the level of rural 
employment in the study regions. 
Malá et al (2011) examined the economic effects of CAP payments on Czech 
agricultural businesses. Panel data of 109 plant production farms was used from the 
period 2004-2009 to construct production, cost and profit function models, as well as 
demand functions for land and labour. The models showed that a 1% increase in 
direct payments lower production by 0,185%. Other subsidy types had no statistically 
significant impact on production levels. On the other hand, direct payments increased 
the demand for land (a majority of support is based on the size of agricultural area), 
and farm profits. Demand for labour was a factor of agricultural output and the price 
of work (wages), but the level of subsidies did not influence it in any way. 
Dupraz and Latruffe (2015) analysed trends in labour in French field crop farms by 
applying censored models on French FADN data for the period 1990-2007. The 
authors found that coupled and decoupled direct payments reduced labour use on 
farms. 
Gohin and Latruffe (2006) analysed the effects of the 2003 CAP reform on, inter 
alia, farm labour and by using a CGE model, the authors found a significant decline 
in agricultural labour after 2003, while employment in food processing has hardly 
changed.  
The above-mentioned studies seem to confirm that direct payments are generally 
unable to create agricultural jobs. Moreover, decoupled subsidies even tend to 
contribute to the reduction of agricultural employment. Not all research arrived at the 
same conclusion, however. Olper et al (2014) used FADN panel data of 150 
European regions across the EU-15 (old Member States) from the period 1990-2009 
to model labour migration from farms towards non-farming sectors. A static, fixed 
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effects model and a dynamic model a labour supply equation was set up, where 
factors included the level of Pillar I/Pillar II payments, relative wages in the 
farm/non-farm sectors, population density, unemployment etc. The model identified 
that CAP support played a role in maintaining the number of agricultural jobs, 
although the strength of the effect is small. Direct payments had a much stronger 
effect in this regard, compared to Pillar II support. Coupled direct payments were 
more helpful in keeping jobs than decoupled aid. Other significant factors that 
influenced out-farm migration were the differences between income and labour 
supply in farm and non-farm sectors and unemployment rate. 
A similar conclusion was reached by Nordin (2014), who examined the effects of the 
2013 CAP reform on agricultural employment in Swedish municipalities. A not very 
widely analyzed aspect of the reform was that permanent grasslands became eligible 
for basic income support under the reform, a fact that had a profound support 
redistributive effect because of the high share of grasslands in Sweden. Using a panel 
dataset on 261 municipalities from 2001 to 2009, as well as statistical data on 
employment and support payments, a fixed effect model was set up with instrumental 
variables. The results showed that employment increases with the share of grassland, 
about 11.000 euro of direct payments generate one job in agriculture. Therefore the 
support on grassland was at least partially effective in keeping the number of 
agricultural jobs stable. This effect was limited by the requirements of cross-
compliance which the farmers have to observe in order to be eligible for support, 
which generated costs and thus weakened the income effect of subsidies. 
3.6.2.2 Off-farm employment, part-time farming 
 
Based on the above-mentioned articles, it can be stated that the effect of direct 
payments on farm employments is controversial at best. Concerning bolstering off-
farm employment and the promotion of part-time farming, however, CAP seems to 
be more successful in meeting its goals. Rizov et al (2018) made a study into the 
effects of CAP payments on non-farm employment in the UK. The data from 2006 to 
2014 on UK small and middle-sized enterprises came from a private business 
database (FAME); furthermore CAP payments data from the Paying Agency were 
also analyzed. The generalized method of moments (GMM) was used to estimate the 
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link between subsidies and employment. The study found a significant positive effect 
between CAP payments and non-farm employment, meaning that the CAP indeed 
can create jobs outside the farming sector, as a kind of spill-over effect. It is 
important to point out that this effect is stronger in the case of Pillar II. (rural 
development) subsidies as compared to Pillar I. (direct payments), per euro spent. 
The employment effect is twice as high in rural areas as in urban regions. 
Further evidence also hints at a positive link between CAP subsidies and off-farm 
work. Benjamin (1994) analysed diversification activities of French farm households 
by using a neoclassical farm household model and showed that compensatory 
payments (direct payments) increased the probability of off-farm work participation, 
especially for educated wives. This may be related to the concentration effect of 
direct subsidies (Mizik, 2019), as a result of which farms either increase their size (if 
they are able to do so) or diversify their activities by looking for part-time 
opportunities. 
Blomquist and Nordin (2017) analysed the impact of CAP subsidies on employment 
outside the agricultural sector by making estimations on Swedish municipality data 
between 2001 and 2009. Results suggest that direct payments create private jobs for 
about $26,000 per job. 
Off-farm employment was also strengthened by the decoupling of payments. 
Hennessy and Rehmann (2008) analyzed the effect of the 2003 CAP reform on 
labour allocation decisions of Irish farmers. A dataset from the national agricultural 
survey was used in a household decision-making probit model to identify labour-
related effects. It was found that decoupling causes a labour substitution effect 
(decoupling causes farm wages to drop, which incentivizes farmers to seek off-farm 
employment). The empirical analysis confirmed decoupling increases the probability 
of farmers seeking off-farm employment on the whole. 
Part-time farming was also researched by Latruffe and Mann (2015), who 
investigated the level of subsidization of part-time farmers in France and 
Switzerland. They used a large sample of FADN farms from 2003, and applied a 
nonlinear economic regression analysis, which included control variables like 
farmland, labour, region, part-time character, age of farmer and labour intensity. The 
results showed that the relationship between the level of direct payments and the 
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part-time character of farms is not linear: farms with a low part-time character 
received less payment, but farms with a strong part-time character generally received 
more. This is contrary to the general belief that part-time farms are not subsidized in 
a sufficient manner. Part-time farms with less livestock and larger agricultural areas 
received especially high amounts of direct payments. Moreover, decoupling (which 
had not taken place in the study period) could further enhance part-time farmers’ 
positions. 
Furthermore, based on a survey carried out in 2009 among 295 French CAP 
beneficiaries, Latruffe et al (2013) considered farmers’ reactions in case the CAP 
was abolished. Respondents of the survey had to describe their ten-year business 
strategy in a scenario where CAP was continued in an unchanged way, as well as a 
scenario where all support was removed from 2014. The survey results were then 
examined with cluster analysis. The results showed that most farmers would not 
change their farming activities in case CAP was discontinued. However, 19% of 
respondents would quit farming in a no-CAP scenario, and a further 13% was 
uncertain about their strategy. In the absence of the CAP, intensive crop farms would 
increase their off-farm activities, substituting household labour with contract work. 
Part-time farming would also gain popularity among farmers. 
The reviewed articles analyzing the effects of direct payments on employment are 
summarized in table 11. 
 
Table 11 – Effects of direct payments on employment 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Petrick et al 
(2012) 
The effect of 
subsidies on farm 
employment 
Germany Fixed-effects 
labour demand 
equation 
Direct payments and 
area-based rural 
development measures 
had no effect on 
employment. Decoupling 
further increased job cuts 
(the extra labour was no 
longer needed to 
maintain the production 
requirements of former 
coupled payments). 
Petrick et al 
(2011) 
The effect of 
subsidies on farm 
Germany Difference-in 
differences 
Investment measures and 
income transfers have no 
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employment approach on panel 
data 
effect on employment 
levels. The increase of 
direct payments led to a 
reduction of jobs, 
especially after 
decoupling. 
Malá et al 
(2011) 
Economic effects 
of CAP subsidies 
Czech 
Republic 
Production, cost 
and profit function 
models, demand 
functions for land 
and labour. 
Demand for labour was a 
factor of agricultural 
output and wages, but the 
level of subsidies did not 
influence it in any way. 
Dupraz and 
Latruffe 
(2015) 
Trends in labour 
in French arable 
farms 
France Censored models 
on French FADN 
data 
Coupled and decoupled 
direct payments reduced 
labour use on farms. 
Gohin and 
Latruffe 
(2006) 
The effect of 
decoupling on 
farm labour use 
Old Member 
States (EU-
15) 
Computable 
General 
Equilibrium model 
There was a significant 
decline in agricultural 
labour after decoupling, 
while employment in 
food processing has 
hardly changed. 
Olper et al 
(2014) 
Effect of CAP 
support on farm 
employment 
Old Member 
States (EU-
15) 
Static, fixed effects 
model and a 
dynamic model of 
labour supply 
equation 
CAP support played a 
role in maintaining the 
number of agricultural 
jobs, although the 
strength of the effect is 
small. Direct payments 
had a much stronger 
effect in this regard, 
compared to Pillar II 
support. Coupled direct 
payments were more 
helpful in keeping jobs 
than decoupled aid. 
Nordin (2014) Effect of the 2013 
CAP reform on 
agricultural 
employment 
Sweden Fixed-effects 
model with 
instrumental 
variables 
Employment increases 
with the share of 
subsidized grassland, 
about 11.000 euro of 
direct payments generate 
one job in agriculture. 
Rizov et al 
(2018) 
Effects of CAP 
payments on non-
farm employment 
United 
Kingdom 
Generalized 
method of 
moments 
There is a significant 
positive effect between 
CAP payments and non-
farm employment, 
meaning that the CAP 
indeed can create jobs 
outside the farming 
sector, as a kind of spill-
over effect. 
Benjamin 
(1994) 
Diversification 
activities of 
French farm 
households 
France Neoclassical farm 
household model 
Direct payments 
increased the probability 
of off-farm work 
participation. 
Blomquist and 
Nordin (2017) 
Impact of CAP 
subsidies on 
employment 
outside the 
agricultural sector 
Sweden Estimations on 
Swedish 
municipality data 
Direct payments create 
private jobs for about 
$26,000 per job. 
 
Hennessy and 
Rehmann 
(2008) 
Effect of the 2003 
CAP reform on 
labour allocation 
Ireland Household 
decision-making 
probit model 
Decoupling increases the 
probability of farmers 
seeking off-farm 
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decisions employment. 
Latruffe and 
Mann (2015) 
subsidization of 
part-time farmers  
France 
Switzerland 
Nonlinear 
economic 
regression analysis 
with control 
variables 
Farms with a low part-
time character received 
less direct payments, but 
farms with a strong part-
time character generally 
received more. 
Latruffe et al 
(2013) 
Policy scenario 
analysis 
France Analysis of survey 
results 
Part-time farming could 
gain popularity under 
certain conditions. 
Source: own composition 
 
The effect of direct payments on farm employment as documented by the reviewed 
articles is controversial. Most articles find no significant relationship between direct 
support and farm employment, meaning that the policy fails to influence rural 
employment conditions in the desired manner. On the other hand, a few articles did 
find a positive link between direct support and farm labour use. However, the 
scientific literature seems to agree upon the finding that decoupling generally caused 
a loss of jobs in agriculture (because farmers no longer had to comply with the 
production criteria set forth in former coupled support schemes). On the subject of 
creating off-farm jobs and promoting part-time farming, the CAP seems to play a 
beneficial role. In any case, in connection with the above findings, it should be noted 
that further research is needed on the impact of the CAP on agricultural employment, 
in particular due to the role of technological development and the elimination of 
black and gray economies, which make scientific clarity difficult in this topic. 
 
3.6.3 The effect of direct payments on external and internal markets 
 
3.6.3.1 External markets 
 
Public intervention usually comes with market-distortive side effects. This is also the 
case with the CAP, the effects of which was examined by Urban et al (2016), 
focusing on the impact of the 2013 decoupling of the CAP on international trade. The 
trade distorting effect of domestic subsidies is a thoroughly researched topic. This 
study analyzed how this distortion changed with the decoupling of CAP direct 
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payments. The authors applied the Global Trade Analysis Project model in different 
scenarios (with variable levels of decoupling). They found that the effect on 
international trade depend highly on the level of decoupling introduced into the CAP. 
Rickard et al (2011) arrived at a similar conclusion. They used a simulation model to 
measure the impacts of CAP policy reforms in the fruit and vegetable sector. The 
policy between 1978 and 2000 included quotas, guaranteed minimum prices for 
tomato growers and support for processors. In the period 2001-2007, a fixed amount 
was paid per ton of tomatoes to growers. From 2008, the fruit and vegetable sector 
was gradually included in the decoupling of direct payments. The result of the 
calculation showed that EU producers and global consumers benefitted most from 
CAP subsidies (during all three periods), while non-EU producers and EU taxpayers 
would have benefitted most from the total elimination of CAP payments. Since the 
EU is an exporter of processed tomato products, theoretically this makes sense. It 
was also found that the policy reform of 2001 did not bring much change concerning 
the production decisions of farmers, but the 2008 decoupling did. The situation is the 
same in case of the level of taxpayer expenditures. All in all, the decoupling did 
bring about a less production-distortive policy and more benefits for EU growers. 
Boysen-Urban et al. (2019) also confirmed this, when they measured the trade 
restrictiveness of decoupled direct payments by an own index (Mercantilist Trade 
Restrictiveness Index) and showed that trade restrictiveness of the CAP decreased by 
the introduction of direct payments. Moreover, the authors found that trade 
restrictiveness depended on the degree of decoupling. 
3.6.3.2 Internal market 
 
The functioning of the single market within the EU necessitates the uniform 
implementation of Community policies in different Member States. If public 
intervention differs in fundamental ways, market distortions on the highly integrated 
single market are quick to appear. While the CAP strives at uniformity across the 
EU, there are decisions and options that can be elected at Member State level. 
Researchers warn that such deviations have to be applied carefully, in order to avoid 
distortions on the single market. Ihle et al (2012) used weekly calf prices from four 
major producer countries after the 2003 CAP reform in order to identify policy 
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effects on commodity price. A price transmission analysis with unit root tests and the 
utilization of Vector Error Correction Model was performed. It was found that the 
markets in different European countries are highly integrated (common market). 
Decoupling decreased prices in all markets – the higher the level of decoupling, the 
lower the price.  Differences in the level of decoupling (which was, to a certain, in 
the hands of Member State administrations) therefore led to significant import/export 
consequences (due to the high interconnectivity of European markets). The CAP 
decision to allow for deviations in certain policy questions has to be evaluated very 
carefully, because of the economic affects it may have on the common European 
market. 
Contrary to the traditional top-down approach of the CAP, the 2014 reform of the 
agricultural policy sought to introduce flexibility for Member States in defining 
certain policy issues at a national level. Henke et al (2018) examined this increase in 
subsidiarity based on a structural survey filled out by experts of each Member State, 
as well as formal communications from the European Commission. The study 
examined policy elements like the speed of transition towards flat-rate payments in 
the Basic Payment Scheme; the restrictiveness of eligibility criteria imposed on 
farmers by Member State administrations; and the extent of redistribution among 
beneficiaries. The Member States were then grouped into clusters based on their 
choices. The first cluster consisted mainly of old continental Member States who 
moved quickly towards a uniform unit amount of payment, but took limited interest 
in further redistribution or restriction of payments. The second cluster was made up 
by old Mediterranean Member States, who exhibited a very cautious approach 
towards flat rate-payments, and defined a wide range of eligibility criteria to restrict 
direct payments to farmers of the previous period. The third cluster consisted of new 
Member States who chose to keep the previously introduced Single Area Payment 
Scheme, and also took a lot of effort into further redistribution of direct payments. 
The fourth cluster’s members tried to uphold the status quo of former payments 
without any particular attempts at redistribution or selectivity of eligible farmers. The 
flexibility of the CAP can be a good tool to depart from the “one size fits all” 
approach and arrive at a better targeted and streamlined set of policy instruments. 
However, special note should be taken on the possible distortions of the common 
market in the case of deviating economic policies across the EU. 
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The reviewed articles analyzing the effects of direct payments on external trade and 
internal markets are summarized in table 12. 
 
Table 12 – Effects of direct payments on external trade and internal 
markets 
 
Author Topic Country Method Result 
Urban et al 
(2016) 
Impact of the 
2013 decoupling 
of the CAP on 
international 
trade 
All Member 
States 
Global Trade 
Analysis Project 
The effect on 
international trade 
depends highly on the 
level of decoupling 
introduced into the CAP. 
Rickard et al 
(2011) 
Impacts of CAP 
policy reforms in 
the fruit and 
vegetable sector 
All Member 
States 
simulation model on 
different policy 
choices 
EU producers and global 
consumers benefitted 
most from CAP subsidies, 
while non-EU producers 
and EU taxpayers would 
benefit most from the 
elimination of CAP. 
Decoupling brought about 
a less production-
distortive policy and more 
benefits for EU growers. 
Boysen-
Urban et al. 
(2019) 
Trade 
restrictiveness of 
decoupled direct 
payments 
All Member 
States 
Mercantilist Trade 
Restrictiveness 
Index 
Trade restrictiveness of 
the CAP decreased by the 
introduction of direct 
payments, and also by 
decoupling. 
Ihle et al 
(2012) 
Price 
transmission 
study on the beef 
market 
Several 
Member 
States 
Price transmission 
analysis with unit 
root tests and 
Vector Error 
Correction Model 
Markets in different 
European countries are 
highly integrated. 
Deviations in certain 
policy choices in Member 
States may distort the 
common market. 
Henke et al 
(2018) 
National policy 
choices on the 
2013 CAP reform 
All Member 
States 
 The flexibility of the CAP 
can be a good policy tool, 
but special note should be 
taken on the possible 
distortions of the common 
market. 
Source: own composition 
 
A very common criticism concerning public economic intervention is its market-
distorting properties. Concerning CAP impacts on external markets, the relevant 
studies mainly focus on decoupling, which was – to a significant extent – introduced 
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exactly because of world trade considerations. The reviewed articles showed that 
decoupling succeeded in reaching its intended goal in this regard, because the CAP 
became less market distortive after decoupling took place. Concerning internal 
markets, researchers warn us that the EU internal market is highly integrated; 
therefore differences in subsidizing between countries can have significant distortion 
effects. These differences arise from the fact that the agricultural policy across the 
EU on the one hand is common in terms of a shared legislative, planning, control and 
financial framework, but on the other hand it leaves an ever increasing room for 
Member States to deviate in a number of policy choices. The growing subsidiarity of 
the policy may be a cause for concern in this regard. 
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4. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the research methods, from asking the research 
questions to presenting the hypotheses to the data collection and the description of 
the applied models. 
 
4.1 Research questions 
 
The main aim of my research is to show the effects of direct payments at the regional 
level in the Member States of the European Union. The most important socio-
economic impacts are addressed, according to the literature review. My research 
questions are: 
 
1. What are the regional effects of direct payments in the European Union? 
2. How different are the effects in the old and in the new Member States? 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
 
I seek the answer to the above research questions with the following hypotheses. 
 
H1: Direct payments increase agricultural income at regional level in the 
European Union. 
 
There is a vast range of literature on state intervention in agriculture and one of their 
central assumptions is that the intervention is needed to increase the traditionally low 
incomes from agriculture (Bojnec-Fertő, 2019). The variability and low level of 
income from agriculture are typical characteristics of the sector, which mainly are 
caused by weather conditions, volatile agricultural markets, and factors of 
production. At the same time, the effectiveness of government subsidies does not 
always produce the desired results. According to part of the literature, direct 
payments have increased farmers' incomes at the national level (Boysen et al. 2016, 
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Ciaian et al. 2015), while in other articles this effect is far from clear (Viaggi et al. 
2010, Vosough Ahmadi et al. 2015). 
I expect a positive relationship between the regional income and support payments 
data collected to test the hypothesis, i.e. I assume that direct support has an income-
increasing effect. 
 
H2: Direct payments increase regional agricultural productivity in the European 
Union. 
 
One of the classic dilemmas of agricultural economics / agricultural policy is 
whether agricultural subsidies can increase productivity. According to some views, 
direct payments increase agricultural productivity (Cillero et al. 2018, Kazukauskas 
et al. 2010), while others arrived at the opposite result (Zhu et al. 2012, Mary 2013). 
The hypothesis is based on the assumption that direct payments have the potential to 
increase unit added value. Accepting the hypothesis also has a serious economic 
policy message. 
To test the hypothesis, I plan to examine changes in land and labor productivity. This 
requires regional agricultural productivity data, which I interpret as the quotient of 
regional agricultural value added and land or labour. I expect a positive link, namely 
that direct payments will increase agricultural productivity. 
To test the hypothesis, I formulated two sub-hypotheses: 
H2.1 Direct payments increase the productivity of agricultural labour at regional 
level. 
H2.2 Direct payments increase the productivity of agricultural land at regional level. 
 
H3: Direct payments alleviate income inequality and regional poverty in the 
European Union. 
 
Direct payments have not only economic but also social effects. Reducing rural 
poverty and reducing the agricultural / non-agricultural income gap can be seen as an 
indirect objective of the Common Agricultural Policy. This assumption is based on 
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the fact that agriculture in rural areas is still a serious job-creating factor and a kind 
of “shelter” (Bojnec-Fertő, 2019). 
When examining regional impacts, the question arises as to whether direct payments 
alleviate poverty and income inequalities within regions. To test these questions, I 
formulated two sub-hypotheses: 
H3.1 Direct payments alleviate income inequalities in the European Union. 
H3.2 Direct payments alleviate regional poverty in the European Union. 
In both cases, I assume a positive relationship, i.e. that direct aids have a favourable 
restructuring and social role. 
 
H4: The regional effects of direct payments will level off in the European Union 
over time. 
 
The above hypotheses basically examine the effects within regions and interpreted 
for each region, i.e. they look at how much the actual situation has changed in each 
region. At the same time, it is also interesting to examine, in relation to research 
questions, whether there has been any change between regions - are the regional 
effects of direct payments converging or diverging? Are the differences between the 
EU-15 and the new Member States and between regions increasing or decreasing? 
 
I am aware that the hypotheses listed above do not cover all the potential economic 
impacts I have identified in the literature review. In this regard, I emphasize that in 
the literature review, I wanted to give a complete picture of all the areas that the 
scientific literature has identified and examined in the subject. Not all areas will be 
presented in this dissertation - due to the limits of scope and methodological reasons, 
or in light of available data. 
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4.3 Analytical framework 
 
As can be seen from the literature review, a number of models have been developed 
in recent decades to examine the effects of direct subsidies. These models are mostly 
ex-ante in nature, i.e., they run simulations and scenarios and examine expected 
future impacts. Such specific industry models have been used by the following 
authors in the literature review, among others: 
• CAPRI: Biró et al. (2017), Britz et al. (2012), Gocht et al. (2013), Hoppe et al. 
(2009), Kozar et al. (2012), Sahrbacher et al. (2009); 
• AGMEMOD: Chantreuil et al. (2013), Erjavec et al. (2011), Erjavec and Salputra 
(2011), Hanrahan et al. (2012); 
• AgriPoliS: Happe et al. (2009), Sahrbacher et al. (2009). 
In addition, other quantified general equilibrium models (e.g., Boysen et al. 2016, 
Espinosa et al. 2014, Gelan and Schwarz 2008, Gohin and Latruffe 2006) and partial 
equilibrium models (Rednak et al. 2003, Rude 2008) have been used in several 
reviewed studies. The methods listed above are well suited for ex-ante modelling of 
the effects of possible agricultural policy changes. However, my research questions 
focus on the ex-post analysis of CAP effects, which is why the analytical tools listed 
above are of little relevance to the present research. 
There are a number of other classical impact assessment methods available for 
analyzing different economic policy interventions. In the impact assessment of the 
CAP, for example, the method of estimating the probability of participation 
(propensity score matching) or the difference of differences approach is also 
relatively common. However, these methods cannot be effectively used to analyze 
direct payments, as they compare the results of the observed and the control group, 
but the latter cannot be created for direct payments. In fact, virtually all farmers in all 
Member States receive direct support, so the possibility to establish a control group 
is severely constrained. 
At the same time, regional impact analysis of direct payments is a new area of CAP 
impact assessment, for which these models are not suitable due to lack of data, and 
which is an area of research not yet explored in the literature. Impact assessments to 
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date, as can be seen from the literature analysis, typically focus on countries, while 
regional impacts are not examined. For these reasons, I decided – in accordance with 
the international literature (Bojnec and Fertő 2019, Ciaian et al. 2015, Galluzzo 
2018b, Kilian et al. 2012, Klaiber et al. 2017, Petrick and Zier 2011, Severini et al. 
2017, Tangermann 1998, and others) – to carry out a classic ex-post impact analysis 
based on regional data at NUTS2 level from 2008 to 2018. 
 
4.4 Research data 
 
In order to test the research hypotheses, it was necessary to build a unique database 
in accordance with the analytical framework, which was based on the following 
databases: 
• Data on the volume of direct payments are from the Clearance Audit Trail 
System (CATS) database. The database is operated by the European 
Commission and records all payments made under any CAP support on an 
annual basis and by beneficiary. The data are reported to the Commission by 
the Member States each year and form the basis for the financial accounting 
between the Commission and the Member States. 
• I downloaded regional data from the Annual Regional Database of the 
European Commission (ARDECO). The database is operated by the 
Commission's Joint Research Center; it is mainly based on Eurostat data but 
also involves additional data sources. The database contains regional data on 
demographics, labour market, capital formation, and gross domestic product, 
broken down by sector. 
• The source of data on poverty and income inequality was the EU Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) database. 
• I collected several control variables for the applied models from the Eurostat 
database (income, agricultural land, population density data). 
 
The variables used for the research are shown in Table 13: 
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Table 13 – Description of the variables used for modelling 
 
Variable name Description of variable Unit of measure Data source 
dp Amount of direct payments € CATS 
gdp 
Gross domestic product (GDP), current 
prices million PPS ARDECO 
gdpperhead GDP/capita PPS ARDECO 
aggva 
Gross Value Added in the agricultural 
sector (GVA), current prices million PPS ARDECO 
nonaggva 
Gross Value Added in all sectors 
outside agriculture (GVA), current 
prices million PPS ARDECO 
gvagrowth 
Total GVA growth, compared to the 
previous year % Eurostat 
gfcf 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) 
in agriculture, current prices million € ARDECO 
agempl Agricultural employment thousand persons ARDECO 
nonagempl Non-agricultural employment thousand persons ARDECO 
salaries 
Salaries of persons working in 
agriculture million PPS ARDECO 
riskofsocial 
Rate of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion % EU-SILC 
uaanew Utilized agricultural area hectares Eurostat 
popdens Population density 
persons/square 
kilometre Eurostat 
convergence 
Regions eligible for financing from the 
European Regional Development Fund, 
or the European Social Fund 
(convergence regions) 
0 – non-
convergence 
region; 1 – 
convergence 
region 
Implementing 
decision of the 
European 
Commission, 18 
February 2014 
entreincome Income of agricultural holdings million € Eurostat 
hhincome Household income (non-agricultural) million € Eurostat 
foldtermnew 
Productivity of agricultural land: 
agricultural GVA divided by the 
utilized agricultural area 
million 
PPS/hectare derived statistic 
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munkatermnew 
Productivity of agricultural labour: 
agricultural GVA divided by 
agricultural employment 
million 
PPS/thousand 
persons derived statistic 
incomeratio 
Rate of agricultural income compared to 
total household income ratio  (from 0 to 1) derived statistic 
oms 
Old Member State (Member of EU 
before 2004) 
0 – New Member 
State 
1 – Old Member 
State 
European 
Commission 
nms 
New Member State (Member of EU 
from 2004 or later) 
0 – Old Member 
State 
1 – New Member 
State 
European 
Commission 
 Source: own composition 
 
In most cases, I also used the logarithmized version of the variables listed above (in 
this case I inserted the abbreviation ‘ln’ in front of the variable name). 
All the data for the variables in the table above are available per NUTS2 region. Data 
are also broken down by year, covering the period 2008-2018 (however, data for 
some variables are not available for each year). 
The names and codes of the regions are included in the dissertation according to the 
NUTS 2016 nomenclature. Out of a total of 281 NUTS2 regions, 244 regions are 
included in the database. The other regions were excluded from the scope of the 
analysis due to lack of data, or due to the fact that the area of the given region 
changed during the analysis period (merged with several regions or split into several 
regions), so the data for them could not be used validly. The range of regions 
included in the analysis is given in Annex 1. 
After a uniform alignment of the values of the variables from the different data 
sources, a strongly balanced panel database was developed. 
The values of each variable can be characterized by the following descriptive 
statistics: 
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Table 14 – Main descriptive statistics of the model variables 
 
Variable name Unit of 
measure 
Number of 
observation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
dp € 2 684 149 
million 
169 
million 
0 1 610 
million 
nonagempl thousand 
persons 
2 684 790,36 722,88 16,63 6 431,32 
nonaggva million 
PPS 
2 684 44 159,97 51495 810,67 594 959 
hhincome million € 2 466 33 882,35 38 116 699,00 383 637 
gvagrowth % 2 384 1 3 -16 44 007 
entreincome million € 1 971 298,71 541,80 -523,00 9 169 
convergence 0 – non 
conv. 
region; 1 - 
conv. 
region 
2 684 0,27 0,44 0 1 
gdpperhead PPS 2 684 26 013,04 9 743 6 783 80 134 
gfcf million € 2 440 268,47 246,78 0,00 170 751 
gdp million 
PPS 
2 684 50 220,63 57 526 943,57 670 957 
aggva million 
PPS 
2 684 813,51 872,75 2,26 10 613,78 
salaries million 
PPS 
2 440 210,36 219,60 1,11 1 881,60 
agempl thousand 
persons 
2 684 41,99 74,94 0,10 827,38 
riskofsocial % 1 043 25,50 11,76 7,10 59,50 
lnnonagempl   2 684 6,34 0,86 2,81 8,77 
lnnonaggva   2 684 10,28 0,93 6,70 13,30 
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lngdpperhead   2 684 10,10 0,38 8,82 11,29 
lngfcf   2 439 5,18 1,04 0,80 7,77 
lngdp   2 684 10,42 0,91 6,85 13,42 
lnaggva   2 684 6,22 1,11 0,81 9,27 
lnsalaries   2 440 4,87 1,08 0,10 7,54 
lnagempl   2 684 2,97 1,26 -2,30 6,72 
lndp   2 683 18,26 1,23 12,13 21,20 
oms 0 – New 
Member 
State; 1 - 
Old 
Member 
State 
2 684 0,80 0,40 0 1 
nms 0 – Old 
Member 
State; 1 - 
New 
Member 
State 
2 684 0,20 0,40 0 1 
uaanew hectare 2 684 646,58 659,12 7,01 4 643,46 
lnuaanew   2 684 6,01 1,07 1,95 8,44 
foldtermnew million 
PPS/ 
hectare 
2 684 1,64 1,72 0,02 21,32 
munkatermnew million 
PPS/ 
thousand 
persons 
2 684 0,07 0,06 0,00 0,47 
lnfoldtermnew   2 684 0,21 0,74 -3,79 3,06 
lnmunkatermnew   2 684 -3,03 0,84 -9,07 -0,76 
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popdens persons/ 
square 
kilometre 
2 637 324,74 694,11 2,70 7 471,50 
lnpopdens   2 637 5,02 1,13 0,99 8,92 
incomeratio   1 891 0,02 0,03 -0,03 0,23 
lnhhincome   2 466 9,97 1,00 6,55 12,86 
lnentreincome   1 661 5,24 1,22 0,00 9,12 
Source: own composition 
 
4.5 Operationalization 
 
To test each hypothesis, I used random effects panel regression models, described in 
the following table. Where applicable, I used a logarithmic version of the variables to 
show percentage effects. In each case, I ran the models for all Member States and 
then separately for the old and new Member States. 
 
Table 15 – Regression models used in the research 
 
Variable 
name 
H1: 
income 
H2.1: labour 
productivity 
H2.2: land 
productivity 
H3.1: income 
inequality 
H3.2: 
poverty 
lndp explanatory 
variable 
explanatory 
variable 
explanatory 
variable 
explanatory 
variable 
explanatory 
variable 
Expected sign 
of exp. 
variable 
+ + + + - 
 
lnentreincome dependent 
variable 
 control variable   
lnmunkaterm  dependent 
variable 
   
lnfoldterm   dependent 
variable 
  
incomeratio  control variable  dependent 
variable 
 
riskofsocial     dependent 
variable 
 
lngdp control 
variable 
 control variable control variable control 
variable 
lngdpperhead   control variable control variable control 
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variable 
lnaggva control 
variable 
control variable  control variable control 
variable 
lnnonaggva  control variable control variable control variable control 
variable 
lnagempl   control variable control variable control 
variable 
lnnonagempl    control variable control 
variable 
lnhhincome control 
variable 
 control variable   
lnsalaries control 
variable 
control variable control variable control variable control 
variable 
lnpopdens  control variable control variable   
lngfcf  control variable control variable   
convergence  control variable control variable control variable control 
variable 
Source: own composition 
 
To test my fourth hypothesis on the equalization of the regional effects of direct 
payments over time, I made use of convergence theories. There are several methods 
for testing convergence between countries and regions. In this study I used Kernel 
density plots and Markov transition probability matrix methods (as presented by the 
article of Csáki and Jámbor, 2018). These methods are well suited to determine how 
asymmetric the distribution of the sample is, as well as to show whether there are 
significant differences in income, productivity, or social differences over time. Based 
on Csáki and Jámbor (2018), the Kernel method is suitable for identifying the 
external convergence, while the Markov method is suitable for identifying the 
internal convergence. Similar methods have previously been used to analyze the 
impact of CAP convergence, by Hansen and Teuber (2011), Montresor et al (2011), 
and Cuerva (2011) for example. 
 
I am also aware of the limitations of my research design. For example, it is clear 
from the structure of the Common Agricultural Policy that not only direct payments 
but also other forms of support (agri-environment, less-favoured areas, etc.) can have 
income, production factors or efficiency impacts. Also, there are other effects (e.g. 
farm structure, production structure) that I will not examine in the dissertation. 
Obviously, EU regional and rural development policies are also important in 
examining regional impacts, but this is a major issue that could be addressed in a 
separate dissertation. Furthermore, it is also quite clear that tests other than the ones 
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used in my dissertation may lead to different results. However, the chosen 
methodology was used by a high number of researchers in this subject. Moreover, the 
fact that direct payments accounted for more or less 75% of all CAP payments 
confirms that the research questions and hypotheses are worth analyzing. I took the 
above limitations into account during the research (for example, by using control 
variables in various models).  
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5. RESULTS 
 
 
5.1 Development of the level of direct support in the research period 
 
5.1.1 The total amount of direct payments 
 
The total amount of direct payments across the EU is presented in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 – Annual changes in the level of direct payments (million €) 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
As shown in the figure above, the study period can be divided into two parts in terms 
of the evolution of the amount of direct payments. From 2008 to 2013, the level of 
direct payments showed an upward trend. This is due to the phasing-in mechanism 
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mentioned earlier, under which the Member States that joined the EU in 2004 
received only 25% of the total amount at that time, which then gradually increased 
until 2013. In the period 2008-2013, the level of direct payments in these Member 
States in question increased by 10 percentage points each year. 
In the period 2014-2018, the level of direct subsidies stabilized, with smaller 
fluctuations in the range of 41-42 billion euros. I would like to draw attention to the 
fact that the 2014 reform of the CAP also fell into this period, in the course of which 
efforts were made to reduce the share of the CAP budget. Seeing the data, we can 
state that this was not successful in the case of direct payments, their amount showed 
relative stability in the examined period (however, there may have been a reduction 
in funding for Pillar II. rural development support). 
 
5.1.2 The amount of direct payments by country 
 
5.1.2.1 The level of direct payments in absolute terms 
 
The annual average amount of direct payments disbursed in each Member State in 
2008-2018 is as follows: 
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Figure 11 – Average annual amount of direct payments in Member 
States (million €) 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
On the one hand, Figure 11 illustrates the different size and significance of the 
agricultural sector in each country; on the other hand, disparities between Member 
States in the level of direct payments. During the period under review, Greece, 
Poland, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Germany and France were able to claim 
above-average amount of direct payments. Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of 
financial resources: 
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Figure 12 – Distribution of annual average direct payments between 
countries 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
Ten Member States received more than € 1 billion annually on average; these ten 
Member States accounted for around 82% of total direct payments. France had a 
much higher level of direct aid than any other country, receiving around € 7.7 billion 
in direct payments annually (19% of the average annual payment in the whole EU). 
This is followed by Germany, Spain and Italy (10-13%); followed by the United 
Kingdom, Poland and Greece (5-8%); and finally, Ireland, Romania and Hungary 
(3%). All other Member States had an average of over 18% of total payments during 
the period under review (slightly less than France). 
 
It is also interesting to see how the level of direct support changed in each country in 
the study period: 
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Figure 13 – Change of annual direct payment amounts from 2008 to 2018 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
Figure 13 shows the percentage change in direct payments from 2008 to 2018 
(except in Croatia, where I compared the level of payment in 2018 to the year of 
accession in 2014). The figure is in line with what was previously reported about the 
phasing-in mechanism. The phasing-in period in Romania and Bulgaria (2007-2016) 
almost completely overlaps with the study period, so it is not surprising that the level 
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of direct payments increased the most there. They are followed by the Member States 
that joined the EU in 2004, which also saw a significant increase. Of the old Member 
States, only Portugal and Spain were able to increase their direct payments during the 
study period, while the level of support in the other old Member States decreased (in 
most cases only to a lesser extent). 
 
5.1.2.2 The amount of direct payments per hectare 
 
In addition to examining the absolute value of direct payments, it is also worth 
analyzing how the distribution of direct payments per hectare developed in different 
Member States. Figure 14 shows the average amount of direct support per hectare, 
broken down by country. 
 
Figure 14 – Average direct payment amount by country in 2008-2018, 
€/hectare 
 
 
Source: own composition 
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Figure 14 illustrates the external convergence problems related to CAP direct support 
rather well. The level of direct payments per hectare varied widely between Member 
States in 2008-2018. Significantly lower than average aid intensities were found in 
new Member States (except for Cyprus and Malta), in particular the Baltic States, 
Romania and Bulgaria. In contrast, some old Member States (notably Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Greece) are still in a particularly good comparative position 
regarding direct payment intensity. I would like to draw the attention to the fact that 
for this figure, I divided the amount of direct subsidies by the utilized agricultural 
area; I did not take the size of eligible livestock into consideration, which would 
somewhat alter the picture. But as most direct payments are still paid on an area basis 
and not based on livestock numbers, the numbers are essentially valid. 
 
In addition, I note that the data on aid intensities in the new Member States are 
affected by the phasing-in effect, so it is worth examining the differences in aid 
intensities between countries at the end of the phasing-in period of new Member 
States: 
Figure 15 – Direct payment amount by country in 2018, €/hectare 
 
 
Source: own composition 
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Figure 15 does not show a significant difference from Figure 14. Although some 
Member States have swapped places, the main conclusions remain the same. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be said that (with the exception of Malta and Cyprus) the 
lower level of support in the new Member States is a temporary phenomenon due to 
phasing-in alone. 
 
Figure 16 shows the change in the intensity of direct payments: 
 
Figure 16 – Change of direct payment intensity, from 2008 to 2018 
 
 
Source: own composition 
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Roughly the same conclusion can be drawn from this figure as from Figure 13; the 
change in aid intensity was mainly determined by the phasing-in effect during the 
study period. 
 
5.1.3 The amount of direct payments by region 
 
5.1.3.1 The regional amount of direct payments in absolute terms 
 
The distribution of the average regional amounts of direct payments is illustrated in 
Figure 17: 
 
Figure 17 – Regional distribution of annual direct payments in 2008-2018 
(million €) 
 
 
Source: own composition 
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paid regionally each year is € 143.7 million, while the median is € 96.3 million. 
These inequalities are partly due to the different size and agricultural significance of 
the regions. Naturally, the NUTS2 region of the Loire Valley receives many times 
more agricultural support than Inner London. On the map, the distribution can be 
illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 18 – Regional distribution of annual direct payments, per quartile 
 
 
Source: own composition (with the mapchart.net tool) 
 
The map shows first quartile (lowest) direct payments in blue, second quartile in 
green, third quartile in yellow, fourth quartile (highest payments) in red. Most direct 
support is received by large-area, rural regions, while smaller, urban regions receive 
essentially less direct support. In addition, almost all regions of some old Member 
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States (France, Spain, Ireland, and Greece) were able to receive a much higher-than-
average direct payment (in the fourth quartile) during the study period. 
 
5.1.3.2 The regional amount of direct payments per hectare 
 
But what can we say about the amount of direct payments per hectare in different 
regions? Figure 19 illustrates the distribution of direct support intensity regionally: 
Figure 19 – Regional distribution of direct payment intensity (€/ha), per 
quartile 
 
 
Source: own composition (with the mapchart.net tool) 
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The colour coding of Figure 19 as the same as that of Figure 18. The distribution of 
direct payments per hectare between regions is partially different from the 
distribution of the total amount of aid, but there are also many similarities. The main 
conclusions are: 
• Most regions in Spain received a high level of support in absolute terms 
during the period under review, but their support intensity (with the exception 
of Andalusia) was rather below average. The map shows that most of them 
have large areas, so the incoming subsidies have to be spread over a large 
production area. 
• The situation in the Benelux countries is just the opposite: because of the 
presence of smaller regions, the amount of direct aid coming to one region is 
not particularly high in absolute terms, but the aid intensity is. 
• Aid intensities are above average in most regions in France, Greece, 
Denmark, Benelux, Northern and Eastern Germany, Northern Italy, Southern 
Sweden, Andalusia, and some regions in Austria. 
• In contrast, the disadvantages of the new Member States in terms of direct aid 
per hectare are clear, with the value of the indicator being below average in 
almost all their regions (except in the case of Malta and Cyprus). 
 
5.2 Results obtained from the examination of the hypotheses 
 
In this chapter, I describe the result of the models detailed in Section 4.5. The 
regression models were run on version 12.0 of the Stata software package. 
 
5.2.1 Impact of direct payments on agricultural incomes  
 
My first hypothesis is that direct payments increase agricultural income at regional 
level in the European Union. The results of the models used to test the hypothesis are 
shown in the following table. 
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Table 16 – Impact of direct payments on agricultural incomes – model 
results 
 
Dependent variable: 
agricultural income 
all Member States old Member States new Member States 
Amount of direct payments 
 
0,325*** 
(0,041) 
 
0,229*** 
(0,049) 
0,460*** 
(0,076) 
GPD 
 
-0,535*** 
(0,125) 
 
-0,493*** 
(0,169) 
-0,242 
(0,318) 
Agricultural GVA 
 
1,103*** 
(0,051) 
 
1,040*** 
(0,059) 
1,324*** 
(0,132) 
Non-agricultural income 
 
0,513*** 
(0,109) 
 
0,392** 
(0,164) 
0,128 
(0,300) 
Agricultural salaries 
 
-0,446*** 
(0,054) 
 
-0,260*** 
(0,070) 
-0,626*** 
(0,098) 
Constant term -4,967*** 
(0,743) 
-2,923*** 
(0,878) 
-7,598*** 
(1,620) 
Number of observations 
 
1578 1300 278 
Number of regions 
 
195 163 32 
R squared 0,702 0,731 0,701 
Source: own composition 
 
The results of the model confirm our hypothesis that direct subsidies increase 
agricultural income. The demonstration of a positive relationship between direct 
payments and agricultural income is consistent with Boysen et al. (2016), Ciaian et 
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al. (2015), Nková et al. (2009), Kozar et al. (2006), Fragoso et al. (2011), Galluzzo 
(2016, 2018a) and the findings of others. In the model, the coefficient of agricultural 
value added is positive and the rate of agricultural wages has a negative sign. This is 
in line with our preliminary expectation: productive activity increases incomes, and 
wages paid appear as an expense, fundamentally reducing it. Interestingly, the 
models found a positive relationship between agricultural and non-agricultural 
incomes, suggesting that the two types of income did not appear as alternatives or 
substitutes for each other. On the contrary, they increased in parallel in the countries 
studied. 
Studying the value of the coefficient, we can conclude that a one percent increase in 
the amount of direct payments results in a surplus of agricultural income of about 
0.32%. The magnitude of this coefficient is influenced by two factors: 
• on the one hand, the share of direct payments in agricultural income; 
• on the other hand, the transfer efficiency of direct payments. 
In connection with the latter, in line with the results of scientific research to date, we 
have reason to believe that a surplus of one euro of direct aid will increase the level 
of agricultural income by less than one euro. This effect can be attributed to the 
following factors (Thompson et al, 2009): 
• In order to maximize support, farmers modify their production decisions, 
which increases the demand for certain factors of production, therefore the 
level of associated costs also rise. This effect partially offsets the income-
increasing effect of direct payments. It should be noted that decoupled aid is 
not exempt from this effect either. On the one hand, because these are not 
completely production-neutral either (Katranidis and Kotakou, 2012). On the 
other hand, the demand for agricultural land is increased by decoupled direct 
payments of the CAP, as they are largely distributed on an area basis, i.e. 
their acquisition is conditional on the possession of land (Patton et al, 2008). 
• Direct coupled payments influence farmers' decisions about what crops to 
produce, so they do not necessarily deal with the production of the most 
promising goods. This also reduces the income effect of direct payments. 
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Assuming that a surplus of one euro of direct payments generates one euro of 
additional agricultural income (i.e. the transfer efficiency of the system is 100%), 
then, based on a coefficient of 0.32 from the model, the share of direct payments 
should be 32% of the total income. But in the period under review, the median share 
of direct payments was 45%. Thus, we can say that the transfer efficiency of direct 
subsidies is 32/45 = 71%, i.e. a surplus of one euro of direct subsidies results in an 
average income surplus of 71 cents. The remainder is absorbed by the market-
distorting effects of direct payments. Most direct support is leaked primarily in the 
form of increased land rents by landowners (Klaiber et al, 2017; Kilian et al, 2012; 
O’Neill 2016). 
 
It is also interesting to note the differences between the old and new Member States. 
For both the old and the new Member States, a positive correlation was found 
between the level of agricultural income and direct payments, but the coefficient is 
higher in the new Member States (0.46 compared to the coefficient of 0.23 in the old 
Member States). That is, direct payments have a greater impact of 46% on the level 
of agricultural incomes in the new Member States than in the old ones (23%). This is 
mainly due to the higher share of direct payments in agricultural income in the new 
Member States, despite the fact that due to phasing-in, direct payments have not yet 
reached their maximum level in these Member States during the period under review. 
Due to the higher income share of direct payments, the functioning of the agricultural 
sector in the new Member States may be much more dependent on CAP payments 
than in the old ones. In the studies of Uthes et al. (2011), Lehtonen and Niemi 
(2018), Jitea et al. (2015), Hanrahan et al. (2012), Rezbova et al. (2012), Manos et al. 
(2010), we have seen earlier that the more a sector relies on direct payments, the 
more vulnerable it can become as a result. In such sectors, different ex-ante models 
have shown that the abolition of direct payments would have marked negative 
consequences. All in all, we can conclude that direct support increases incomes to a 
greater extent in the new Member States, but that their high income ratio makes the 
sector too dependent on aid. 
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5.2.2 Impact of direct payments on productivity 
 
My second hypothesis is that direct payments increase regional agricultural 
productivity in the European Union. The results of the models for agricultural labour 
productivity are detailed in the following table. 
 
Table 17 – Impact of direct payments on labour productivity – model 
results 
 
Dependent variable: 
labour productivity 
all Member States old Member States new Member States 
Amount of direct payments 
 
-0,016** 
(0,008) 
 
0,012 
(0,009) 
-0,663** 
(0,028) 
Agricultural GVA 
 
0,044*** 
(0,015) 
 
0,008 
(0,017) 
0,208*** 
(0,040) 
Non-agricultural GVA 
 
-0,244*** 
(0,033) 
 
-0,180*** 
(0,041) 
-0,441*** 
(0,089) 
Population density 
 
0,379*** 
(0,045) 
 
0,316*** 
(0,049) 
0,060 
(0,156) 
Agricultural GFCF 
 
0,036*** 
(0,011) 
 
0,049*** 
(0,012) 
0,024 
(0,029) 
Agricultural salaries 
 
0,046*** 
(0,016) 
 
0,110*** 
(0,024) 
0,007 
(0,025) 
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Income ratio 
 
-0,655*** 
(0,250) 
 
-1,201*** 
(0,407) 
-0,582 
(0,374) 
Convergence region 
 
-2,967*** 
(0,324) 
 
0,488*** 
(0,160) 
-0,660* 
(0,350) 
Constant term 
 
-2,967*** 
(0,324) 
-3,992*** 
(0,374) 
1,740 
(1,079) 
Number of observations 
 
1842 1539 303 
Number of regions 
 
214 182 32 
R squared 0,211 0,232 0,061 
Source: own composition 
 
The results of the model contradict our hypothesis: direct subsidies have a negative 
effect on labour productivity in agriculture. With a 1% increase in direct payments, 
the labour productivity indicator will deteriorate by 0.016%, which means a lower 
agricultural value added (GVA) produced by a thousand people. The result is 
consistent with Zhu et al. (2010, 2012), Marzec and Pisulewski (2017), Mary (2013), 
Latruffe et al. (2017), which examined the technical efficiency of farms in general, 
and showed a negative relationship between productivity and the level of direct 
subsidies. 
The negative effects of direct subsidies on efficiency are due to the following factors 
(Zhu et al, 2012): 
• Direct subsidies are a stable source of income, increasing the income realized 
from agricultural activity, regardless of how technically efficient the 
production process is. In this way, farmers may become interested in sub-
optimal production activities, thus reducing efficiency. 
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• Due to their stable nature, direct payments distort farmers' risk perceptions 
and preferences, which affect their production activities and often influence 
them in a less efficient way. 
• Coupled support is particularly disadvantageous in terms of efficiency, as it 
can encourage farmers to produce goods that are not particularly efficient to 
produce under the given circumstances. 
For all these reasons, direct payments do not encourage farmers to innovate, to 
develop new technologies, to invest or to restructure economic activities. This way, 
producers' efficiency efforts decline, and the phenomenon of wastage of factors of 
production, such as agricultural labour, emerges (Bakucs et al, 2010). 
The coefficients of certain control variables were as follows: 
• The use of gross fixed assets in agriculture (GFCF) has a positive effect on 
labour productivity. This is because in the model, the degree of fixed asset 
accumulation reflects productive investments (such as the purchase of 
agricultural machinery and equipment) that increase the efficiency of 
production. 
• The level of agricultural wages also has a positive effect on labour 
productivity. Presumably because the amount of wages paid suggests not only 
the quantity but also the quality of the labour used, which increases 
efficiency. 
• Convergence regions are less economically developed regions of the Union, 
so it is not surprising that the model for all regions has shown lower labour 
productivity. 
• As the population density decreases, agricultural labour productivity also 
decreases. Presumably due to the shrinking labour supply in sparsely 
populated areas of the Union. 
 
There is an interesting difference between the old and the new Member States. While 
the regression model run on data from the old Member States did not find a 
significant correlation between direct payments and labour productivity, a significant 
negative effect could be identified in the new Member States. Based on these, direct 
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payments do not seem to affect labour productivity in the old Member States, while 
they are negatively affected in the new ones. 
 
The results of the model for agricultural land productivity are detailed in the 
following table. 
 
Table 18 – Impact of direct payments on the productivity of land – model 
results 
 
Dependent variable: land 
productivity 
all Member States old Member States new Member States 
Amount of direct payments 
 
-0,081*** 
(0,018) 
 
-0,069** 
(0,028) 
-0,040 
(0,037) 
Agricultural employment 
 
0,098*** 
(0,029) 
 
0,081** 
(0,034) 
-0,012 
(0,069) 
Agricultural income 
 
0,114*** 
(0,008) 
 
0,111*** 
(0,034) 
0,099*** 
(0,018) 
GDP 
 
3,296*** 
(0,270) 
 
3,272*** 
(0,316) 
4,033*** 
(0,587) 
GDP/capita 
 
1,006*** 
(0,073) 
 
0,977*** 
(0,087) 
0,902*** 
(0,233) 
Agricultural GFCF 
 
0,277*** 
(0,018) 
 
0,346*** 
(0,020) 
0,009 
(0,039) 
Non-agricultural income 
 
-0,326*** 
(0,057) 
-0,344*** 
(0,069) 
-0,153 
(0,123) 
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Non-agricultural GVA 
 
-3,562*** 
(0,274) 
 
-3,613*** 
(0,322) 
-4,089*** 
(0,512) 
Population density 
 
0,485*** 
(0,040) 
 
0,537*** 
(0,043) 
0,425*** 
(0,126) 
Agricultural salaries 
 
0,174*** 
(0,023) 
 
0,230*** 
(0,033) 
0,103*** 
(0,033) 
Convergence region 
 
-0,248*** 
(0,093) 
 
-0,237* 
(0,129) 
-0,105 
(0,238) 
Constant term 
 
-8,528*** 
(0,608) 
-8,297*** 
(0,925) 
-9,507*** 
(1,395) 
Number of observations 
 
1562 1284 278 
Number of regions 
 
193 161 32 
R squared 0,535 0,559 0,558 
Source: own composition 
 
The results of the model run counter to our original expectation: direct payments 
have a negative impact on agricultural productivity of arable land. With a 1% 
increase in direct payments, the land productivity indicator will deteriorate by 0.08%, 
i.e. the agricultural value added (GVA) per hectare. 
The negative link between the productivity of agricultural land and direct payments 
is because farmers receive payments mainly based on the size of the agricultural land 
used (although there are also livestock-based direct payments, most payments are 
calculated on an area basis). To maximize direct support amounts, farmers are 
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therefore interested in having as much agricultural land as possible for their own use. 
There are basically two ways to achieve this: 
• more land is bought or leased, and market demand for agricultural land 
increases accordingly (Constantin et al, 2017); 
• previously unused land is also brought into agricultural production. In doing 
so, farmers may also involve marginal, inferior land in production, merely to 
establish the entitlement to direct payment. The standard of agricultural 
production in these areas lags behind that of better-quality land, and 
consequently the productivity decreases. 
In addition to the deterioration of the quality of the land, the decrease in productivity 
may also be exacerbated by the fact that direct subsidies, which can be considered as 
a more or less guaranteed income element, do not contribute to the efficiency and 
innovation of agricultural production technology (Zhu et al, 2012). 
It is interesting to note that the increased demand for agricultural land may culminate 
in the phenomenon of “land grabbing” in extreme cases. In this context, investors 
embark on large-scale land acquisitions, which upset traditional land use conditions 
and lead to high levels of land concentration, resulting in possible social tensions and 
environmental problems. “Land grabbing” is a well-known phenomenon in many 
regions of the world, driven by several market factors. One such factor in Europe is 
CAP area-based direct support, which contribute to increasing pressures in the 
agricultural land market (Kay, 2016). 
Regarding the coefficient of certain control variables, it can be emphasized that the 
use of gross fixed assets in agriculture has a positive effect on the productivity of 
agricultural land. This is consistent with the results of the labour productivity model; 
fixed asset investment generally aids in technological advancement and thus 
increases the efficiency of the use of factors of production. The variable representing 
convergence regions also had a negative coefficient in this model, in line with 
preliminary theoretical expectations. The impact on land productivity is negative in 
the old Member States, while not significantly different from zero in the new 
Member States. Interestingly, this is the opposite of what has been shown in terms of 
labour productivity. On the one hand, this may be due to the fact that the old Member 
States have higher levels of direct aid per hectare than the new Member States on 
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average. Thus, the there is more incentive for farmers to include less productive land 
in production because the higher amounts of direct support pay off for the possible 
losses. On the other hand, in the new Member States, there is a larger area of 
relatively productive land that can be involved in agricultural production (Constantin 
et al, 2017). Therefore, the inclusion of new land in the new Member States does not 
lead to the same reduction in productivity as in the old Member States. 
At the same time, it is important to stress that, the phenomenon of “land grabbing” is 
much more prevalent in the new Member States overall than in the old ones because 
the price of agricultural land is much lower in them (Verhoog and Stoica, 2018). At 
the same time, the decline in land productivity related to CAP direct payments is still 
lower in the new Member States. 
 
5.2.3 Impact of direct payments on income inequality and poverty 
 
 
My third hypothesis is that direct subsidies alleviate regional income inequalities and 
poverty in the European Union as well. 
 
First, I examined the issue of income inequalities. The issue of income equalization 
was examined through the share of agricultural income in total income. Income 
inequality is thus understood here as the difference in the level of agricultural and 
non-agricultural income (rather than the specifics of the income distribution 
relationship between individual beneficiaries or the convergence between regions). 
The results of the panel regression models are summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 19 – Impact of direct payments on income inequality – model 
results 
 
Dependent variable: 
income ratio 
all Member States old Member States new Member States 
Amount of direct payments 0,0016** 0,000 0,010** 
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 (0,0007) 
 
(0,000) (0,005) 
Non-agricultural 
employment 
 
-0,031*** 
(0,006) 
 
-0,038*** 
(0,005) 
-0,016 
(0,028) 
Non.agricultural GVA 
 
-0,198*** 
(0,017) 
 
-0,126*** 
(0,014) 
-0,227*** 
(0,068) 
GDP/capita 
 
-0,015*** 
(0,005) 
 
-0,023*** 
(0,004) 
-0,006 
(0,023) 
GDP 
 
0,225*** 
(0,017) 
 
0,156*** 
(0,013) 
0,227*** 
(0,077) 
Agricultural GVA 
 
0,011*** 
(0,001) 
 
0,008*** 
(0,001) 
0,021*** 
(0,007) 
Agricultural salaries 
 
-0,015*** 
(0,001) 
 
-0,004*** 
(0,001) 
-0,026*** 
(0,004) 
Agricultural employment 
 
0,005*** 
(0,001) 
 
0,0003 
(0,001) 
0,012** 
(0,006) 
Convergence region 
 
0,014*** 
(0,003) 
 
0,005 
(0,004) 
-0,014 
(0,024) 
Constant term 
 
0,010 
(0,035) 
0,125*** 
(0,031) 
-0,053 
(0,130) 
Number of observations 
 
1858 1555 303 
Number of regions 
 
216 184 32 
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R squared 0,584 0,454 0,700 
Source: own composition 
 
The result is in line with our preliminary expectation that direct payments will help 
increase the share of agricultural income in total income. A one percent increase in 
direct payments increases the share of agricultural income within total income by 
0.001653%. The average rate in question was 2% during the period considered. 
Direct payments increase agricultural income more than non-agricultural ones, but 
the effect is small. 
It has long been a fact in the scientific literature that the profitability of the 
agricultural sector lags behind that of the whole economy. Incidentally, this is a 
phenomenon not only in the European Union, but in many regions of the world. 
Accordingly, public agricultural programs worldwide aim to “enable farmers to 
enjoy an equal standard of living with workers in other industries through increased 
agricultural income” (Winters, 1989). Despite some conceptual and methodological 
difficulties, European research also shows that agricultural income lags behind that 
of other sectors. In 2008, a European Commission study found that per capita farm 
entrepreneur's income was around 58% of the EU average wage (European 
Commission, 2010). 
We have already seen in the testing of Hypothesis 1 and in the analysis of relevant 
scientific articles (e.g. in the studies of Boysen et al, 2016; Ciaian et al, 2015; 
Galluzzo, 2016) that direct subsidies increase agricultural income. In addition, direct 
subsidies can also have a positive spill-over effect on non-agricultural employment 
(Rizov et al, 2018), production and income. Partial leakage of subsidies also leads to 
an increase in non-agricultural incomes (Klaiber et al, 2017; Kilian et al, 2012; 
O’Neill 2016). The positive sign of the coefficient indicates that the agricultural 
effect is stronger than the non-agricultural one, so agricultural incomes are moving 
towards the average income level of the whole economy. However, the value of the 
coefficient is quite low, so the displacement is only small. Direct payments appear to 
be effective in moving the profitability of farms from a critically low level, but are 
not in themselves able to catch up with the average of other sectors. 
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It is worth noting that the values of the control variables are in line with expectations: 
an increase in agricultural employment and value added (production) improves the 
ratio, while an increase in non-agricultural employment and production worsens it. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of the GDP / capita variable is negative. This may be 
explained by the fact that regions with a high per capita GDP tend to have a lower 
share of agricultural income; other sectors are the real driving force of the economy, 
so the share of agricultural income is lower than other incomes. 
A comparison between the old and new Member States shows that the coefficient for 
direct payments is positive in both models, but not significant for the old Member 
States. Accordingly, direct payments appear to be more effective in helping the 
income share of agriculture in new Member States. This can be explained by the fact 
that in these countries direct support accounts for a larger share of agricultural 
incomes (and total incomes), so their equalizing effect can be proportionally more 
pronounced. The finding is consistent with Kapronczai et al. (2014), which found 
that the income situation of Hungarian farmers improved significantly after EU 
accession, thanks to CAP subsidies. Similarly, European Commission research has 
found that the income gap between sectors is narrowing in the new Member States 
(European Commission, 2010). 
In the second part of the third hypothesis, I assumed that direct subsidies alleviate 
regional poverty in the European Union. I modelled regional poverty as the rate of 
material and social deprivation from the EU-SILC database. The dependent variable 
represents the percentage of the population living in material and social deprivation, 
for which Eurostat has developed a detailed indicator system. In 2016, 16% of the 
EU population suffered from material and social deprivation (Eurostat, 2017). The 
result of the model is presented in Table 20: 
 
Table 20 – Impact of direct payments on poverty – model results 
 
Dependent variable: rate 
of material and social 
deprivation 
all Member States old Member States new Member States 
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Amount of direct payments 
 
-0,668*** 
(0,238) 
 
-0,171 
(0,247) 
0,575 
(0,741) 
Non-agricultural 
employment 
 
-22,434*** 
(2,396) 
-26,646*** 
(3,124) 
-11,341** 
(4,623) 
Non-agricultural GVA 
 
-22,571*** 
(7,225) 
 
-9,680 
(10,582) 
8,193 
(12,135) 
GDP/capita 
 
-30,045*** 
(2,156) 
 
-28,079*** 
(2,452) 
-20,370*** 
(4,061) 
GDP 
 
48,716*** 
(7,289) 
 
38,910*** 
(9,890) 
-2,417 
(13,757) 
Agricultural GVA 
 
-0,695 
(0,606) 
 
-1,648** 
(0,715) 
2,350* 
(1,255) 
Agricultural salaries 
 
-1,468*** 
(0,483) 
 
2,413*** 
(0,798) 
-2,693*** 
(0,662) 
Agricultural employment 
 
1,334* 
(0,712) 
 
-2,021** 
(0,935) 
5,132*** 
(1,054) 
Convergence region 
 
1,723 
(1,476) 
 
13,103*** 
(2,075) 
-20,969*** 
(4,413) 
Constant term 
 
214,050*** 
(14,548) 
176,436*** 
(18,000) 
228,678*** 
(23,512) 
Number of observations 
 
938 618 320 
Number of regions 136 104 32 
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R squared 0,689 0,737 0,839 
Source: own composition 
 
The results of the model confirm our hypothesis: direct subsidies reduce the rate of 
material and social deprivation. This finding is consistent with a study by Poczta-
Wajda (2015) who, using quantitative tools, found that agricultural support systems 
in different countries of the world are generally successful in alleviating poverty and 
social deprivation. Czyżewski et al. (2017), based on a comprehensive panel 
regression study covering all EU Member States, found that CAP subsidies reduce 
relative deprivation. 
I could not analyze the differences between the old and new Member States because 
the coefficient of the variable is not significant in those separate models. In any case, 
the value of the coefficient is low in both models, which hints at a very small-
magnitude effect. 
 
5.2.4 Convergence of direct payments’ impacts between regions 
 
My fourth hypothesis is that regional effects of direct payments will level off in the 
European Union over time. 
5.2.4.1 The convergence of direct payments 
 
First, I examined the dynamics of the distribution of direct subsidies in the period 
2008-2018. 
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Table 21 – Markov transition probability matrix for direct payments 
between regions, from 2008 to 2018 
 
Initial distribution   <75 percent 76-124 percent >125 percent 
159 <75 percent 94% 49% 21% 
34 76-124 percent 5% 42% 8% 
51 >125 percent 1% 9% 71% 
Source: own composition 
 
The above Markov transition probability matrix shows the chances of the amount of 
direct support of the regions changing from the beginning to the end of the study 
period. We can see, for example, that 94% of the regions that received less than 75% 
of the average CAP direct payment at the end of the period (2018) received 75% or 
less at the beginning of the period (2008) as well. Overall, it cannot be said that the 
regional level of direct payments has been largely rearranged over the period under 
review, as there are relatively high probability values in the main diagonal of the 
matrix. This suggests that the status quo has been maintained. The only significant 
exception to this finding seems to be that 49% of the regions with an average aid rate 
of 76-124% in 2018 had access to support amounts below 75% on average. The 
reason for this is certainly the phasing-in phenomenon, the effect of which I have 
already illustrated with the help of Figures 13 and 16. The conclusions drawn there 
are consistent with the values of the transition probability matrix above. We can also 
state about the matrix that in the examined period it was very uncommon for the 
level of direct support of a region to decrease because the probability values below 
the main diagonal are relatively low. 
 
The representation of the Kernel density function confirms that the equalization of 
the regional level of direct payments was very subdued during the study period. 
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Figure 20 – Kernel density plot on the regional amount of direct 
payments 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
The shape of the functions showing the distribution of the level of direct payments 
does not show a significant change over time. In other words, there is at most a small 
degree of convergence in the level of direct support for European regions during the 
period under review. In addition, it is worth noting that the strongly asymmetric 
distribution of the curve is consistent with those previously illustrated in Figure 17. 
Accordingly, previous studies in the literature (Volkov et al, 2019a; Rumanovska, 
2016; Ackrill, 2003) that urge further convergence of direct payments between 
countries appear to be well-founded. 
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5.2.4.2 The convergence of agricultural income 
 
The calculations for the convergence of agricultural incomes yielded the following 
results. 
 
Table 22 – Markov transition probability matrix for regional 
agricultural income 
 
Initial distribution   <75 percent 76-124 percent >125 percent 
178 <75 percent 72% 88% 71% 
11 76-124 percent 5% 0% 3% 
55 >125 percent 23% 12% 26% 
Source: own composition 
 
Table 22 shows that the regions with below-average incomes at the end of the period 
were mainly those with below-average incomes at the beginning of the study. This is 
not a surprising finding in itself; it merely confirms the maintenance of the status 
quo. But the table also shows that at the end of the period, most of the regions with 
average or above-average incomes were regions that previously had lower 
agricultural incomes. This rearrangement is presumably due to the emerging regions 
of the new Member States, where the previously very unfavourable income position 
of farmers has been able to improve significantly after accession (Kapronczai et al, 
2014). This is in line with the statement in section 5.2.1 that direct payments increase 
agricultural incomes to a greater extent in the new Member States than in the old 
ones. In this way, some regions could certainly exchange places between different 
points of the matrix. 
But how did this affect the overall picture of the regional distribution of incomes? 
The representation of the kernel density function is as follows. 
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Figure 21 – Kernel density plot for regional agricultural income 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
We can see that there was no significant change in the overall picture during the 
study period; the annual density curves are fairly similar. There may have been some 
rearrangement in terms of income relationships within the sample (relocation 
between categories for some regions), but the effect is not strong enough to change 
the distribution of income to a larger extent (Volkov et al, 2019a). 
5.2.4.3 Convergence of agricultural employment 
 
Regarding agricultural employment, the methods used do not show any convergence 
during the study period. 
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Table 23 – Markov transition probability matrix for regional 
agricultural employment 
 
Initial distribution   <75 percent 76-124 percent >125 percent 
125 <75 percent 98% 19% 0% 
35 76-124 percent 2% 74% 1% 
84 >125 percent 0% 7% 99% 
Source: own composition 
 
There are extremely low probability values in the matrix outside the main diagonal, 
which indicates that the initial distribution of farm employment conditions between 
regions is unchanged. 
 
Figure 22 – Kernel density plot for regional agricultural employment 
 
 
Source: own composition 
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The functions overlap almost perfectly; here too we cannot detect a shift in the nature 
of the distribution of regional agricultural employment over time. This is consistent 
with Petrick et al. (2011, 2012), who found that direct subsidies do not affect the 
level of agricultural employment. After decoupling, the impact on the amount of 
utilized labour was further weakened. Malá et al. (2011) found that labour demand is 
determined by the level of agricultural production and wages; the level of direct 
payments cannot influence it. 
5.2.4.3 Convergence of agricultural productivity 
 
The situation is similar for agricultural labour productivity. The methods used do not 
indicate a levelling off of labour productivity between regions during the study 
period. 
 
Table 24 – Markov transition probability matrix for regional 
agricultural labour productivity 
 
Initial distribution   <75 percent 76-124 percent >125 percent 
110 <75 percent 94% 10% 1% 
67 76-124 percent 5% 81% 12% 
67 >125 percent 1% 9% 87% 
Source: own composition 
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Figure 23 – Kernel density plot for regional labour productivity 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
The above results show that neither of the two methods shows convergence of 
agricultural labour productivity between regions in the study period. This is in line 
with the previous finding of section 5.2.2 (direct payments do not have a strong 
impact on agricultural productivity). I note that Cuerva (2011) and Montresor et al. 
(2011) arrived at the same conclusion. Wicki (2012) examined the convergence 
between labour productivity indicators in the agricultural sectors of old and new 
Member States and also concluded that there was no conversion between these 
countries in the period 2007-2013. It was found that a major restructuring of farms 
would be needed to start the equalization of labour productivity. 
 
The situation is similar regarding the productivity of agricultural land. 
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Table 25 – Markov transition probability matrix for regional land 
productivity 
 
Initial distribution   <75 percent 76-124 percent >125 percent 
134 <75 percent 87% 31% 0% 
59 76-124 percent 12% 58% 10% 
51 >125 percent 1% 11% 90% 
Source: own composition 
 
Figure 24 – Kernel density plot for regional land productivity 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
We can state the same as for labour productivity: there is no trace of convergence in 
agricultural land productivity in the study period. Jitea and Pocol (2014), for 
example, also came to this conclusion. 
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5.2.4.4 Convergence of poverty conditions 
 
The convergence of the indicator of material and social deprivation is reported in the 
Table 26 and Figure 25 below. 
 
Table 26 – Markov transition probability matrix for regional poverty 
 
Initial distribution   <75 percent 76-124 percent >125 percent 
163 <75 percent 99% 0% 24% 
2 76-124 percent 0% 0% 2% 
79 >125 percent 1% 100% 74% 
Source: own composition 
 
It can be seen from the matrix that there has been some rearrangement in terms of the 
poverty rate between regions during the period under review. Regions with a poverty 
rate around the average at the end of the period had an above-average poverty rate at 
the beginning of the period, i.e. the percentage of people at risk of material 
deprivation or social exclusion decreased. Irz et al. (2001) found in their theoretical 
approach a positive correlation between the strengthening of the agricultural sector 
and the reduction of poverty. Furthermore, as noted in Section 5.2.3, our own 
modelling also concluded that direct support has certain poverty-reducing role. This 
is consistent with the above findings on the dynamics of the rearrangement of 
poverty. However, it should be noted that in addition to CAP subsidies, the value of 
the poverty indicator is obviously shaped by several different factors as well. 
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Figure 25 – Kernel density plot for regional poverty 
 
 
Source: own composition 
 
We can see that the curves representing the distribution of the proportion of the 
population at risk of poverty become more and more flattened over the study period. 
This means that regional disparities in terms of poverty decreased, confirming the 
conclusions drawn from the previous transition probability matrix. 
 
5.3 Summary of research results 
 
In the light of the results obtained, my findings on the research hypotheses are 
summarized in Table 27. 
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Table 27 – Summary of research results 
 
Hypothesis Hypothesized 
effect  
Demonstrated 
effect 
Conclusion 
H1 effect of direct 
payments on income 
positive positive Accept H1 
H2.1 effect of direct 
payments on labour 
productivity 
positive negative Reject H2.1 
H2.2 effect of direct 
payments on land 
productivity 
positive negative Reject H2.2 
H3.1 effect of direct 
payments on the ratio of 
agricultural income in 
total income 
positive positive Accept H3.1 
H3.2 effect of direct 
payments on poverty 
negative negative Accept H3.2 
H4 convergence of direct payment effects: 
- income convergence partial 
convergence 
Partially accept 
H4 – income. 
- employment convergence no convergence Reject H4 – 
employment. 
- labour 
productivity 
convergence no convergence Reject H4 – 
labour 
productivity. 
- land 
productivity 
convergence no convergence Reject H4 – land 
productivity. 
- poverty convergence convergence Accept H4 – 
poverty, 
Source: own composition 
 
My results show that direct payments increase agricultural incomes, especially in 
new Member States, although the transfer efficiency of direct support is low. They 
also increase the share of agricultural income in total income, albeit only slightly. In 
addition, they can contribute to reducing regional poverty. At the same time, 
efficiency criticisms of direct payments seem justified: they do not promote the 
efficient use of land and labour, on the contrary, they worsen farm productivity. 
Direct payments make only a very limited contribution to the economic convergence 
of European regions. In the examined period, I found signs of equalization only in 
the field of poverty indicators and partly in relation to agricultural incomes. In terms 
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of agricultural employment and productivity indicators, there was no evidence of 
convergence between the regions studied.  
165 
 
6. SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation aimed to analyze certain regional economic effects of CAP direct 
payments. The research has focused on the economic effects of direct payments in 
different regions of the European Union; how different the effects are in the old and 
new Member States; and how these effects are balanced over time between regions. 
The particularity of the research is that instead of analyzing the data at Member State 
level, I included the relevant data of the NUTS2 classified regions, which allowed for 
a more detailed analysis. During the research, I used quantitative, ex-post impact 
analysis methods, which were based on data of 244 European NUTS2 regions in the 
period 2008-2018. 
 
I began my research by reviewing the relevant literature on the subject. Regarding 
the effects on agricultural income, research to date has found that direct payments 
increase the income levels of their beneficiaries. In the new Member States, direct 
payments have been particularly successful in improving agricultural income 
positions since accession. Direct payments have been able to increase the level of 
agricultural income even though a significant proportion of them have leaked in the 
form of land rents to landowners. However, the system has been widely criticized for 
the nature of the distribution of support amounts: 20% of farmers receive 80% of 
direct payments; the concentration of payments is very high in almost all Member 
States. Moreover, this disproportion is not limited to the level of support between 
farmers; there are also large differences in support intensities between some Member 
States (mainly to the disadvantage of new Member States). In addition, the studies 
have shown that, although direct payments are a relatively stable part of agricultural 
income, they have little effect on the development of other income elements; they 
have no anti-cyclic effect; therefore, their income stabilizing role is limited. 
Regarding the effects on agricultural production, based on a review of the literature, 
CAP direct payments seem to have a production-boosting effect. However, some 
studies emphasize that the more a sector’s production relies on direct payments, the 
more vulnerable it becomes. This is because direct aids do not play a role in 
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stimulating economic restructuring; on the contrary, they can preserve old production 
conditions, which can help stabilize markets in the short term but limit development 
and competitiveness in the long term. Consequently, direct subsidies can have a 
negative effect on the productivity and technical efficiency of farms. As a relatively 
stable source of income, direct payments do not encourage farmers to innovate, 
develop new technologies, restructure economic activities, or invest. 
The literature analysis also identified several other economic effects of direct 
payments. Based on the studies reviewed, direct support had no effect (neither 
positive nor negative) on farm investments. Regarding the promotion of agricultural 
employment, the literature has produced quite ambivalent results. Other articles also 
drew attention to the trade-distorting effects of subsidies and the impact on 
traditional land use conditions. 
 
Based on the lessons learned in the scientific literature, and considering the available 
data and methods, I set up the following research hypotheses: 
• H1: Direct payments increase agricultural income at regional level in the 
European Union. 
• H2.1: Direct payments increase the productivity of agricultural labour at 
regional level. 
• H2.2: Direct payments increase the productivity of agricultural land at 
regional level. 
• H3.1: Direct payments reduce income inequalities in the European Union. 
• H3.2: Direct payments alleviate regional poverty in the European Union. 
• H4: The regional effects of direct payments are balanced in time in the 
European Union. 
I tested the hypotheses with panel regression models; and for the last hypothesis, I 
used Markov transition probability matrices and Kernel density functions to examine 
convergence between regions. The calculations were based on a balanced panel 
database containing data on 244 EU NUTS2 regions for the period 2008-2018 on the 
level of direct payments, the values of the hypotheses’ dependent variables and the 
values of several control variables. 
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During the testing of the hypotheses, the effect of direct subsidies on increasing 
agricultural income was confirmed. A percentage increase in the level of direct 
payments, all other factors being unchanged, resulted in a surplus of around 0.32% in 
agricultural income in the study period. Considering the share of direct payments in 
total agricultural income, this means that the transfer efficiency of direct payments is 
71%, i.e. a direct support surplus of one euro results in an average income surplus of 
71 cents. The remainder is absorbed by the economic (side) effects of direct 
subsidies, such as rising input prices. Most direct payments are leaked in the form of 
increased land rents by landowners. 
Contrary to our hypothesis about labour productivity, the results showed that direct 
subsidies have a negative effect on labour productivity in agriculture. The result is in 
line with the findings of previous research, which generally showed a negative 
relationship between productivity and the level of direct support. The effect is mainly 
due to the fact that direct payments are a stable source of income, increasing the 
income realized from agricultural activity, regardless of how technically efficient the 
production process is. Direct payments therefore do not encourage farmers to 
innovate and reorganize their economic activities, so factors of production, such as 
agricultural labour, may be used in an irrational, wasteful way. 
Likewise, I identified a negative correlation between direct payments and agricultural 
land productivity. This is due to the fact that farmers receive payments primarily on 
the basis of the size of the agricultural land used, which increases the demand for 
land. Farmers buy or rent more land, or involve marginal, less productive land in 
production, leading to reduced efficiency. 
Regarding the hypothesis of income inequality, I wondered whether direct subsidies 
increase the share of agricultural income in total income. The result, in line with 
Hypothesis 3.1, suggests that direct payments help to increase the share of 
agricultural income in total income, but the effect is small. Based on these, direct 
subsidies appear to be effective in moving the profitability of farms from a critically 
low level but are not in themselves able to catch up with the average of other sectors. 
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Poverty studies have confirmed my hypothesis that direct payments reduce the 
incidence of material deprivation and social exclusion. This finding is consistent with 
the results of previous research that found that agricultural support systems in 
different countries of the world are generally successful in alleviating poverty and 
social deprivation. 
With regard to the comparison of the economic effects of CAP direct payments 
between old and new Member States, it can generally be stated that in the new 
Member States modelling has generally shown a stronger, more pronounced effect 
than in the old Member States (except for land productivity). For example, in terms 
of the impact on agricultural incomes, the coefficient for direct payments is much 
higher in new Member States (0.46 compared to 0.23 in the old Member States). This 
is mainly due to the higher share of direct payments in agricultural income in new 
Member States. The situation is similar when examining the share of agricultural 
income in total income or labour productivity. The more a sector relies on direct 
payments, the more vulnerable it can become as a result. All in all, we can conclude 
that direct payments increase incomes to a greater extent in the new Member States, 
but due to their high ratio in agricultural income, the sector may become too 
dependent on support payments. 
In connection with Hypothesis 4, I came to the conclusion that there is some 
convergence in the distribution of agricultural incomes and poverty indicators over 
the study period among the regions included in the analysis. This rearrangement is 
presumably due to the emerging regions of the new Member States, where the 
previously very unfavourable income position of farmers has been able to improve 
significantly since accession. Consequently, poverty-related conditions in some 
regions could also improve. I did not find any signs of an equalization process in the 
extent of agricultural employment or in relation to land and labour productivity 
indicators in the study period. Accordingly, it can be stated that direct payments 
could not generate a significant realignment between the regions concerning these 
factors. Therefore, the cohesion objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
according to which decision-makers seek to encourage regional economic and social 
convergence, is only partially achieved through direct payments. 
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In the light of the above findings, what recommendation could be made for the future 
of direct payments? I suggest that consideration be given to extending the use of 
insurance premium subsidies and income stabilization instruments. Both are present 
in the current CAP toolbox, but their use is not yet widespread, and their financial 
weight is relatively low compared to other support schemes. Under the former, part 
of the premium for (market or public) agricultural insurance is reimbursed to 
farmers, thus encouraging efforts to reduce the inherent risks of agricultural activity. 
The latter compensates for the decrease in farmers' income from agriculture, 
compared to the average of a fixed, past period of a few years. These measures 
could, in my view, provide an appropriate response to three important criticisms of 
the current system of direct payments. 
On the one hand, they could improve the income stabilizing effect of the support 
system, which is one of the main declared objectives of the CAP. The income 
stabilizing effect of direct payments is severely limited. It is true that they are a 
relatively stable part of agricultural income, but they have only a limited ability to 
reduce its fluctuations. Due to their fixed nature, they are not able to react to the 
seasonal, cyclical effects, changes in supply and demand, and market shocks, which 
have a strong effect in agriculture. Moreover, they have little effect on the level of 
other income elements. To make agricultural incomes predictable and stable over 
time, more targeted economic intervention is needed, which could be achieved in the 
proposed way. 
On the other hand, they could improve the transfer efficiency of the support system. 
It has been found by previous scientific research, as well as by this dissertation, that a 
significant share of direct support amounts ultimately goes to landowners, not 
farmers. The closer the link between a given support measure and the agricultural 
land, the greater the leakage of the aid amount in the form of land rents and prices. 
Most direct payments are paid on an area basis, the main condition for receiving 
them being the possession of agricultural land. However, the proposed insurance and 
income stabilization schemes are linked to agricultural land in a more indirect way, 
the level of support depends on a number of other factors of production and market 
conditions. Thus, there would presumably be less leakage of Community funds from 
farmers to non-agricultural actors. 
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Thirdly, they could respond to the criticisms of productivity and technological 
efficiency made against direct subsidies. Direct support is a fixed income supplement 
for the farmer, regardless of how efficiently they handle resources and production 
factors, and how much they encourage technological development and innovation. 
However, in the framework of income stabilization instruments, if the beneficiary 
was able to operate more efficiently and productively in the previous period, thereby 
increasing their agricultural income, the increased income reference would be the 
basis for support in the future. In this way, farmers could become more interested in 
efficient operation and increasing competitiveness. 
In addition to the above arguments, insurance and income stabilization instruments 
are not directly linked to agricultural production, so their acceptance with world 
trading partners may be easier. Furthermore, they would presumably be better 
received by the EU public than the current system of direct payments. 
 
A limitation of the present research was that it focused mainly on direct aids, other 
forms of CAP support and EU regional and cohesion policy grants did not fall within 
the scope of the research. The range of data collected was also a limiting factor; 
additional economic data could further complete the presented quantitative analysis. 
In addition, there are a number of other methodological approaches besides the one I 
have used, which would undoubtedly bring interesting results in terms of the 
economic effects of direct payments. 
Due to the above, and also because of the importance of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, there is room for further research on this topic. It would be worthwhile to 
study in more detail the phenomenon of subsidy leakage and its extent with the help 
of data on land prices and land rents. Another interesting research question may be 
how the structure of farms and production influences the impact mechanism of direct 
subsidies. The current ex-post analysis could be complemented by the use of ex-ante 
models or qualitative research methods. In addition, future research could focus on 
modelling a modified direct support system that can respond to the main scientific 
criticisms of the current system. 
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Appendix 1 – List of NUTS2 regions under 
analysis 
 
NUTS2 code Name of NUTS2 region 
AT11 Burgenland (AT) 
AT12 Niederösterreich 
AT13 Wien 
AT21 Kärnten 
AT22 Steiermark 
AT31 Oberösterreich 
AT32 Salzburg 
AT33 Tirol 
AT34 Vorarlberg 
BE10 Région de Bruxelles-Capitale / Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest 
BE21 Prov. Antwerpen 
BE22 Prov. Limburg (BE) 
BE23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen 
BE24 Prov. Vlaams-Brabant 
BE25 Prov. West-Vlaanderen 
BE31 Prov. Brabant wallon 
BE32 Prov. Hainaut 
BE33 Prov. Liège 
BE34 Prov. Luxembourg (BE) 
BE35 Prov. Namur 
BG31 Severozapaden 
BG32 Severen tsentralen 
BG33 Severoiztochen 
BG34 Yugoiztochen 
BG41 Yugozapaden 
BG42 Yuzhen tsentralen 
CY00 Kypros 
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CZ01 Praha 
CZ02 Strední Cechy 
CZ03 Jihozápad 
CZ04 Severozápad 
CZ05 Severovýchod 
CZ06 Jihovýchod 
CZ07 Strední Morava 
CZ08 Moravskoslezsko 
DE11 Stuttgart 
DE12 Karlsruhe 
DE13 Freiburg 
DE14 Tübingen 
DE21 Oberbayern 
DE22 Niederbayern 
DE23 Oberpfalz 
DE24 Oberfranken 
DE25 Mittelfranken 
DE26 Unterfranken 
DE27 Schwaben 
DE30 Berlin 
DE50 Bremen 
DE60 Hamburg 
DE71 Darmstadt 
DE72 Gießen 
DE73 Kassel 
DE80 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
DE91 Braunschweig 
DE92 Hannover 
DE93 Lüneburg 
DE94 Weser-Ems 
DEA1 Düsseldorf 
DEA2 Köln 
DEA3 Münster 
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DEA4 Detmold 
DEA5 Arnsberg 
DEB1 Koblenz 
DEB2 Trier 
DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz 
DEC0 Saarland 
DED2 Dresden 
DEE0 Sachsen-Anhalt 
DEF0 Schleswig-Holstein 
DEG0 Thüringen 
DK01 Hovedstaden 
DK02 Sjælland 
DK03 Syddanmark 
DK04 Midtjylland 
DK05 Nordjylland 
EE00 Eesti 
EL30 Attiki 
EL41 Voreio Aigaio 
EL42 Notio Aigaio 
EL43 Kriti 
EL51 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 
EL52 Kentriki Makedonia 
EL53 Dytiki Makedonia 
EL61 Thessalia 
EL62 Ionia Nisia 
EL63 Dytiki Ellada 
EL64 Sterea Ellada 
EL65 Peloponnisos 
ES11 Galicia 
ES12 Principado de Asturias 
ES13 Cantabria 
ES21 País Vasco 
ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra 
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ES23 La Rioja 
ES24 Aragón 
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid 
ES41 Castilla y León 
ES42 Castilla-la Mancha 
ES43 Extremadura 
ES51 Cataluña 
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana 
ES53 Illes Balears 
ES61 Andalucía 
ES62 Región de Murcia 
ES70 Canarias (ES) 
FI19 Länsi-Suomi 
FI20 Åland 
FR10 Île de France 
FRB0 Centre - Val de Loire 
FRC1 Bourgogne 
FRC2 Franche-Comté 
FRD1 Basse-Normandie 
FRD2 Haute-Normandie 
FRE1 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
FRE2 Picardie 
FRF1 Alsace 
FRF2 Champagne-Ardenne 
FRF3 Lorraine 
FRG0 Pays-de-la-Loire 
FRH0 Bretagne 
FRI1 Aquitaine 
FRI2 Limousin 
FRI3 Poitou-Charentes 
FRJ1 Languedoc-Roussillon 
FRJ2 Midi-Pyrénées 
FRK1 Auvergne 
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FRK2 Rhône-Alpes 
FRL0 Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 
FRM0 Corse 
FRY2 Martinique 
FRY3 Guyane 
FRY4 La Réunion 
HU21 Közép-Dunántúl 
HU22 Nyugat-Dunántúl 
HU23 Dél-Dunántúl 
HU31 Észak-Magyarország 
HU32 Észak-Alföld 
HU33 Dél-Alföld 
ITC1 Piemonte 
ITC2 Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste 
ITC3 Liguria 
ITC4 Lombardia 
ITF1 Abruzzo 
ITF2 Molise 
ITF3 Campania 
ITF4 Puglia 
ITF5 Basilicata 
ITF6 Calabria 
ITG1 Sicilia 
ITG2 Sardegna 
ITH1 Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen 
ITH2 Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
ITH3 Veneto 
ITH4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
ITI1 Toscana 
ITI2 Umbria 
ITI4 Lazio 
LU00 Luxembourg 
LV00 Latvija 
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MT00 Malta 
NL11 Groningen 
NL12 Friesland (NL) 
NL13 Drenthe 
NL21 Overijssel 
NL22 Gelderland 
NL23 Flevoland 
NL31 Utrecht 
NL32 Noord-Holland 
NL33 Zuid-Holland 
NL34 Zeeland 
NL41 Noord-Brabant 
NL42 Limburg (NL) 
PL21 Malopolskie 
PL22 Slaskie 
PL41 Wielkopolskie 
PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 
PL43 Lubuskie 
PL51 Dolnoslaskie 
PL52 Opolskie 
PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 
PL62 Warminsko-Mazurskie 
PL63 Pomorskie 
PL71 Lódzkie 
PL72 Swietokrzyskie 
PL81 Lubelskie 
PL82 Podkarpackie 
PL84 Podlaskie 
PT11 Norte 
PT15 Algarve 
PT16 Centro (PT) 
PT17 Área Metropolitana de Lisboa 
PT18 Alentejo 
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PT20 Região Autónoma dos Açores (PT) 
PT30 Região Autónoma da Madeira (PT) 
RO11 Nord-Vest 
RO12 Centru 
RO21 Nord-Est 
RO22 Sud-Est 
RO31 Sud - Muntenia 
RO32 Bucuresti - Ilfov 
RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia 
RO42 Vest 
SE11 Stockholm 
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 
SE21 Småland med öarna 
SE22 Sydsverige 
SE23 Västsverige 
SE31 Norra Mellansverige 
SE32 Mellersta Norrland 
SE33 Övre Norrland 
SK01 Bratislavský kraj 
SK02 Západné Slovensko 
SK03 Stredné Slovensko 
SK04 Východné Slovensko 
UKC1 Tees Valley and Durham 
UKC2 Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 
UKD1 Cumbria 
UKD3 Greater Manchester 
UKD4 Lancashire 
UKE1 East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 
UKE2 North Yorkshire 
UKE3 South Yorkshire 
UKE4 West Yorkshire 
UKF1 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 
UKF2 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 
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UKF3 Lincolnshire 
UKG1 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 
UKG2 Shropshire and Staffordshire 
UKG3 West Midlands 
UKH1 East Anglia 
UKH2 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 
UKH3 Essex 
UKJ1 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 
UKJ2 Surrey, East and West Sussex 
UKJ3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight 
UKJ4 Kent 
UKK1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area 
UKK2 Dorset and Somerset 
UKK3 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 
UKK4 Devon 
UKL1 West Wales and The Valleys 
UKL2 East Wales 
UKM5 North Eastern Scotland 
UKN0 Northern Ireland (UK) 
 
